Author: PRASANNASRI26092001

SUCCESSION OF DIGITAL PROPERTY IN INDIA

AUTHOR – JOPHEL SIMON, SCHOOL OF LAW (CHRIST UNIVERSITY) BANGALORE

BEST CITATION – JOPHEL SIMON, SUCCESSION OF DIGITAL PROPERTY IN INDIA, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 105-120, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT –

The digitisation of modern life has created a new category of wealth—digital property—including cryptocurrencies, cloud-based accounts, social media profiles, and digital intellectual property^[1]. These assets hold both financial and sentimental value, yet India’s succession framework, rooted in the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, remains limited to tangible property^[2]. This legislative silence leaves heirs dependent on the restrictive Terms of Service of technology companies, often resulting in inaccessible assets, prolonged disputes, and irreversible financial loss^[3]. Challenges such as encryption, cross-border jurisdiction, and lack of public awareness further compound the problem, while risks of identity theft and asset dissipation persist.

This study critically examines the inadequacy of Indian succession law in governing digital property, drawing on international models such as the U.S. Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA), Germany’s Facebook inheritance ruling, and the EU’s MiCA framework for crypto-assets^[4]. Using doctrinal and comparative methods, it argues that reform is urgent and feasible. The paper recommends statutory recognition of digital assets, the introduction of digital wills and executors, integration of technological tools like blockchain-based wills and digital vaults, and greater public awareness initiatives. Modernising inheritance law to accommodate digital assets is essential to safeguard economic value, uphold family rights, and ensure dignity and posthumous autonomy in the digital age. Recent developments—including the omission of Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 via the Repealing and Amending Act, 2025 (removing mandatory probate requirements)^[5], the operationalisation of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 through the DPDP Rules, 2025 (introducing the Right to Nominate for posthumous data rights)^[6], and the Madras High Court’s 2025 recognition of cryptocurrency as property^[7] provide partial tools for digital estate management. Yet a unified statutory framework recognising digital assets as inheritable property, overriding restrictive platform Terms of Service, and enabling digital wills and executors remains absent. This paper proposes blockchain-enabled reforms to bridge this gap, ensuring constitutional safeguards under Articles 14, 21, and 300A^[8].

Keywords: Digital inheritance, digital assets, Indian succession law, cryptocurrency, estate planning, comparative law.

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[1] UNIDROIT, Principles on Digital Assets and Private Law pmbl. (2022) (defining digital assets as “qualifying data assets” subject to proprietary rights).

[2] Indian Succession Act, No. 39 of 1925, India Code (Lexis) (last visited Mar. 6, 2026); Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, § 6, India Code (Lexis) (last visited Mar. 6, 2026) (both applying primarily to coparcenary and tangible estates).

[3] Chainalysis, 2021 Crypto Crime Report 45 (2021) (estimating $3.7 billion in global crypto losses from inaccessible private keys).

[4] Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 6 (Unif. L. Comm’n 2015); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], July 12, 2018, III ZR 183/17 (Ger.) (Facebook case); Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA), 2023 O.J. (L 150) 40, art. 3.

[5] The Repealing and Amending Act, No. 37 of 2025, sch. I (omitting Indian Succession Act § 213), India Code (Lexis) (last visited Mar. 6, 2026)

[6] Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 (notified Nov. 14, 2025), Gazette of India, pt. II, § 3(i), r. 13 (Right to Nominate), available at Min. Elecs. & Info. Tech., Gov’t of India (last visited Mar. 6, 2026).

[7] Rhutikumari v. Zanmai Labs Pvt. Ltd., O.A. No. 194 of 2025, at  45 (Madras High Ct. Oct. 2025) (India) (affirming cryptocurrency as “trust property” under art. 300A).

[8] India Const. arts. 14 (equality), 21 (life and personal liberty), 300A (deprivation of property); see also Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1, ¶ 124 (India) (extending art. 21 to privacy).

RECONSIDERING THE TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE IN INDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL INCOMPATIBILITY, CHILD RIGHTS, AND THE CASE FOR GENDER-NEUTRAL SHARED PARENTING

AUTHOR – TK ARATHI TANVI & JOHN CALEB

STUDENTS AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

BEST CITATION – TK ARATHI TANVI & JOHN CALEB, RECONSIDERING THE TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE IN INDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL INCOMPATIBILITY, CHILD RIGHTS, AND THE CASE FOR GENDER-NEUTRAL SHARED PARENTING, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 82-92, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/EMIR4802

Abstract

The child custody regulations of India for children who are under five years of age follow Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, which establishes a legal presumption that mothers will typically receive custody of their children. The paper presents three related arguments. The first argument proves that Section 6(a) grants mothers preferential custody rights, which violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution because it fails to meet the requirements established by Shayara Bano v. Union of India and the constitutional anti-stereotyping principle derived from Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India. The second argument shows that Indian custody decisions disable the constitutional rights of children because judges disregard Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which India has ratified, and treat child welfare as an unimportant matter instead of their main focus. The third argument establishes that existing laws should create a shared parenting framework because current legal gaps force children from separated families to endure unnecessary harm.

The research develops through three components that include Indian constitutional law the Supreme Court of India and two legal codes from the United Kingdom and Australia and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and the research about attachment in developmental psychology. The research presents a complete reform plan which involves three main elements. The first element requires the elimination of gender-based presumption through the repeal of Section 6(a). The second element establishes a welfare assessment system which follows the guidelines of the Children Act 1989. The third element establishes joint parental responsibility as the standard legal requirement. The fourth element requires all disputed custody cases to include systems that allow children to take part.

CEDAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT GAP: WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND INDIA

AUTHOR – KSHEIRAJ H, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY), BENGALURU, INDIA

BEST CITATION – KSHEIRAJ H, CEDAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT GAP: WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND INDIA, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 69-81, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/MYVG9189

Abstract

This paper analyzes the efficacy of international legal frameworks aimed at safeguarding women’s rights, with a specific focus on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW creates a complete set of rules against gender discrimination, but its enforcement still depends on cooperation from states and implementation within those states. This study compares Afghanistan and Iran to show how authoritarian or religiously structured governments use sovereignty, cultural autonomy, and religious legitimacy to make it harder to enforce international women’s rights norms. These cases show that there is still a big gap between what international law says about protecting women’s rights and what protections are actually available to women in their own countries. In contrast, the paper examines India’s constitutional jurisprudence to demonstrate how domestic courts can convert international norms into binding legal standards. The Supreme Court of India has used CEDAW principles in its constitutional interpretation in cases like Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, and Joseph Shine v. Union of India. The paper contends that by juxtaposing these divergent methodologies, international women’s rights law primarily serves as a normative framework, with its efficacy contingent upon the readiness of domestic legal institutions to assimilate and implement gender equality standards.

Keywords:

CEDAW; International Women’s Rights; Gender Equality; Authoritarian Regimes; Treaty Enforcement; Constitutional Interpretation; India.

MITIGATING CLIMATE-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE ASEAN REGION

AUTHOR – ARCHIT MAHAJAN, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

BEST CITATION – ARCHIT MAHAJAN, MITIGATING CLIMATE-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE ASEAN REGION, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 54-68, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

 The ASEAN region is facing a growing problem of people being forced to leave their homes due to climate change. Rising sea levels, natural disasters, and environmental damage are all contributing to this issue. There are already plans in place, such as the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, that help people right after a disaster. However, these plans don’t do enough to protect people who have been displaced in the long run. Also, international laws about refugees don’t cover people who are forced to leave their homes because of climate change, which means these people are not getting the help they need. This is a major problem because it leaves affected communities without clear legal protection. This research examines how India’s Act East Policy can be leveraged to address these gaps by fostering regional cooperation, advancing human security, and promoting climate resilience. Using a qualitative, analytical approach that draws on case studies, policy analysis, and judicial precedents, the study evaluates ASEAN’s limitations and explores India’s potential role in shaping solutions. It proposes actionable measures, including binding agreements, livelihood programs, and capacity-building initiatives, concluding that aligning the Act East Policy with climate justice imperatives can strengthen regional resilience and safeguard human security.

Keywords – Climate-Induced Displacement; ASEAN; Human Security; Regional Resilience; Act East Policy; Climate Justice; International Refugee Law; AADMER; Climate Migrants; India–ASEAN Cooperation.

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN HEINOUS OFFENCES: BALANCING REFORM AND RETRIBUTION

AUTHOR – R ASHITHA ZARAH, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

BEST CITATION – R ASHITHA ZARAH, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN HEINOUS OFFENCES: BALANCING REFORM AND RETRIBUTION, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 47-53, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/WTIP6092

INTRODUCTION

India’s juvenile justice system stands at a critical juncture, grappling with the tension between rehabilitative ideals and demands for retributive justice in cases of heinous offences. Recent high-profile incidents, such as the Narsingi gang-rape in Hyderabad that occurred in February of 2026, where police seek to try juvenile offenders as adults, underscore this dilemma. This paper examines the evolving framework under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 ^[1]as against 2026’s spate of juvenile-involved sexual violence, advocating a nuanced balance.

The core philosophy of juvenile justice in India has historically prioritized reform over punishment, recognizing children’s malleability and societal responsibility in delinquency.^[2] Rooted in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which India ratified in 1992, the system views juveniles as ‘children in conflict with law’ (CCL) rather than criminals, emphasizing rehabilitation through Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs).^[3] However, the 2012 Nirbhaya case, involving a juvenile co-accused, ignited public outrage, leading to the JJ Act, 2015’s provision for trying 16-18-year-olds as adults in heinous offences after JJB assessment.^[4]

Heinous offences, defined under section 2(33) of the JJ Act is acts punishable by seven years or more imprisonment (e.g., rape under POCSO Act, murder) such crimes trigger preliminary inquiries under section 15.^[5] The JJB evaluates the juvenile’s mental/physical capacity to commit the crime, considering age, circumstances, and potential for reform before transfer to a Children’s Court. This shift marked a departure from the absolute protection under the 2000 Act, reflecting retribution’s encroachment amid rising juvenile apprehensions in violent crimes.^[6]

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[1] Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015

[2] United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art 40.

[3] Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015, s 4.

[4] Subramanian Swamy v Raju (2014) 8 SCC 390 .

[5] Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015, s 15.

[6] National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India 2013 (Compendium, Ministry of Home Affairs 2013) ch 10.

RECONSIDERING THE INSANITY DEFENSE: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN LEGAL DOCTRINE AND MODERN PSYCHIATRIC UNDERSTANDING

AUTHOR – PRATHIKSHA NAVEEN, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

BEST CITATION – PRATHIKSHA NAVEEN, RECONSIDERING THE INSANITY DEFENSE: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN LEGAL DOCTRINE AND MODERN PSYCHIATRIC UNDERSTANDING, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 36-46, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/RYBQ5368

Abstract

The intersection of criminal law and mental health has long been a contested domain, where legal principles often struggle to keep pace with medical science^[1]. Among the doctrines at this intersection, the insanity defense occupies a uniquely controversial space. On one hand, it embodies a recognition that punishment presupposes responsibility, and responsibility presupposes the ability to choose between right and wrong^[2]. On the other hand, its doctrinal rigidity and resistance to change reveal a legal system that has not meaningfully integrated the last century of advances in psychiatry and neuroscience.^[3]

The defense, most famously articulated in the M’Naghten Rules of 1843^[4], continues to dominate in many common law jurisdictions, including India under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code (now Section 22 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023)^[5]. These formulations prioritize cognitive capacity, whether the accused knew the nature of the act or that it was wrong over volitional or emotional impairments, which are equally central to psychiatric understandings of mental illness.^[6] The persistence of such narrow tests has given rise to widespread criticism^[7]. Scholars, judges, and psychiatrists alike have argued that the defense excludes many genuinely mentally ill defendants while at the same time being inconsistently applied.^[8]

This paper examines whether the insanity defense, as currently structured in common law systems, adequately reflects the realities of psychiatric knowledge. It explores the defense’s historical evolution, its statutory and judicial interpretations, and the doctrinal inconsistencies that result from its outdated foundations. It also considers comparative perspectives from other jurisdictions and critiques the gap between law and medicine. The central argument advanced here is that the insanity defense, though rooted in humane principles, has become outdated, conceptually flawed, and ethically problematic. Reform is urgently needed to align legal doctrine with scientific knowledge, ensuring both fairness to mentally ill defendants and legitimacy for the criminal justice system.^[9]

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[1] Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 777–78 (1985).

[2] H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 152–53 (2d ed. 2008).

[3] Michael L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense 19–22 (1994).

[4] R v. M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).

[5] Indian Penal Code § 84 (1860); Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 22 (2023).

[6] Alan A. Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 69 A.B.A. J. 134, 135 (1983).

[7] Nigel Walker, Crime and Insanity in England: The Historical Perspective 72–73 (1968); Michael L. Perlin, The Symbolism, Mythology and Reality of the Insanity Defense, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1375 (1997).

[8] Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability and the Death Penalty: The Shame of the States 55–56 (2d ed. 2008) (discussion of inconsistent application).

[9] Andrew Ashworth & Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law 145–46 (8th ed. 2013) (on doctrine and reform).

THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION RTE FRAMEWORK IN INDIA

AUTHOR – YASH MITTAL, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY), BENGALURU, INDIA

BEST CITATION – YASH MITTAL, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION RTE FRAMEWORK IN INDIA, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 23-35, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IDKM9395

Abstract

This analysis examines whether the fundamental right to education in India, as incorporated in Article 21A^[1], and the RTE Act, 2009, include pre-primary or early childhood education, or ages 0 to 6 years. Article 21A, incorporated in the 86th Constitutional Amendment in 2002, specifically includes children aged 6 to 14 years, and the RTE Act, 2009, implements this by specifically stating that “child” includes 6 to 14 years, and that free and compulsory education is to be provided to children in this age range. Pre-primary or early childhood education is not specifically included in Article 21A, but early childhood education is specifically addressed in welfare policies such as ICDS/Anganwadi, in general policies in NEP 2020 to achieve universal ECCE by 2030, and in the RTE Act, 2009, in Sec. 11, which specifically addresses the duty to provide preschool education for children aged 3 to 6 years, along with a proviso stating that 25% quota in schools admitting children in pre-school age may be permitted.

From a legal perspective, the top courts in India have not specifically addressed pre-primary or early childhood education in the context of a fundamental right, thereby limiting the RTE Act, 2009, to children aged 6 to 14 years^[2]. In a few instances, the courts have addressed early childhood education: in Social Jurist v. GNCTD, 2013, the court indicated that the 25% quota in the RTE Act, 2009, could be applicable to children in nursery age, and in 2026, the Rajasthan High Court held that the RTE Act, 2009, provisions are applicable to children aged 3 to 6 in schools that offer pre-primary education, thereby addressing Sec. 11 and the quota proviso in the RTE Act,

In India, the disparity is evident when matched against nations like the UK, where free pre-school education is mandated under the EYFS statutory framework, and formal education is only compulsory from the age of 5. Now, in South Africa, it has been legally mandated for one year of pre-primary education for all children. Worldwide, conventions like the UNCRC and SDG 4.2 advocate for universal ECCE through instruments like UNCRC and SDG 4.2, promoting Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE). Yet, in India, the question of implementation still persists, with only 20% of children in the 3-5-year age bracket attending any form of pre-school education (2017-18 NSO), with the participation of rural, tribal, poor, and disabled children far behind others in the race. Anganwadis and pre-schools are plagued with the problem of infrastructure, funding, and training of teachers.

The paper is structured as follows: (I) Constitutional and legislative framework (Article 21A and the scope of the RTE Act); (II) Statutory and policy provisions for children in the 0-6 years age bracket (ICDS, NEP 2020, etc.); (III) Case law related to pre-primary and the RTE Act; (IV) Comparative law; (V) Implementation challenges; (VI) Access for marginalized groups; (VII) Policy recommendations; (VIII) Methodology and sources; and finally, conclusions and recommendations.

Keywords

Right to Education; Pre-Primary Education; Early Childhood Education; Article 21A; Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009; Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE); Constitutional Law; Educational Rights in India; Child Development Policy; Legal Framework of Education.

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[1] Article 21A – Right to Education

INDIA CONST. art. 21A.

[2] The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, No. 35 of 2009, INDIA CODE (2009).

THE TWO-FINGER TEST AND RAPE KITS IN INDIA: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FORENSIC BEST PRACTICES IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES

AUTHOR – NIDHI MALAYIL, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

BEST CITATION – NIDHI MALAYIL, THE TWO-FINGER TEST AND RAPE KITS IN INDIA: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FORENSIC BEST PRACTICES IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 12-22, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/YASU3819

Abstract

An assault on the human body is regarded as one of the most serious human rights infringements. The mannerisms employed in legal and medical systems in treating survivors have had a great bearing on the course of justice. In India, the two-finger test remained a means of establishing medico-legal evidence until very recently, under the pretext of determining whether a rape survivor was ‘habituated to sexual intercourse.’ Although the courts have repeatedly emphasised its invalidity and inefficiency, it continues to be in use in some quarters, which substantially adds to the trauma already faced by survivors and goes against the principles of equality, privacy, and dignity enshrined in the Constitution. Meanwhile, due to technical impediments such as infrastructural and procedural lapses, scientifically sound and non-invasive forensic kits continue to be deployed sparsely. This research aims to critique the constitutional aspects of these practices, undertake a medico-legal perspective of the test, and juxtapose it against international best practices. Employing doctrinal, analytical, comparative, and descriptive methods, reforms are suggestive of bringing about alignment of Indian forensic practices with universal and constitutional standards, emphasising a survivor-centric approach to such reform.

Keywords

Two-finger test; rape kits; sexual assault; forensic evidence; constitutional law; human rights; India; comparative analysis; dignity; justice

INQUIRY INTO THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE DOCTRINE IN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

AUTHOR – NIRANJEN SUBBU M S, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

BEST CITATION – NIRANJEN SUBBU M S, INQUIRY INTO THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE DOCTRINE IN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 93-104, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

The Essential Religious Practice (ERP) doctrine has emerged as one of the most influential yet contested judicial principles governing religious freedom in Indian constitutional law. Developed by the Supreme Court, the doctrine attempts to distinguish between practices that are “essential” to a religion and those that are merely secular or non-essential, thereby determining the extent of constitutional protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The study critically examines the conceptual inconsistencies and methodological challenges embedded in the doctrine, particularly the role of courts in determining theological essentiality. It argues that the ERP test has gradually shifted from a jurisdictional boundary between religion and secular regulation to an instrument of judicial intervention in matters of faith. The research further identifies issues such as judicial overreach, inconsistency in application, and the “inversion of agency” that compels individuals to frame personal choices as religious obligations. In response to these shortcomings, the paper evaluates alternative approaches, including the anti-exclusion principle and a sincerity-based proportionality framework, advocating for a more rights-oriented method of adjudicating religious freedom claims within India’s constitutional framework.

Keywords: Essential Religious Practice Doctrine; Religious Freedom; Constitutional Morality; Judicial Review; Indian Constitutional Law

SYNTHETIC LAW AND STRICT LIABILITY: RECLASSIFYING AI JUDICIAL HALLUCINATIONS AS PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

AUTHOR – RIMJHIM BIYANI, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

BEST CITATION – RIMJHIM BIYANI, SYNTHETIC LAW AND STRICT LIABILITY: RECLASSIFYING AI JUDICIAL HALLUCINATIONS AS PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 06-11, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

The swift assimilation of Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) into the Indian legal ecosystem has precipitated a fundamental crisis of evidentiary authenticity, significantly altering the epistemological basis of the adversarial system. In recent times, the global judicial system has witnessed a phenomenal increase in the incidence of ghost precedents – fictitious citations of law hallucinated by probabilistic algorithms and presented to courts as established, sovereign law. This research critically evaluates the necessary jurisprudential shift against unverified algorithmic reliance, catalysed by the Delhi High Court’s landmark ruling in Christian Louboutin Sas v. M/s Shoe Boutique^[1]. Operating in tandem with global cautionary tales such as the Mata v. Avianca sanctions in the United States^[2], the Indian judiciary is presently confronted with the urgent need to transition from a permissive, error-tolerance framework to a regime of strict, misconduct-based liability.

Situating this paradigm shift within the contemporary statutory framework of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023^[3], and the ethical mandates of Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961^[4], this paper systematically deconstructs the defense of automatic reliance and technological ignorance. Furthermore, the study examines the constitutional imperatives of algorithmic accountability, arguing that the deployment of unverified digital outputs in adjudicatory processes violates a litigant’s Article 21^[5] right to a reasoned order and fundamentally breaches the principles of natural justice. Ultimately, this paper posits that the formalization of a sui generis Duty of Verification – enforced via mandatory human-in-the-loop audits and binding technological affidavits under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) – is an absolute necessity.^[6] It concludes that the delegation of core legal reasoning to AI without rigorous human oversight constitutes a catastrophic breach of the fiduciary bond between the Bar and the Bench.

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[1] Christian Louboutin Sas v. M/s Shoe Boutique, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1704.

[2] Mata v. Avianca, Inc., No. 22-cv-1461, 2023 WL 4114965 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023).

[3] Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).

[4] Advocates Act, 1961, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1961, § 35 (India).

[5] INDIA CONST. art. 21.

[6] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).