Author: PRASANNASRI26092001

  • UNIFORM CIVIL CODE: IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE LAWS IN INDIA

    UNIFORM CIVIL CODE: IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE LAWS IN INDIA

    AUTHOR – SHREYAS BASAVARAJ MAIGOOR, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

    BEST CITATION – SHREYAS BASAVARAJ MAIGOOR, UNIFORM CIVIL CODE: IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE LAWS IN INDIA, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 410-418, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

    ABSTRACT

    The debate on the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) regarding marriage laws in India is critically analyzed here with an emphasis on the conflict between constitutional equality and religious freedom. It examines the divided regime of personal marriage legislation over Hindus[1], Muslims[2], Christians, and Parsis and the alternative secular regime under the Special Marriage Act, 1954[3]. In a doctrinal and comparative legal approach, the research analyzes constitutional provisions, statutory schemes, and judicial pronouncements such as Shah Bano[4], Sarla Mudgal,[5] and Shayara Bano. The observations bring to light systemic gender discrimination, non-uniform rights, and the absence of uniformity, all of which compromise constitutional protection under Articles 14, 15, and 21[6]. The study also addresses the role of the judiciary, the conservative approach of the Law Commission, and comparative experiences from other pluralist societies. Recommendations entail gradual reforms, consolidation of secular choices, preparing a model uniform marriage code, and assigning priority to gender justice. The paper concludes that even as a UCC’s immediate countrywide implementation is politically delicate, the gradual, participative, and consensus-based reforms can balance pluralism with constitutional visions of equality, justice, and secularism.

    KEY WORDS – Uniform Civil Code, Marriage Laws, Constitutional Law, Gender Justice, Religious Freedom, Equality, Supreme Court, Secularism, Law Commission, Goa Civil Code.


    [1] Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

    [2] Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937.

    [3] Special Marriage Act, 1954.

    [4] Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556; AIR 1985 SC 945.

    [5] Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635; AIR 1995 SC 1531.

    [6] Constitution of India, Articles 14, 15, 25–28, and 44.

  • CRITICAL ANALYSIS: DOMESCTIC VIOLENCE AN ITS LEGAL PROTECTION IN INDIA

    CRITICAL ANALYSIS: DOMESCTIC VIOLENCE AN ITS LEGAL PROTECTION IN INDIA

    AUTHOR – AKSHAYA MPS* & HEMAVATHY D**

    * STUDENT AT TAMIL NADU DR. AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY

    ** PROFESSOR AT TAMIL NADU DR. AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY

    BEST CITATION – AKSHAYA MPS & HEMAVATHY D, CRITICAL ANALYSIS: DOMESCTIC VIOLENCE AN ITS LEGAL PROTECTION IN INDIA, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 405-409, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

    ABSTRACT

    Domestic violence is one of the most serious social and legal issues affecting individuals worldwide, particularly women. It includes physical, emotional, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse within domestic relationships. In India, domestic violence was historically treated as a private family matter, but growing awareness and activism have led to stronger legal protections. The enactment of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA) marked a significant milestone in addressing violence against women within households. The Act provides civil remedies such as protection orders, residence orders, custody orders, and compensation to victims.

    Despite the existence of various laws and legal frameworks, domestic violence continues to remain widespread due to social stigma, lack of awareness, and weaknesses in implementation. This research paper examines the concept of domestic violence, the legal framework for protection, the role of courts, and the challenges faced in enforcing laws. It also evaluates the effectiveness of legal remedies and suggests reforms to improve protection for victims.

    Women form the largest group of victims of domestic violence since time immemorial and violence against women still continue even in the 21st century. Women from every social background irrespective of their age, religion, caste, or class fall victim to domestic violence. However domestic violence is not just limited to women; men, children and elderly people can also be victims of it.

    Domestic violence occurs at all levels of society and in all population groups.

    In India, 30% women have experienced domestic violence at least once from the age of 15, and around 4 percent of pregnant women have even experienced spousal violence during pregnancy.

    Key Words:  Domestic violence, Legal issues, civil remedies, victims, Awareness, Women, Society etc,,.

  • GLOBAL REGULATORY DIVERGENCE ON CRYPTO: – “A STUDY OF MICA (EU), PSA (SINGAPORE), AND THE CLARITY ACT (USA) VS. INDIA’S CONTAINMENT MODEL”

    GLOBAL REGULATORY DIVERGENCE ON CRYPTO: – “A STUDY OF MICA (EU), PSA (SINGAPORE), AND THE CLARITY ACT (USA) VS. INDIA’S CONTAINMENT MODEL”

    AUTHOR – DURGA SREE.P* & MR. JINESH M**

    * STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, VISTAS

    ** ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT SCHOOL OF LAW, VISTAS.

    BEST CITATION – DURGA SREE.P & MR. JINESH M, GLOBAL REGULATORY DIVERGENCE ON CRYPTO: – “A STUDY OF MICA (EU), PSA (SINGAPORE), AND THE CLARITY ACT (USA) VS. INDIA’S CONTAINMENT MODEL”, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 393-404, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/KNVC8879

    Abstract

    Rising numbers of virtual currencies have thrown old laws and money systems into disarray across nations. Even though many people in India trade digital coins, clear rules are still missing taxes apply but full approval does not exist. Looking closely at court decisions reveals how interpretations shape what is allowed. Some parts of the Constitution matter more when deciding if controls fit with citizen rights. Tax policies shift often, reacting to new trends rather than guiding them. Foreign models give hints about possible directions local policy might take. Comparing global approaches shows which methods hold up under scrutiny. How judges rule today could define boundaries tomorrow. Rules grow slowly, shaped by both public use and government caution.

    From 2013 to 2017, Indian regulators approached virtual digital assets with hesitation. Then came a shift between 2018 and 2020 marked by outright ban attempts followed by courtled pushback. During that time, banks were told to cut ties with crypto firms because of risks feared by authorities¹. Yet such a move did not last long once legal challenges reached higher courts. A turning point arrived through a key decision delivered by the country’s top judges in 2020². That ruling struck down the central bank’s directive on grounds it went too far. Still, the bench made clear that oversight powers still belong to governing bodies when stability is at stake. Years after, new rules began forming not just reactive but built around taxes and reporting duties. This phase, spanning 2021 to 2023, focused more on tracking than banning. Now, future changes loom again under proposed amendments set forth in the 2025 finance legislation³. These aim to reshape how such assets are officially described within law. So what started as wariness turned into structured control, shaped heavily by one pivotal verdict.

    A fresh look at the Finance Act, 2022 digs into how new tax rules hit digital asset trades hard Section 115BBH⁵ slaps a blunt 30% charge, while section 194S carves out a 1% cut right at source, blocking any chance to balance losses. These moves, applied before clarity exists, stir confusion, pushing users away, makes following rules tougher, also triggered questions about fairness tied to Article 19(1)(g). On another front, the examination checks whether India lines up with global norms by folding virtual assets into money laundering controls via the 2002 law⁷, along with guidance shaped by FATF. Comparing MiCA, Singapore, and U.S. frameworks highlights gaps in India’s strict digital asset approach. A dedicated regulator and tailored legislation could provide clarity, ensure user safety, and support innovation through smarter structure.

  • THE IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGNATING JUS POST BELLUM AS A CUSTOMARY PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

    THE IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGNATING JUS POST BELLUM AS A CUSTOMARY PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

    AUTHOR – KRISHNA ANAND IYER, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED-TO-BE) UNIVERSITY

    BEST CITATION – KRISHNA ANAND IYER, THE IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGNATING JUS POST BELLUM AS A CUSTOMARY PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 378-392, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

    ABSTRACT

    The principle of jus post bellum in international law is one of the three laws of war, which outlines post-war conduct, which is primarily reconstruction and restoration to status quo. Under the purview of the laws of war, the principles of jus ad bellum, or lawful justification for war, and jus in bello, or the lawful conduct to be followed in war, take precedence over jus post bellum, primarily because jus post bellum lacks the obligatory power that comes with customary laws, unlike the other two. The aim of this paper is to explore the applicability of the principle and an in-depth analysis of the direct consequence if the principle also becomes a principle of customary international law.

    1. Keywords

    “Jus post bellum”, “laws of war in customary law”, “obligations essential for post-conflict reconstruction”, “international humanitarian law”, “customary international law”

  • SOCIAL STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER JUVENILE JUSTICE

    SOCIAL STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER JUVENILE JUSTICE

    AUTHOR – MEGHANA R, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

    BEST CITATION – MEGHANA R, SOCIAL STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER JUVENILE JUSTICE, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 368-377, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

    Abstract

    Juveniles in conflict with law in India still suffer from extreme discrimination and stigma, posing barriers to their rehabilitation and social reintegration. In spite of a progressive legislative paradigm under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“JJ Act, 2015”), public perception too goes against the reformist purpose of the legislation. The present study critically analyzes how stigma thwarts the ends of the Act based on doctrinal research approaches, case law, government reports, and cross-border comparative international paradigms. The article shows how confidentiality violations, poor aftercare, and deep-rooted bias among stakeholders lead to continued marginalization of children, negating the promise of a “fresh start” under statute. Case analysis of Sheela Barse v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 596, Salil Bali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705, and Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390 depicts judicial anxiety about discrimination by society and the need for change at the earliest. The approach used is doctrinal analysis, along with qualitative examination of the court rulings with emphasis on failure in enforcement and implementation. The author concludes that without real change in institutional practice and attitudes among the community, the objectives of the Juvenile Justice model—rehabilitation, reintegration, and safeguarding children’s rights—will never be achieved.

    Keywords: juvenile justice, stigma, discrimination, rehabilitation, rights of children

  • LEGAL CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY: A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE

    LEGAL CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY: A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE

    AUTHOR – RUBAN G, STUDENT AT VINAYAKA MISSION’S LAW SCHOOL, CHENNAI

    BEST CITATION – RUBAN G, LEGAL CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY: A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 362-367, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

    Abstract: –

    Significant developments have taken place in assisted reproductive technology, which has led to an increase in cross-border surrogacy. The issue of international surrogacy has raised various complex issues in the area of private international law. International surrogacy arrangements involve various international parties such as intended parents and surrogate mothers, and children born out of such surrogacy arrangements. International surrogacy arrangements have raised various conflicts with regard to jurisdiction, recognition of parentage, and determination of the nationality of the child. The absence of an international regulatory framework has led to inconsistent approaches by different countries in dealing with surrogacy arrangements. Therefore, there is an element of uncertainty for all the parties involved in such arrangements.[1]

    In the past, India has become one of the popular destinations for international surrogacy arrangements due to low medical costs and availability of specialized medical services. However, there have been concerns with regard to commercialization of surrogacy arrangements and exploitation of surrogate mothers. The enactment of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 is an attempt by India to deal with the issue of surrogacy by regulating commercial surrogacy and allowing altruistic surrogacy under certain circumstances.[2]

    Judicial decisions have also contributed to the development of the legal framework governing surrogacy. In Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India addressed issues concerning guardianship and the legal status of a child born through international surrogacy, highlighting the challenges arising from cross-border reproductive arrangements.[3]

    This paper analyses the legal issues surrounding international surrogacy from the perspective of private international law, particularly focusing on jurisdictional conflicts, determination of parentage, and recognition of foreign decisions.

    Keywords: Private International Law, International Surrogacy, Cross-Border Surrogacy, Jurisdictional Conflicts, Parentage Determination, Citizenship of Surrogate Child, Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021.


    [1] Scott B. Rae, Ethical Issues in International Surrogacy, 38 J. Med. & Phil. 248, 248–63 (2013), available at
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1093/jmp/jht016  

    [2] Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, No. 47 of 2021, India Code, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/17102

    [3] Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India, (2008) 13 S.C.C. 518 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/854968/.

  • REGULATING SYNTHETIC VOICE IMPERSONATION IN COURTS: A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH PAPER WITH INDIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

    REGULATING SYNTHETIC VOICE IMPERSONATION IN COURTS: A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH PAPER WITH INDIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

    AUTHOR – MANAN JHAMB, STUDENT AT CHANDIGARH UNIVERSITY

    BEST CITATION – MANAN JHAMB, REGULATING SYNTHETIC VOICE IMPERSONATION IN COURTS: A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH PAPER WITH INDIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 352-361, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/UOUQ6138

    I. UNDERSTANDING THE TOPIC: EXPLAINING

    Concept: Synthetic Voice Impersonation

    Artificial Voice Impersonation is when systems or people are deceived into thinking that an artificially created voice — produced by AI and Deepfake technology — is a genuine individual’s voice. In literature the fake voice creation process is called synthetic voice cloning or voice synthesis; AI algorithms are trained on a set of previously recorded voices to create vocalizations that mimic the tone of the training sample. The hyper-realism of these artificially created audio reproductions makes them nearly indistinguishable from actual human voices; thus, there are problems associated with deception and digital consent.[1] There is documented evidence of the use of fabricated/impersonated synthetic voice in committing crimes and fabricating evidence.
    Thus, there is a very serious problem for Courts of Law — in which the presentation of fabricated audio recordings can be used as “evidence” to support claims of confessions from defendants or statements from witnesses or victims; therefore, the reliability of the trial being fair cannot be ensured and the integrity of the evidence has been questioned.[2]


    [1] Kumar, R. (2025). Synthetic voice impersonation technology and the “Liars Dividend”: Regulatory gaps and comparative legal safeguards. Asian Journal of Law and Technology, 11(2), 177–210

    [2] Kothari, V., & Tibrewala, A. (2024). Synthetic voice impersonation as a threat to judicial integrity and fair trial rights. Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 19(4), 87–109.

  • SEDITION REIMAGINED UNDER THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA: REFORM OR MERE REPACKAGING?

    SEDITION REIMAGINED UNDER THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA: REFORM OR MERE REPACKAGING?

    AUTHOR – VAISHNAVI SRIVASTAVA* & DR. SUKRITI YADAV**

    * STUDENT AT AMITY UNIVERSITY LUCKNOW CAMPUS

    * ASSIST. PROFESSOR GRADE 1 AT AMITY UNIVERSITY LUCKNOW CAMPUS

    BEST CITATION – VAISHNAVI SRIVASTAVA & DR. SUKRITI YADAV, SEDITION REIMAGINED UNDER THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA: REFORM OR MERE REPACKAGING?, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 340-351, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

    Abstract

    In India sedition laws have always been a matter of controversy, largely due to their colonial origins and misuse against political dissent. Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), introduced by the British in 1870, criminalized speech or expression that brought “disaffection” against the government. Over the years, this provision was widely criticized for curbing free speech and being misapplied against journalists, activists, and citizens who merely questioned those in power. The Supreme Court, while upholding its constitutionality in Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), limited its application to acts inciting violence or public disorder. Yet, its misuse persisted.

    With the introduction of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, the government repealed Section 124A, signaling the apparent end of sedition law. However, its replacement, Section 152 of the BNS, has raised concerns of being “old wine in a new bottle.” This section penalizes acts that endanger the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India, including subversive speech. Critics argue that the language remains vague, retaining potential for misuse similar to the colonial law. While the government claims it provides stronger safeguards and focuses on threats to national security, skeptics fear it could still target dissent under the guise of protecting integrity.

    Thus, while the terminology has shifted, the essence of sedition survives. Unless clearly distinguished from legitimate criticism of the government, the BNS risks continuing the legacy of colonial suppression, making the promise of reform appear cosmetic rather than substantive.

    Keywords: Sedition, BNS 2023, Free Speech, National Security, Legal Reform

  • THE “MISUSE” NARRATIVE VS. SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: DECONSTRUCTING SECTION 498A

    THE “MISUSE” NARRATIVE VS. SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: DECONSTRUCTING SECTION 498A

    AUTHOR – RASHMI MALL* & DR. SHAIWALINI SINGH**

    * LL.M (CRIMINAL LAW) STUDENT AT AMITY LAW SCHOOL LUCKNOW, AMITY UNIVERSITY UTTAR PRADESH, LUCKNOW CAMPUS

    ** ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, AMITY LAW SCHOOL LUCKNOW, AMITY UNIVERSITY UTTAR PRADESH, LUCKNOW CAMPUS

    BEST CITATION – RASHMI MALL & DR. SHAIWALINI SINGH, THE “MISUSE” NARRATIVE VS. SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: DECONSTRUCTING SECTION 498A, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 335-339, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/ZSSE9826

    ABSTRACT

    This research paper investigates the prevailing tension between the legislative intent of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (now Sections 85 and 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023) and the judicial discourse surrounding its purported misuse. Introduced as a response to the alarming rise in dowry-related violence in the 1980s, Section 498A provided a critical legal framework for criminalizing domestic cruelty. However, over the decades, a narrative has emerged bolstered by landmark Supreme Court judgments that characterizes the law as a tool for ‘legal terrorism’ and personal vendetta. This paper deconstructs this narrative through a doctrinal analysis of case law, statistical trends from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), and sociological data from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5). It argues that the low conviction rates often cited as proof of misuse are more accurately understood as a failure of the justice delivery system, stemming from police-mediated settlements, hostile witnesses, and patriarchal societal pressures. Furthermore, the paper analyses the procedural shifts introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, particularly the codification of preliminary inquiries and the institutionalization of cooling-off periods. The research concludes that while safeguards against arbitrary arrest are necessary, the current judicial and legislative trajectory risks trivializing domestic violence and undermining the substantive justice that the law was designed to provide.

    Keywords: Section 498A, Domestic Violence, Misuse Narrative, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Substantive Justice.

  • THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT’S RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO BAIL WITH REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 21 AND 22

    THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT’S RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO BAIL WITH REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 21 AND 22

    AUTHOR – TARANNYA P, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY)

    BEST CITATION – TARANNYA P, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT’S RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO BAIL WITH REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 21 AND 22, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 323-334, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

    ABSTRACT

    The rights-based approach to bail adopted by the Indian Supreme Court, grounded in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, signifies a constitutional shift in the interpretation of criminal law and procedural practices. Article 21 asserts that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law,” while Article 22 enumerates specific procedural protections in instances of preventive detention and arrest. By interpreting these articles in conjunction, the Supreme Court has delineated bail jurisprudence in such a way that prioritizes liberty as the presumptive standard and classifies detention as a carefully restricted exception. Traditionally, bail was analyzed through a limited perspective defined by the Code of Criminal Procedure, focusing on procedural details and the seriousness of the crime. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has gradually transformed this perspective toward a model that is more aligned with constitutional rights. Bail is now regarded not merely as a judicial prerogative but is instead understood as fundamentally associated with the right to liberty enshrined in Article 21. The Court has consistently emphasized that excessive pre-trial incarceration, particularly when applied without proper justification, undermines the presumption of innocence and effectively penalizes individuals prior to the establishment of guilt. In this context, bail jurisprudence has emerged as a vital protection against the potential abuse of state authority.

    The Court has also pointed out that bail decisions should be informed by the virtues of reasonableness, fairness, and proportionality. Decisions to grant bail should be based upon reasonable grounds and should not be arbitrary, taking into account the competing interests of upholding the liberty of the accused as much as upholding the administration of justice. Factors such as the gravity of the offense for which the accused is charged, potential disruption of witnesses or evidence, chance of offending again, and risk of non-compliance with bail are all important parameters; but these are subject to the presumption of liberty enshrined in the Constitution. Recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court highlight that bail cannot be denied merely by taking into consideration the gravity of the alleged offense. Instead, the focus should be kept on assessing whether continued detention is necessary and justified for achieving legitimate government goals.

    The aim of the principle is to prevent the criminal justice process from becoming punishment per se, thus ensuring that individuals are not treated merely as objects of state power but rather are treated with dignity and humanity as citizens secured by the constitution. This right- based approach to bail has wider systemic implications. Prioritizing bail in appropriate cases allows the Court to confront perennial problems like jail congestion, of which undertrial prisoners account for a significant proportion of jail inmates. It enhances access to justice by securing judicial relief to marginalized and vulnerable sections of society that often lie at risk of arbitrary detention. It again instils in the criminal justice system the culture of accountability by subjecting judicial discretion to constitutional scrutiny and reminding the judiciary of its role of upholder of basic rights.

    Overall, the Supreme Court’s evolving bail jurisprudence is reflective of a deeper constitutional philosophy that treats liberty as an article of justice itself and not as a statutory privilege of the state. Through the application of Article 21 as well as Article 22 to the calculus of bail decisions, the Court has emphasized that the criminal justice machinery must operate in conformity with the virtues of fairness, dignity, and proportionality. That development points toward a justice system that is more humane, transparent, and constitutionally compliant in every sense of the term, and in which the concern is less punishment-oriented and more focused upon the protection of individuals’ inalienable right of being free even while awaiting trial.

    Keywords: Indian Supreme Court, Rights-Based Approach, Bail Jurisprudence, Article 21, Right to Life, Personal Liberty, Constitutional Law, Criminal Justice, Presumption of Innocence, Pre-Trial Detention