Author: PRASANNASRI26092001

SHOULD THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 21 BE EXTENDED TO ANIMALS: AN ANALYSIS

AUTHOR – R SUSHMITHAA ROSHINI* & NISHANT AGGARWAL**

* ADVOCATE FROM HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

** STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST UNIVERSITY, BANGALORE

BEST CITATION – R SUSHMITHAA ROSHINI & NISHANT AGGARWAL, SHOULD THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 21 BE EXTENDED TO ANIMALS: AN ANALYSIS INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 242-248, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

The harmonious co-existence of human beings and non-human animals is crucial for maintaining the balance in the ecosystem. However, humans have formed a society and have placed themselves in a central and superior position. This has led to acts of cruelty against animals. At present the need of the hour requires a pragmatic approach towards the welfare of the animals. In India, there has always been a welfare-based approach that is driven and focussed towards the protection of animals, however in the recent times the judiciary has begun inclining towards an approach that is based on rights. This approach lacks enough support from the jurisprudential perspective. This paper explores the consequences of adopting a perspective based on rights and aims to explain how the notion of absolute duty is better in promoting animal welfare rather than bestowing them with fundamental right to life, as it has its own religious, socio- legal repercussions. There are numerous other ways to guard animals, uphold their dignity and discourage cruelty and one of the means is to strengthen the existing legislative framework and impose stringent penalties.

DIGITAL RESURRECTION WITHOUT RIGHTS: THE ABSENCE OF POSTHUMOUS PERSONALITY AND VOICE RIGHTS FOR DECEASED ARTISTS IN INDIA’S AI ERA

AUTHOR – SAMRIDHI MISHRA, STUDENT AT NARSEE MONJI INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY), NAVI MUMBAI.

BEST CITATION – SAMRIDHI MISHRA, DIGITAL RESURRECTION WITHOUT RIGHTS: THE ABSENCE OF POSTHUMOUS PERSONALITY AND VOICE RIGHTS FOR DECEASED ARTISTS IN INDIA’S AI ERA, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 233-241, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

Indian courts have, in a short but consistent line of cases, granted living celebrities injunctive relief against unauthorized AI voice-cloning by reading together the right to privacy under Article 21 and common-law passing-off principles. This jurisprudence rests on doctrinal foundations dignity, autonomy, ongoing commercial control that are inherently tied to a living plaintiff and do not obviously survive death. This paper asks a single, narrow question: when an AI platform clones a deceased Indian artist’s voice for commercial gain, without consent from the artist’s estate, does Indian law give that estate any cause of action at all? Using the viral AI-generated “Kishore Kumar” recordings of early 2026 as a live fact pattern, the paper maps six candidate doctrines constitutional privacy, authorial moral rights, performers’ moral rights, performers’ economic rights, trademark protection for the deceased, and passing-off against the specific harm of synthetic voice recreation. It finds that India’s personality-rights framework, built entirely around living-plaintiff reasoning, offers no doctrine squarely fitted to this harm: the rights that do survive death (authorial moral rights, performers’ economic rights, trademark) were drafted for different harms (distortion of an existing work, reproduction of a fixed performance, source confusion), while the doctrine most directly on point performers’ moral rights under Section 38B of the Copyright Act, 1957 contains no express survival mechanism at all, unlike its authorial counterpart. Drawing on comparative material from California’s amended postmortem right of publicity and Tennessee’s ELVIS Act, the paper proposes a narrow, term-limited statutory right for India, distinct from and independent of its living-persons framework, calibrated to close the specific gap this fact pattern has exposed.

Keywords: posthumous personality rights, voice cloning, performers’ rights, Copyright Act 1957, artificial intelligence, right of publicity

THE DUAL TRAUMA OF COERCION: EXAMINING FAMILIAL PRESSURE ON MINOR VICTIMS TO INITIATE POCSO PROCEEDINGS

AUTHOR – MR. WAMAN T. KOLI, RESEARCH SCHOLAR AT M.C.E.SOCIETY’S A.K.K. NEW LAW ACADEMY, PUNE

BEST CITATION – MR. WAMAN T. KOLI, THE DUAL TRAUMA OF COERCION: EXAMINING FAMILIAL PRESSURE ON MINOR VICTIMS TO INITIATE POCSO PROCEEDINGS, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 229-232, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, was enacted as a robust socio-legal instrument to shield minors from sexual exploitation and ensure a child-friendly trial environment. However, a significant systemic distortion has emerged in recent years: the weaponization of the Act by guardians and family members who coerce minor victims into filing false or highly exaggerated criminal complaints. This phenomenon primarily manifests in two contexts—the criminalization of consensual adolescent relationships under the guise of ‘family honor’ and the manipulation of children as tactical leverage in bitter matrimonial, property, or civil disputes. This article explores the multi-faceted dimension of this problem, delineates the psychological and secondary victimization of the minor, analyzes cutting-edge Supreme Court jurisprudence up to 2026, and proposes urgent institutional safeguards to protect the true autonomy and voice of the child.

SEBI’S JUNE 2026 BOARD DECISION ON THE OPEN-MARKET BUY-BACK ROUTE

AUTHOR – TAURAI SAHA, STUDENT AT NALSAR UNIVERSITY OF LAW, HYDERABAD

BEST CITATION – TAURAI SAHA, SEBI’S JUNE 2026 BOARD DECISION ON THE OPEN-MARKET BUY-BACK ROUTE, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 224-228, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I1030

ABSTRACT

On 19 June 2026, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) approved a package of reforms that reinstates the open-market buy-back route through stock exchanges and finalises a registration framework for index providers.^[1] The same Board meeting also cleared a faster launch mechanism for alternative investment funds, an intraday borrowing facility for mutual funds, and a simplified transmission process for legal heirs of deceased investors.^[2] For law firms advising private equity (“PE”) sponsors on listed portfolio companies and index-linked strategies, these are not administrative footnotes to the regulatory calendar; they alter the exit toolkit, compress execution timelines, and introduce new insider-trading and diligence risk. This write-up examines five areas where the decision changes advisory practice: the revived tax efficiency of the open-market route, the diligence burden shifting onto portfolio companies once merchant bankers become optional, the constraints on promoters and PE nominee directors, the new registration perimeter for index providers, and ancillary reforms bearing on fund structuring and investor servicing.

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[1]Securities and Exchange Board of India, Press Release No. 33/2026 (June 19, 2026).

[2]Securities and Exchange Board of India, Press Release No. 33/2026 (June 19, 2026).

SECTION 62 OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CODE, 2020 AND THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AUTHOR – TAURAI SAHA, STUDENT AT NALSAR UNIVERSITY OF LAW, HYDERABAD

BEST CITATION – TAURAI SAHA, SECTION 62 OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CODE, 2020 AND THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 217-223, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I1029

Abstract

The right to strike currently holds an unstable position in Indian labour law. Courts have declined to recognise it as a fundamental right, yet successive legislative frameworks have preserved it as a statutory entitlement, subject to procedural conditions.^[1] The consolidation of twenty-nine central labour statutes into four Labour Codes between 2019 and 2020 presented Parliament with an opportunity to rationalise this framework. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (hereinafter “the Code” or “IRC”), however, has moved in the opposite direction in one critical respect. Section 62 universalises the pre-strike notice requirement that was previously confined to Public Utility Services under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter “IDA”). When read alongside the automatic initiation of conciliation proceedings triggered by that notice, and the prohibition on striking during those proceedings, Section 62 creates what this paper terms a “Notice-Conciliation Trap.” This trap renders the right to strike procedurally illusory for workers in all industrial establishments.

This paper pursues three related objectives. First, it situates Section 62 within the historical development of Indian strike law by comparing it against the IDA’s regime. Second, it measures Section 62 against the normative principle of collective bargaining; that workers must possess credible coercive capacity to negotiate on equal terms with employers. Third, it draws a comparative analysis with South Africa’s Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter “LRA”), which similarly regulates strikes through notice and conciliation but does so in a manner that preserves rather than extinguishes the right. The paper also addresses the controversy surrounding the expanded definition of “strike” under Section 2(zk) of the Code and concludes with a proposal for legislative reform.

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[1] All India Bank Employees’ Association v National Industrial Tribunal AIR 1962 SC 171; B R Singh v Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 710.

INHERITANCE OF EQUITY SHARES OF AN INDIAN COMPANY BETWEEN NON-RESIDENTS

AUTHOR – PURVESH KOTHEKAR, STUDENT AT NALSAR UNIVERSITY OF LAW

BEST CITATION – PURVESH KOTHEKAR, INHERITANCE OF EQUITY SHARES OF AN INDIAN COMPANY BETWEEN NON-RESIDENTS, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 214-216, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”) regulates foreign exchange transactions. This note analyses the inheritance of equity shares between non-residents under FEMA. Pursuance of the same, the note analyses the presence of legal provisions governing the same, the permissibility of such inheritance and the regulatory check-boxes for such inheritance, if permissible.

SELECTIVE CAPITAL REDUCTION AFTER PANNALAL BHANSALI: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SETTLED, AND THE LEGAL GAP THAT REMAINS

AUTHOR – HARSHA SUTHAR, NALSAR UNIVERSITY OF LAW, HYDERABAD

BEST CITATION – HARSHA SUTHAR, SELECTIVE CAPITAL REDUCTION AFTER PANNALAL BHANSALI: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SETTLED, AND THE LEGAL GAP THAT REMAINS, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 210-213, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

On March 10, 2026, the Supreme Court decided Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom Limited & Ors. (2026 INSC 213)^[1], a case that finally answers a question Indian company law had left unsettled for over two decades: can a company use Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013^[2] to reduce its share capital by targeting only a defined group of shareholders, while leaving everyone else’s holding untouched?

The Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran said yes. That holding closes one debate and opens another: once selective reduction is confirmed as lawful, what actually stops a company from using Section 66, rather than a scheme of arrangement or the statutory squeeze-out route, precisely because Section 66 asks less of it?

Bharti Telecom Limited (BTL) is an unlisted, closely held company that came off the stock exchanges between 1999 and 2000. Its only real business is holding a large stake in Bharti Airtel Limited (BAL), the listed telecom company. Individual investors held about 1.09% of BTL.

In 2018, BTL moved to cancel 28,457,840 equity shares held by these individual shareholders under Section 66, offering them an exit price. It first set that price at Rs. 163.25 per share after deducting Dividend Distribution Tax. Shareholders approved the resolution by a margin above 99.90%. The NCLT confirmed the reduction but held the tax deduction was arbitrary and raised the price to Rs. 196.80 per share. BTL paid that amount, but thirty-five shareholders still challenged the reduction itself before the NCLAT, and lost. Their appeal reached the Supreme Court wherein three objections were before the Court. First, on valuation method: since BTL’s only asset was its BAL shareholding, the appellants argued the price should track BAL’s listed market value directly, without any Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM), citing the Singapore Court of Appeal’s approach in Kiri Industries Ltd. v. Senda International Capital Ltd.^[3] Second, on price: they pointed to a 2007 private offer of Rs. 2,000 per share and SingTel’s 2018 purchase of BTL shares at Rs. 310 per share as proof that Rs. 196.80 undervalued their stake. Third, on procedure: they argued the notice calling the meeting did not properly disclose the valuation methodology and that the valuer’s link to BTL’s internal auditor was a conflict of interest.^[4]

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[1]Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom Limited & Ors., 2026 INSC 213.

[2]Companies Act, 2013, § 66(1).

[3]Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd & Anor, [2022] SGCA(I) 5 (Sing. CA).

[4]supra note 1.

WHOSE CONTRACT GOVERNS IN A COMPOSITE TRANSACTION?

IDENTIFYING THE PRINCIPAL AGREEMENT AND RESOLVING SEAT CONFLICTS IN TRIPARTITE PLATFORM ARRANGEMENTS

AUTHOR – HARSHA SUTHAR, NALSAR UNIVERSITY OF LAW, HYDERABAD

BEST CITATION – HARSHA SUTHAR, WHOSE CONTRACT GOVERNS IN A COMPOSITE TRANSACTION? IDENTIFYING THE PRINCIPAL AGREEMENT AND RESOLVING SEAT CONFLICTS IN TRIPARTITE PLATFORM ARRANGEMENTS, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 203-209, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

Indian courts have long permitted non-signatories to be impleaded in arbitration where a dispute forms part of a “composite transaction.” This principle is tested most acutely in tripartite platform arrangements, where an end-user contracts with an intermediary platform, which in turn contracts with an independent service provider, and the arbitration clause, if any, resides only in the second, back-end agreement. This article examines two connected questions arising from that structure: which of the layered agreements qualifies as the “principal” agreement for the purposes of the composite transaction doctrine, and, where both agreements contain arbitration clauses naming different seats, which seat should prevail in a consolidated proceeding. Drawing on Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc., Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises, Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India (P) Ltd., and the line of authority on consolidation beginning with P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities Pvt. Ltd., this article argues that the back-end agreement between the platform and the service provider is properly the principal agreement, that an arbitration clause located there can in principle draw in the end-user, and that the seat named in that agreement should take primacy over a differing seat in the end-user’s own contract. The article then identifies a structural lapse that survives this analysis: the threshold requirement of proving composite-transaction status is fact-intensive and litigation-heavy, and disproportionately burdens the end-user, the party least equipped to bear that cost. The doctrine, designed as a shield against contractual fragmentation, can accordingly still function as a sword in the hands of the party that drafted the fragmented agreements in the first place.

Keywords: composite transaction doctrine, non-signatories, seat of arbitration, tripartite agreements, platform contracts, Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996

AI-GENERATED MUSIC & COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP: HUMAN INTERVENTION, AUTHORSHIP, AND THE LIMITS OF PROTECTION

AUTHOR – SIDDHARTH JADHAV, STUDENT AT ILS LAW COLLEGE PUNE.

BEST CITATION – SIDDHARTH JADHAV, AI-GENERATED MUSIC & COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP: HUMAN INTERVENTION, AUTHORSHIP, AND THE LIMITS OF PROTECTION, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 193-202, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

Abstract

The creation of music has been revolutionized by generative artificial intelligence (AI), raising pressing issues for copyright law related to authorship, ownership, and the extent of protection for sound recordings and musical compositions. The doctrinal conflicts and policy decisions that result from the intersection of machine-generated outputs with legal frameworks based on human creativity are critically examined in this study. In order to explain how levels of human participation impact authorship attribution under standard tests of originality and fixation, it first maps technical modalities: entirely autonomous generation, algorithmic recomposition, and human-assisted co-creation. Building on this theoretical underpinning, the paper examines real-world issues such as training data from copyrighted works, the possibility of model memorization and output replication, the implications of attribution and moral rights, and distributive issues pertaining to royalties and compensation for displaced creators. In order to protect expressive labor, the main argument supports a balanced, hybrid regulatory framework that maintains a human-centric authorship threshold while enacting specific legal and contractual mechanisms to regulate machine-human collaboration. These mechanisms include mandatory training-data licensing, transparency and provenance obligations, sui generis rights for AI service providers, and revenue-sharing schemes. In order to account for algorithmic opacity and cross-border data flows, the study also suggests procedural improvements for enforcement and dispute resolution. The study intends to provide policymakers and courts with practical avenues that balance incentives for AI innovation with sufficient protection for human creators and cultural heritage by fusing technical reality with doctrinal analysis. The paper’s methodology grounds legal theories in empirical reality by combining doctrinal analysis, a review of case law, and a technical evaluation of generative models. By outlining contractual provisions and regulatory adjustments that governments may implement to lessen harms while maintaining cultural vibrancy, it advances scholarship.

Keywords: AI-generated music; authorship; copyright law; training-data licensing; remuneration mechanisms.

THE MODERN UNION IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS UNDER THE UTTARAKHAND UNIFORM CIVIL CODE

AUTHORS – AVIRUP DUTTA* & DR. DEBASHREE CHAKRABORTY**

* RESEARCH SCHOLAR, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL SCIENCE, TECHNO INDIA UNIVERSITY, WEST BENGAL,

** HOD, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL SCIENCE, TECHNO INDIA UNIVERSITY, WEST BENGAL.

BEST CITATION – AVIRUP DUTTA & DR. DEBASHREE CHAKRABORTY, THE MODERN UNION IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS UNDER THE UTTARAKHAND UNIFORM CIVIL CODE, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (10) OF 2026, PG. 188-192, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I1024

Abstract

In Indian society marriage has always been the fundamental aspect of family life, but due the diversity of culture there are various communities where cohabitation outside the institution of marriage is carried on effectively. Live-in relationship can be stated as a relationship in the nature of marriage without the formalities of marriage, where the partners share certain obligation towards each other. The Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand is the first legislation in India to provide statutory recognition and regulation of live-in relationships. The recognition of the same was previously done only through judicial interpretation. India does not have a nationwide Uniform Civil Code (UCC) regulating live-in relationships. The only comprehensive statutory framework in force is the Uniform Civil Code, Uttarakhand, 2024, which came into effect on 27 January 2025. Despite the progressive approach there are various gaps in the legislative structure, this article studies the legislative structure regulating live-in relationship under the umbrella of UCC, Uttarakhand and addresses the lacunas of the act. The article also suggests reformative measures for effective working of the statute without harming the rights of the individual.

Key Words – Live-in relationship, Uniform Civil Code (UCC), State intrusion, Cohabitation.