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RECONSIDERING THE INSANITY DEFENSE: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN LEGAL DOCTRINE AND MODERN PSYCHIATRIC UNDERSTANDING

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Abstract

The intersection of criminal law and mental health has long been a contested domain, where legal principles often struggle to keep pace with medical science⁵⁷. Among the doctrines at this intersection, the insanity defense occupies a uniquely controversial space. On one hand, it embodies a recognition that punishment presupposes responsibility, and responsibility presupposes the ability to choose between right and wrong⁵⁸. On the other hand, its doctrinal rigidity and resistance to change reveal a legal system that has not meaningfully integrated the last century of advances in psychiatry and neuroscience.⁵⁹

The defense, most famously articulated in the M’Naghten Rules of 1843⁶⁰, continues to dominate in many common law jurisdictions, including India under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code (now Section 22 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023)⁶¹. These formulations prioritize cognitive capacity, whether the accused knew the nature of the act or that it was wrong over volitional or emotional impairments, which are equally central to psychiatric understandings of mental illness.⁶² The persistence of such narrow tests has given rise to widespread criticism⁶³. Scholars, judges, and psychiatrists alike have argued that the defense excludes many genuinely mentally ill defendants while at the same time being inconsistently applied.⁶⁴

This paper examines whether the insanity defense, as currently structured in common law systems, adequately reflects the realities of psychiatric knowledge. It explores the defense’s historical evolution, its statutory and judicial interpretations, and the doctrinal inconsistencies that result from its outdated foundations. It also considers comparative perspectives from other jurisdictions and critiques the gap between law and medicine. The central argument advanced here is that the insanity defense, though rooted in humane principles, has become outdated, conceptually flawed, and ethically problematic. Reform is urgently needed to align legal doctrine with scientific knowledge, ensuring both fairness to mentally ill defendants and legitimacy for the criminal justice system.⁶⁵

⁵⁷ Stephen J. Morse, *Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered*, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 777–78 (1985).

⁵⁸ H.L.A. Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law* 152–53 (2d ed. 2008).

⁵⁹ Michael L. Perlin, *The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense* 19–22 (1994).

⁶⁰ *R v. M’Naghten* (1843) 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).

⁶¹ Indian Penal Code § 84 (1860); Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 22 (2023).

⁶² Alan A. Stone, *The Insanity Defense on Trial*, 69 A.B.A. J. 134, 135 (1983).

⁶³ Nigel Walker, *Crime and Insanity in England: The Historical Perspective* 72–73 (1968); Michael L. Perlin, *The Symbolism, Mythology and Reality of the Insanity Defense*, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1375 (1997).

⁶⁴ Michael L. Perlin, *Mental Disability and the Death Penalty: The Shame of the States* 55–56 (2d ed. 2008) (discussion of inconsistent application).

⁶⁵ Andrew Ashworth & Jeremy Horder, *Principles of Criminal Law* 145–46 (8th ed. 2013) (on doctrine and reform).

Chapter 1: Conceptual and Historical Background

1.1 Origins of the Insanity Defense

The idea that mental illness may excuse criminal responsibility is not a modern innovation. In early English common law, courts occasionally recognized that “madness” could absolve a person of liability, though the boundaries of the defense were uncertain. By the 18th century, the “wild beast test” emerged, which excused only those who had no more understanding than “a wild beast or infant.”⁶⁶ This crude formulation emphasized total cognitive incapacity and excluded partial impairments, reflecting the limited psychiatric knowledge of the time.⁶⁷

The turning point came in 1843 with *McNaughten’s Case*. Daniel M’Naghten, suffering from delusions, shot and killed Edward Drummond, mistaking him for the British Prime Minister. His acquittal on grounds of insanity sparked public outrage, prompting the House of Lords to formulate what became known as the M’Naghten Rules. These rules held that a defendant is excused if, “at the time of the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act, or if he did know it, that he did not know it was wrong.”

1.2 Philosophical Underpinnings

The M’Naghten Rules reflected a philosophical commitment to rationality as the foundation of responsibility. Criminal law is built on the assumption of free will the ability to distinguish right from wrong and to act accordingly. If a person lacks this ability, the rationale for punishment collapses. However, the rules also reveal a narrow understanding of mental illness, reducing it to cognitive incapacity while ignoring volitional and emotional dysfunctions.

This cognitive emphasis was not accidental. The Victorian era feared that a broad insanity defense would undermine moral responsibility and public safety. The law therefore struck a conservative balance: it acknowledged insanity but tightly restricted its scope. This restrictive approach has endured, with many jurisdictions still applying tests derived directly or indirectly from M’Naghten.

1.3 The M’Naghten Rules

The watershed moment in insanity jurisprudence came with **R v. M’Naghten (1843)**, when the House of Lords laid down what became the foundation of modern insanity law. The M’Naghten Rules declared that a person could be excused from criminal responsibility only if, at the time of the act, they were suffering from a “defect of reason” caused by a “disease of the mind,” and as a result, either did not know what they were doing, or did not know that what they were doing was wrong.⁶⁸

At the time, this was a bold step forward. It offered courts a way to recognize that some individuals, because of mental illness, could not truly be held accountable in the same way as ordinary offenders. But the test was also a product of its century. It imagined mental illness mainly as a problem of thinking – whether a person could intellectually grasp reality and distinguish right from wrong.

This narrow, cognitive focus meant that the M’Naghten Rules left out many other dimensions of mental disorder that psychiatry today considers central. Modern science tells us that mental illness is not only about distorted beliefs or lack of knowledge. It can also involve overwhelming impulses, inability to control one’s actions, or emotional disturbances so severe that rational decision-making breaks down. For example, a person with schizophrenia may understand that killing is legally wrong, yet still act under the irresistible command of a hallucination. A person with severe bipolar disorder may know the “nature” of their act, but

⁶⁶ R v. *Arnold* (1724) 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (Old Bailey); Nigel Walker, *supra* note 7, at 45–48.

⁶⁷ R.D. Smith, *Trial by Madness: A History of the Insanity Defense* 41–42 (1981).

⁶⁸ *M’Naghten*, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 200; 8 Eng. Rep. at 718.

in a manic episode be completely unable to regulate their behavior.

The M’Naghten test does not capture these realities. By reducing insanity to a matter of intellectual awareness, it treats mental illness as though it exists in a vacuum of logic, ignoring the messy and complex ways it affects human behavior. The result is a rule that, while once groundbreaking, now feels outdated and ill-suited to the nuanced understanding of mental health we have today.⁶⁹

1.4 Early Criticisms

Even in the 19th century, psychiatrists criticized the rules as medically inaccurate. Mental illness often impairs not only knowledge but also control the ability to conform one’s conduct to the requirements of law. For example, an individual with severe schizophrenia may understand that stabbing someone is legally wrong yet feel compelled to act under the command of hallucinations. Under M’Naghten, such individuals are excluded, despite their diminished responsibility.

The law’s suspicion of psychiatry also shaped this narrowness. Courts feared that expanding the defense would open the floodgates to fabricated claims and erode deterrence. The result was a compromise: the insanity defense became legally manageable but scientifically outdated.

Chapter 2: Statutory Framework

2.1 Indian Law: Section 84 IPC and Section 22 BNS

In India, the insanity defense is codified in Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, now carried forward into Section 22 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The provision states:

“Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing

the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.”⁷⁰

This formulation is almost a verbatim reproduction of M’Naghten. It requires proof of “unsoundness of mind” that renders the accused incapable of knowing the nature of the act or its wrongfulness.

Notably, the statute adopts a cognitive test, excluding cases where a person retains knowledge but lacks self-control. Courts in India have repeatedly affirmed this narrow scope, insisting that the defense applies only where the cognitive faculty is destroyed.

2.2 Other Common Law Jurisdictions

- **United Kingdom:** The M’Naghten Rules still form the backbone of the insanity defense. Although modern statutes such as the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 address procedural aspects, the substantive test remains unchanged.
- **United States:** The picture is more fragmented. While many states initially followed M’Naghten, others experimented with broader tests, such as the “irresistible impulse” test (addressing control) or the Model Penal Code test (focusing on substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct)⁷¹. However, following public backlash in cases like *Hinckley v. United States* (1982), several states restricted or even abolished the defense (e.g., Kansas, Utah, Idaho, Montana).
- **Singapore and Malaysia:** Both countries retain formulations based on M’Naghten in their penal codes, again emphasizing cognitive incapacity.⁷²

2.3 Critique of Statutory Formulations

The persistence of M’Naghten-inspired statutes is not accidental; it reflects a deep

⁶⁹ Stephen J. Morse, *Culpability and Control*, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 1, 12–15 (2003).

⁷⁰ H.L.A. Hart, *supra* note 2, at 151–54.

⁷¹ Stone, *supra* note 6, at 138–40.

⁷² See Nigel Walker, *supra* note 7, at 60–64 (19th-century critiques); see also N. Walker, *Crime and Insanity in England* (1968).

conservatism in criminal law. Legislatures are often wary of expanding the insanity defense, fearing that it could be misused by defendants to escape punishment or that the public might lose faith in the justice system if too many people are seen as “getting off on a technicality.”⁷³ These anxieties make lawmakers hesitant to revisit rules that, at least on the surface, appear to provide clarity and restraint.

But this conservatism comes at a real human cost. By clinging to standards drafted in the 19th century, statutes continue to enshrine a view of mental illness that is outdated and incomplete. The M’Naghten model imagines insanity as a simple question: could the person tell right from wrong? That may have seemed adequate in the 1840s, but psychiatry has since revealed that mental illness is far more complex. Conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, severe depression, or PTSD cannot always be reduced to a lack of intellectual awareness. They often involve distorted perceptions, uncontrollable impulses, and emotional dysregulation factors that directly affect a person’s ability to act responsibly even if they technically “know” what the law forbids.

The consequence is that people with genuine, medically recognized disorders may be punished as though they were fully rational, simply because their illnesses do not fit neatly into the cognitive-only framework of these statutes. The law, in effect, chooses neatness and tradition over accuracy and compassion. This dissonance risks not only injustice for defendants but also undermines public confidence in the legal system itself. After all, when the law’s categories fail to match the realities of human behavior, its claim to fairness begins to ring hollow.

Chapter 3: Judicial Approach and Case Law

3.1 India

Indian courts have consistently taken a restrictive view of Section 84 IPC (now Section 22 BNS), emphasizing that only *legal insanity*,

not *medical insanity* is recognized as a defense. This distinction has been reaffirmed across decades of jurisprudence.

In *Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat* (1964), the Supreme Court drew a critical line between psychiatric diagnoses and the legal threshold for insanity. The Court clarified that “unsoundness of mind” under Section 84 does not mean any mental disorder *per se*, but only such unsoundness that destroys the cognitive capacity to understand the nature of the act or its wrongfulness. The Court further held that while the burden of proof rests on the accused under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, this burden is not as heavy as that on the prosecution, it is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court. Nonetheless, the judgment entrenched the doctrine that medical evidence alone is insufficient unless it shows incapacity *at the time of the act*.

This principle was echoed in *Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand* (2011), where the Supreme Court reiterated that a history of mental illness or even ongoing psychiatric treatment does not automatically establish insanity under law. The accused must demonstrate that at the *exact moment* of committing the offence, he was incapable of understanding the act’s nature or wrongfulness. The Court emphasized circumstantial factors such as the accused’s conduct before and after the incident as vital as the indicators. For instance, acts of concealment, flight, or coherent explanation often weigh against a plea of insanity.

Other important rulings include *Bapu v. State of Rajasthan* (2007), where the Court insisted that the defense must show total cognitive incapacity rather than partial impairment, and *Shirley v. State of Madhya Pradesh* (1999), where inconsistent behavior by the accused undermined the insanity plea. Collectively, these cases reveal the judiciary’s insistence on *strict proof* and reluctance to extend the benefit of the defense without overwhelming evidence.

⁷³ Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 22 (2023).

This approach has often been criticized as excessively formalistic. By drawing a rigid boundary between “medical” and “legal” insanity, Indian courts tend to disregard psychiatric complexity. For example, schizophrenia, which can fluctuate in severity, may not manifest as total incapacity at every moment, yet still drastically reduces responsibility. The courts’ insistence on pinpointing incapacity at the exact moment of crime makes it nearly impossible for many genuinely ill defendants to succeed.

3.2 United States

In the U.S., the insanity defense has been shaped by a series of Supreme Court rulings that reflect federal deference to state discretion.

In *Clark v. Arizona* (2006), the Court upheld Arizona’s narrow insanity test, which only considered cognitive incapacity. The defense argued that excluding psychiatric evidence about mental illness from the trial violated due process. However, the Court disagreed, holding that states have broad leeway in defining insanity and in regulating the admissibility of psychiatric testimony. This case reinforced the principle that the Constitution does not mandate any particular insanity standard⁷⁴, leaving each state free to design its own approach.

Similarly, in *Kahler v. Kansas* (2020), the Court upheld Kansas’s abolition of the traditional insanity defense. Instead of allowing a separate insanity plea, Kansas permits defendants to present mental illness evidence only to show lack of mens rea. The majority held that the Due Process Clause does not compel states to adopt any specific insanity rule, whether M’Naghten, MPC, or otherwise. The dissent, however, warned that such abolition undermines centuries of moral and legal principle: punishing that incapable of moral blameworthiness contradicts the very basis of criminal law.

These rulings highlight two features of the American approach: fragmentation and politicization. While some states adhere to M’Naghten, others follow the MPC’s broader test, and a handful (Kansas, Utah, Idaho, Montana) have eliminated insanity as a substantive defense altogether. This patchwork system results in uneven protections for mentally ill defendants depending on geography, raising questions of fairness and consistency.

3.3 United Kingdom

The UK continues to adhere to the M’Naghten Rules, with little substantive reform. In *R v. Sullivan* (1984), the House of Lords held that epilepsy constituted a “disease of the mind” within M’Naghten, even though it was a neurological condition rather than a psychiatric disorder. The judgment illustrated how courts have expanded the category of “disease of the mind” but remained faithful to the cognitive incapacity test⁷⁵. The ruling has been criticized for its circularity: by stretching “disease of the mind” to cover any condition affecting cognitive functioning, the law collapses medical distinctions into legal formalism.

Another case, *R v. Windle* (1952), exemplifies the rigidity of the test. The accused, suffering from mental illness, killed his wife but remarked, “I suppose they will hang me for this.” The court held that this statement proved he knew the act was wrong, thus disqualifying him from the defense, despite psychiatric evidence of his illness. The case is emblematic of how the emphasis on knowledge of wrongfulness excludes defendants whose illness impaired volition rather than cognition.

Despite periodic Law Commission reports recommending reform (e.g., the 2013 report proposing a new defense of “not criminally responsible by reason of recognized medical condition”), the UK has not overhauled the M’Naghten framework. The inertia reflects a cautious judicial and legislative attitude,

⁷⁴ See generally Edwin W. Patterson, *The Insanity Defense: A Study in Legal Inconsistency*, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 123 (1944) (historical fragmentation).

⁷⁵ *R v. Sullivan* [1984] A.C. 156 (H.L.).

prioritizing certainty and public confidence over medical accuracy.

3.4 Critique of Judicial Trends

Judicial interpretations across jurisdictions reveal recurring problems:

1. **The Legal–Medical Divide:** Courts routinely insist that *legal insanity* is distinct from *medical insanity*. While legally tidy, this approach undermines the credibility of the defense by dismissing psychiatric realities. It also leaves experts frustrated, as their nuanced diagnoses are reduced to blunt legal categories.
2. **Overemphasis on Cognition:** By focusing almost exclusively on knowledge of wrongfulness, courts exclude volitional impairments. Defendants who act under irresistible impulses, hallucinations, or compulsions though severely ill, are deemed legally sane if they “knew” the act was wrong. This ignores decades of psychiatric evidence showing that control and judgment are as central to responsibility as cognition.
3. **Reliance on Conduct–Based Inferences:** Especially in India, courts look to behavior before and after the crime to judge capacity. While pragmatically useful, this can be misleading. Mentally ill defendants may conceal their acts or flee out of fear, not rational calculation. Such inferences often override medical testimony, producing unjust outcomes.
4. **Inconsistency and Arbitrariness:** Because legal standards are rigid while mental illness is fluid, outcomes vary widely. Two defendants with similar conditions may face different results depending on how courts interpret their conduct or weigh expert testimony. This inconsistency undermines both fairness and predictability.

5. **Erosion of Justice and Public Trust:** By convicting individuals who are genuinely incapable of moral responsibility, courts risk miscarriages of justice. At the same time, by clinging to outdated standards, they fuel public skepticism that the insanity defense is either too lenient or too rigid.

Overall, judicial approaches reveal a profound mismatch between doctrine and science. While courts aim to preserve clarity and prevent abuse, their narrow interpretations often sacrifice justice for administrability. The consequence is a defense that appears more symbolic than substantive, offering protection in theory but rarely in practice.

Chapter 4: Comparative Perspective and Critical Analysis

4.1 Comparative Perspectives

The struggle to reconcile law with psychiatry is not unique to India or the United Kingdom. Different jurisdictions have experimented with reforms, each reflecting varying degrees of openness to scientific insights. Examining these approaches offers useful lessons.

4.2 The Model Penal Code (MPC) – United States

One of the most significant reform efforts came through the American Law Institute’s **Model Penal Code (MPC)** in the mid-20th century. The MPC sought to move beyond the rigid cognitive framework of M’Naghten by introducing a more nuanced standard. According to the MPC, a defendant is not criminally responsible if, at the time of the conduct, “as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”

This formulation represents a major shift in three ways:

1. **Substantial, not total incapacity:** Unlike M’Naghten, which demands a near-complete destruction of cognitive

capacity, the MPC acknowledges that responsibility may be impaired without being obliterated. This reflects psychiatric reality, where illnesses often operate on a spectrum rather than an all-or-nothing basis.

2. **Appreciation, not mere knowledge:** The word “appreciate” broadens the scope from a purely intellectual awareness to a deeper, emotional and moral understanding. A person may “know” something is illegal but may not fully appreciate its significance due to mental illness.
3. **Inclusion of volitional impairments:** Crucially, the MPC recognizes that mental disorders may affect not just cognition but also volition—the ability to control one’s actions. A defendant experiencing irresistible impulses or command hallucinations is thus eligible for the defense, even if they knew their act was wrong.

For example, under the MPC, a person with schizophrenia who hears voices instructing them to commit a violent act could be excused if they lacked the capacity to resist those hallucinations, even though they might have technically known the act was “wrong.” This makes the test both more humane and more consistent with psychiatric evidence.

That said, political backlash following high-profile cases (notably John Hinckley Jr.’s acquittal after the attempted assassination of U.S. President Ronald Reagan) led many states to abandon the MPC test or adopt stricter standards. Still, the MPC remains a model of how law and psychiatry can coexist without reducing responsibility to a narrow cognitive formula.

4.3 Germany

Germany’s approach illustrates a different balance. The German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) recognizes both **complete lack of responsibility (Schuldunfähigkeit)** and

diminished responsibility (verminderte Schuldfähigkeit) due to mental disorder.

A defendant is considered not responsible if, due to a mental disorder, they lack the capacity either to understand the wrongfulness of the act or to act in accordance with that understanding. But even where total incapacity is not proven, German law allows for *diminished responsibility*. This doctrine enables courts to recognize partial impairment by reducing the severity of punishment rather than acquitting outright.

This middle-ground solution is significant because it reflects the graded nature of mental illness. Instead of forcing courts into an “all-or-nothing” decision—sane or insane—Germany’s framework permits nuanced judgments. It also alleviates public fears that defendants “escape justice” entirely, since diminished responsibility often results in reduced sentencing or mandatory psychiatric treatment rather than outright acquittal.

4.4 Canada

Canada’s reform also deserves attention for its clarity and flexibility. Under **Section 16 of the Canadian Criminal Code**, a person is not criminally responsible if, at the time of the act, they were suffering from a mental disorder that rendered them “incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act” or “of knowing that it was wrong.”

On its face, this looks similar to M’Naghten, but Canadian courts have interpreted it more generously. The key lies in the concept of “appreciation.” Canadian jurisprudence recognizes that appreciation goes beyond mechanical knowledge, it encompasses an ability to assess the broader consequences and moral significance of one’s actions.

For instance, in *R v. Chaulk* (1990), the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that “knowing something is legally wrong” is not sufficient if the mental disorder prevents the person from truly understanding its moral or social wrongness. This flexibility has allowed Canadian

courts to accommodate modern psychiatric insights while still maintaining a doctrinal test.

Canada also developed robust procedural safeguards. Those found “not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder” (NCRMD) are placed under the authority of review boards, which assess their treatment and risk to the public. This system balances compassion for the accused with public safety.

4.5 Critical Analysis

Despite these reform efforts, many jurisdictions continue to cling to outdated standards rooted in M’Naghten. This persistence highlights a deep structural tension between law and psychiatry.

1. Exclusion of Genuine Cases

The rigid focus on cognition means that defendants with profound mental disorders such as schizophrenia or severe bipolar disorder may still be held criminally responsible if they had a superficial awareness that their act was “wrong.” For example, a paranoid schizophrenic who kills under a delusion of self-defense may technically “know” the act is illegal but lack the capacity to truly control or evaluate it. These individuals, though medically impaired, fall outside the legal defense.

2. Stigma and Symbolism

As Michael Perlin famously argues, the insanity defense functions more as a *symbol* than as a substantive protection. Courts and legislatures maintain the defense to signal that the law is humane, yet in practice it is rarely successful and is often tainted by public suspicion. The fear that “criminals will fake insanity” continues to shape judicial caution, even though empirical studies show insanity pleas are rare and successful in only about 1% of cases.

3. Inconsistent Outcomes

Because psychiatric testimony must be forced into rigid legal categories, different courts often reach divergent

conclusions in similar cases. In India, for instance, one schizophrenic defendant might succeed if their post-offense conduct appears erratic, while another might fail if they fled the scene, an act interpreted as evidence of awareness. Such arbitrariness erodes the predictability and fairness of the criminal justice system.

4. Erosion of Justice

Ultimately, the law’s refusal to adapt to modern psychiatry risks punishing individuals who lack true criminal responsibility. This undermines the very moral foundation of punishment, which rests on the principle that only those who freely choose to do wrong deserve blame. By ignoring volitional and emotional impairments, the defense ceases to protect those most in need of it, reducing its role to a hollow procedural relic rather than a meaningful safeguard.

Chapter 5: Discussion and Synthesis

5.1 Law’s Reluctance to Change

The law’s unwillingness to modernize the insanity defense is not simply a matter of doctrinal inertia. It reflects deeper social anxieties. Whenever a high-profile case results in an acquittal on grounds of insanity, public outrage tends to follow. To ordinary citizens, the idea that someone who has committed a violent crime could “walk free” because of a mental disorder appears deeply unsettling. Legislators, sensitive to this outrage, often react by narrowing the defense rather than expanding it.

Yet this reaction is largely based on myth rather than reality. Empirical research from the United States, Canada, and other jurisdictions consistently shows that insanity pleas are **rare** (typically raised in less than 1% of criminal cases) and even more rarely successful. Most defendants who raise the plea are not cunning manipulators but individuals with long,

documented histories of mental illness, often hospitalized before their offense. The so-called “floodgates” argument—that opening the defense will overwhelm the justice system and has no basis in fact.

The persistence of these fears reveals a paradox: the legal system resists reform not because reform is impractical, but because the defense is politically unpopular. Courts and lawmakers find it easier to maintain rigid standards than to risk public criticism, even if the result is injustice in individual cases.

5.2 Bridging the Gap with Psychiatry

Modern psychiatry paints a much more complex picture of human behavior than the law’s binary categories of “sane” and “insane” suggest. Disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder can distort not only what a person knows but also what they can control and how they evaluate their actions emotionally.

- A person with schizophrenia may intellectually know that killing is wrong, but under the influence of command hallucinations (“a voice told me to do it”), their ability to resist may be gravely compromised.
- Someone with bipolar disorder in a manic state may understand the law but act with such impaired judgment and impulse control that their choices are radically unlike those of a healthy person.
- Severe depression can so profoundly cloud cognition and volition that the individual may commit acts of harm under a distorted perception of reality.

Neuroscience reinforces these insights. Brain imaging studies reveal that abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex and amygdala areas involved in decision-making, impulse control, and emotional regulation can predispose individuals to behavior that departs significantly from rational choice. To ignore these dimensions and reduce responsibility solely to

whether someone “knew” an act was wrong is to deny what science now makes undeniable: mental illness affects human action in multiple, overlapping ways.

The current legal framework treats psychiatric expertise with caution, sometimes bordering on hostility. Judges are wary of letting doctors “take over” legal questions, but this wariness has the side effect of sidelining the very evidence most relevant to understanding a defendant’s state of mind. Bridging the gap requires courts to develop more trust in psychiatric testimony and not blind acceptance, but a willingness to let science inform doctrine.

5.3 Towards a Reformed Defense

Reform need not mean abandoning safeguards. The concern that opportunistic defendants may “fake” insanity is legitimate, but it can be addressed without sacrificing fairness to those who are genuinely ill. A modernized insanity defense could rest on four pillars:

1. Expanding the Test to Include Volitional Incapacity

The Model Penal Code provides a valuable blueprint. A just legal system must acknowledge that responsibility is not only about knowledge but also about control. Someone who lacks the capacity to conform their behavior to the law should not be judged by the same standard as someone who freely chose to offend.

2. Clarifying the Role of Psychiatric Evidence

Courts often treat expert testimony as advisory at best and dismissive at worst. A reformed system should explicitly recognize the evidentiary value of psychiatric findings, subject to cross-examination and judicial scrutiny, but not forced into artificially narrow categories. The law should give psychiatrists space to explain cognitive,

emotional, and volitional impairments in their full complexity.

3. Introducing Diminished Responsibility Provisions

Following the German model, a middle ground between full liability and full acquittal can balance compassion with accountability. A defendant whose illness impairs, but does not fully negate, responsibility could face reduced sentencing, coupled with mandatory psychiatric treatment. This approach reassures the public that offenders are not simply “let off,” while also respecting the principle that punishment must be proportionate to culpability.

4. Ensuring Procedural Safeguards

To prevent abuse, every insanity plea should involve:

- **Mandatory psychiatric evaluation** by neutral experts;
- **Transparent review boards** (as in Canada) to monitor treatment and public safety;
- **Periodic reassessment**, ensuring that release decisions are evidence-based, not politically motivated.

Such safeguards strike a balance: they protect society from dangerous individuals, but they also protect mentally ill defendants from being unjustly condemned.

5.4 Synthesis

The heart of the issue is this: punishment in criminal law is justified only when the defendant has chosen to do wrong. If illness removes or radically impairs that choice, then punishment loses its moral foundation. By clinging to outdated standards, the law prioritizes certainty and public image over accuracy and justice.

A reformed insanity defense does not have to be a loophole for opportunists. With carefully designed safeguards, it can reflect both compassion and responsibility. The challenge is

whether lawmakers and judges are willing to move past fear-driven narratives and embrace a system that is scientifically informed, morally coherent, and truly just.

Conclusion

The insanity defense has always been about fairness, about recognizing that we cannot punish people in the same way if their minds were so disordered that they could not truly choose their actions. When the M’Naghten Rules were created in 1843, they gave courts a clear rule to follow, but they also froze the law in a time when mental illness was barely understood. Nearly two centuries later, we know so much more about how the mind works, yet the law still clings to those narrow, outdated ideas.

This gap between law and psychiatry has very real consequences. People living with severe conditions like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or PTSD may understand, in the abstract, that an act is wrong, but their illness may leave them powerless to resist voices, impulses, or emotions beyond their control. The law, however, often refuses to see this, and in doing so, punishes people who are not truly blameworthy. At the same time, the rigidity of the rules feeds public mistrust, reinforcing the idea that the insanity defense is a loophole rather than a safeguard of justice.

Reconsidering the insanity defense is not about being “soft” on crime. It is about being honest about human reality. Justice cannot be served by ignoring modern science or by pretending that the mind is as simple as the law once imagined it to be. Reform must bring law and psychiatry into dialogue: recognizing both knowledge of right and wrong *and* the ability to control one’s actions, creating space for expert input, and treating mental illness as the complex human condition it is.

If the law continues to rely on outdated categories, it risks not only unfair outcomes for defendants but also the moral authority of the justice system itself. Aligning the insanity



defense with today's psychiatric understanding is therefore not just legal housekeeping but it is a matter of humanity. A justice system worthy of its name must recognize that where responsibility is absent, punishment is not justice but cruelty.

