Author: PRASANNASRI26092001

THE RIGHT TO FOOD AS A HUMAN RIGHT: AN OVERVIEW OF NUTRITIONAL STANDARDS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

AUTHOR – DR. K.L. CHANDRASHEKHARA, ASST. PROFESSOR OF LAW, VIDYAVARDHAKA LAW COLLEGE, AFFILIATED TO KARNATAKA STATE LAW UNIVERSITY, MYSURU

BEST CITATION – DR. K.L. CHANDRASHEKHARA, THE RIGHT TO FOOD AS A HUMAN RIGHT: AN OVERVIEW OF NUTRITIONAL STANDARDS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 1002-1009, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I9104

Abstract

The right to food finds recognition in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 as well. Article 25 assures the right to a standard of living sufficient for healthy well-being of oneself and one’s family as including food. Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, states that the right to passable food is essential for a standard of living. Hence, being free from hunger is a fundamental right of everyone. The right to adequate food can only be realized when each person by themselves or as part of a community, gains continuous access physically and economically to adequate food or at least access to the means for procuring food. At its core this right seeks to imply that, both quantitatively and qualitatively, sufficient food is made available so as to fulfill all the dietary needs of all people, while ensuring that such food is not only within the cultural context at is also free from adverse substances, besides being accessible and sustainable so as to ensure that the same does not come into conflict with the enjoyment of any of the other human rights.

It is commonly accepted that around the world today, an estimated one hundred and eighty to two hundred million persons between the ages of ten to twenty four years are living with disabilities.1 Also, it is often assumed that responding to the vulnerabilities of persons with disabilities simply requires extending humanitarian aid protection paradigm to them. That paradigm focuses on adherence to humanitarian principles, securing and maintaining access, and developing sophisticated on going food security analysis and programme.

Key Words: Right to Food, Persons with Disability, Human Rights, Nutritional Standards

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND FARMER RIGHTS

A REGULATORY CRITIQUE

AUTHOR – PRIYANKA. B, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF EXCELLENCE IN LAW, TAMILNADU DR. AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI

BEST CITATION – PRIYANKA. B, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND FARMER RIGHTS, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 989-1001, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

Abstract

Geographical Indications (GIs) represent one of the most vital yet under-examined tools in India’s intellectual property framework — particularly from the standpoint of farmer rights and agrarian welfare. The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 (GI Act), enacted to fulfil India’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, has created a formal legal architecture for protecting the distinctive character of geographically origin-linked products. With 697 registered GIs as of July 2025 and a government target of 10,000 registrations by 2030, the Indian GI regime presents a facade of dynamism.

Yet beneath this quantitative growth lies a troubling structural gap: the farmers and artisans who are the actual producers and custodians of GI products are systematically sidelined by a regime that favours institutional registrants, intermediaries, and exporting entities. The authorized user framework is under-utilised, enforcement mechanisms are weak, awareness among rural producers is negligible, and the post-registration benefit-sharing structures are absent. International experience — particularly from the European Union and China — demonstrates that GI protection can be a transformative tool for rural income generation. India has thus far failed to replicate this potential.

This paper critically examines the GI Act 1999 from a farmer-rights perspective, analysing its statutory framework, registration architecture, judicial interpretations, enforcement challenges, international obligations under TRIPS, and the structural exclusion of actual producers from GI benefits. It concludes with concrete recommendations for legislative and policy reform.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND REGULATORY APPLICATION IN INDIA

A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND POLICY RESEARCH

AUTHOR – PRIYANKA. B, STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF EXCELLENCE IN LAW, TAMILNADU DR. AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI

BEST CITATION – PRIYANKA. B, AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND REGULATORY APPLICATION IN INDIA, THE GLOBAL SOUTH, AND NORTH, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 981-988, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

1. Introduction

Agriculture is the backbone of India’s socioeconomic structure. As the world’s second-most populous nation, India’s ability to feed its citizens, generate rural employment, and sustain its economy hinges critically on how agricultural policy is designed and implemented. The sector contributes approximately 17–18% of India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs nearly 45% of the total workforce. Given this centrality, the regulation and governance of agricultural activities carry profound legal, economic, and social significance.

Agriculture in India is governed by a multi-tiered regulatory architecture that includes constitutional provisions, central legislation, state-level statutes, executive schemes, and administrative orders. The interplay between these layers creates both opportunities for policy innovation and tensions arising from jurisdictional ambiguity. In recent decades, India has attempted to liberalise and modernise its agricultural regulatory environment — efforts that have not been without controversy.

This research examines the structure and application of agricultural policy and regulation in India, tracing the constitutional framework, key legislative instruments, landmark regulatory mechanisms such as the Minimum Support Price (MSP) and the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) system, recent reform attempts including the contentious 2020 Farm Laws, and the current policy trajectory under the New National Agricultural Policy 2025.

CLIMATE LITIGATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIA, THE GLOBAL SOUTH, AND NORTH

AUTHOR – MANAS BHONDE, STUDENT AT ILS LAW COLLEGE, PUNE

BEST CITATION – MANAS BHONDE, CLIMATE LITIGATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIA, THE GLOBAL SOUTH, AND NORTH, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 968-980, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I9101

Abstract

This paper analyses climate litigation and environmental constitutionalism of the Global South (India, Brazil, South Africa) alongside the Global North (EU, USA, Germany), and makes the case that differing legal frameworks constitute more profound structural inequalities of climate governance. Using case studies, the author shows that Southern courts give primacy to community-based, action-oriented claims, such as pollution being linked to the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, while Northern systems look more to formalistic compliance with the law by pouring procedural requirements like emission targets into a statute book. At the same time, there are systemic gaps: the South has severe enforcement deficits, as evidenced by India’s National Green Tribunal’s abysmal funding, while the North has to contend with rampant legalised irresponsibility, demonstrated by Shell’s irresponsibility for the oil spills in the Niger Delta.

The research highlights developing directions– youth-driven lawsuits (Held v. Montana, 2023), Indigenous advocacy (Petition of Torres Strait Islanders to the UN), and Rights of Nature (Atrato River Case of Colombia)– that fill this gap. It recommends a hybrid approach that combines the Southern emphasis on distributive justice with Northern focus on the institutional depth, framing constitutional change (e.g. climate rights nurturing), judicial capacity development (UNEP Judicial Initiative), and transnational discourse (India’s citation of Urgenda) activism. This paper argues that courts can integrate ecological responsibility and social justice, and through this transformation, shift the focus of climate litigation to one that fosters intergenerational and interspecies justice: the eco-centric form of constitutionalism.

Keywords- Climate change litigation, Environmental constitutionalism, Global South, India, Rights of Nature, Transnational Justice.

IF CRIMINALIZING A CRIME DESTROYS MARRIAGES, THEN IS THE HUSBAND A CRIMINAL: MARITAL RAPE AND THE UNEQUAL CITIZENSHIP OF MARRIED WOMEN IN INDIA

AUTHOR – SAMIKSHAA, STUDENT AT PRESIDENCY UNIVERSITY, BANGALORE

BEST CITATION – SAMIKSHAA, IF CRIMINALIZING A CRIME DESTROYS MARRIAGES, THEN IS THE HUSBAND A CRIMINAL: MARITAL RAPE AND THE UNEQUAL CITIZENSHIP OF MARRIED WOMEN IN INDIA, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 957-967, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I9100

ABSTRACT

A woman does not cease to be a human being when she becomes a wife. Yet the debate surrounding marital rape in India continues to be shaped by a deeply patriarchal assumption that marriage grants husbands a form of sexual entitlement over their wives. A woman’s refusal is respected when it is directed at a stranger, questioned when it is directed at a partner, and too often dismissed when it is directed at a husband. In this hierarchy, consent does not disappear by accident. It disappears because society has long been more comfortable protecting marriage than protecting women within it.

This article argues that the continued refusal to recognise marital rape is not merely a gap in criminal law but a reflection of a larger social belief that a wife’s body is part of her marital obligations. Women are told that marriage requires compromise, adjustment, sacrifice, and service. Rarely are they told that these expectations stop where their bodily autonomy begins. The expectation of the “good wife” continues to coexist with the expectation that a husband is entitled to sex, even when consent is absent.

Through a feminist constitutional analysis, this article examines how the marital rape exception undermines the principles of equality, dignity, and personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. It questions why the law fears the consequences of criminalising violence more than the consequences of permitting it. If recognising a crime is believed to threaten marriage, then the problem is not the law’s intervention but the conduct being protected from it. A wife is not property. Her body is not a marital entitlement. And constitutional rights cannot be left outside the bedroom door.

Keywords: Marital Rape, Consent, Feminist Jurisprudence, Constitutional Morality, Bodily Autonomy, Marriage, Equality, Women’s Rights.

THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE: WHEN THE CONSTITUTION SPEAKS BY SAYING NOTHING

AUTHOR – AAESH FALEEL, B.B.A L.L.B., SCHOOL OF LAW, RV UNIVERSITY

BEST CITATION – AAESH FALEEL, THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE: WHEN THE CONSTITUTION SPEAKS BY SAYING NOTHING, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 952-956, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I999

ABSTRACT

The idea of constitutional silence emphasizes the role the judiciary plays in interpreting the Indian Constitution in situations of constitutional text being silent, requiring the application of its principles of liberty, equality and dignity. This paper discusses how courts can address textual silence, engaging with constitutional morality and the living constitution. The importance of courts in recognizing unenumerated rights is claimed through references to seminal decisions (such as S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, Puttaswamy v. Union of India, Shayara Bano, Navtej Johar, and Joseph Shine) which each demonstrate an evolving recognition of unenumerated rights when responding to changes in society’s beliefs and morals, and highlight the recognized status of constitutional morality in ruling on these contextual shifts. Inflections of Hans Kelsen’s Grundnorm theory and the role judicial interpretation plays in linking on contemporary issues and applying constitutional morality to the normative order of the Constitution, illustrate how references to constitutional norms (such as morality) can be interpreted by the judiciary to affect substantive regimes of justice. Several comparative jurisdictions (the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom) note decidedly different responses to constitutional silences than occurs in India, suggesting a distinctly creative judicial response in India. Ultimately, silence does not mean absence of meaning; silence may instead be held to represent a reservoir of meaning that courts draw on to recognize justice and the democratic values associated with the Constitution in a continually redefined society for its citizens.

EVOLVING LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF INDIA’S COMPETITION ACT IN THE DIGITAL SPACE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS IN SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM

AUTHOR – ARGHA BANERJEE, RESEARCH SCHOLAR AT UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

BEST CITATION – ARGHA BANERJEE, EVOLVING LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF INDIA’S COMPETITION ACT IN THE DIGITAL SPACE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS IN SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 940-951, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I998

Abstract

The Competition Act, 2002 was introduced to promote fair competition, safeguard consumer interests, and curb anti-competitive practices in India. It replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP Act), in response to the changing needs of a liberalized and globalized economy. This paper examines the background and evolution of the Act, with special focus on the Raghavan Committee’s recommendations, which played a key role in shaping the legislation. The paper outlines the key objectives and core provisions of the Act, along with its enforcement structure, particularly the role of the Competition Commission of India (CCI). This paper investigates how recent CCI and judicial interpretations of the Competition Act, 2002 are shaping India’s digital and platform economy. Focusing on landmark cases, especially the Google–Android TV settlement (April 2025) and the Zomato–Swiggy investigation (2024–25), it evaluates how enforcement actions on bundling, exclusivity, and predatory pricing apply legal tests under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.  By comparing these developments to U.S. and EU precedents, the paper highlights India’s evolving stance on market leverage and two‑sided platforms, while examining interpretive challenges like market definition, economic complexity, and procedural delays. This paper concludes with recommendations to enhance the Act’s interpretive clarity and to improve the CCI’s agility in regulating India’s digital economy.

Keywords: App‑bundling, Abuse of dominance, Digital Economy.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FOOD SAFETY GOVERNANCE: EMERGING APPLICATIONS, REGULATORY CHALLENGES, AND THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE

AUTHOR – ANILKUMAR B. PRAJAPATI* & DR. RAKHI KATARIA**

* RESEARCH SCHOLAR, SCHOOL OF LAW, GUJARAT UNIVERSITY, AHMEDABAD

** ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, MOTILAL NEHRU LAW COLLEGE, AHMEDABAD

BEST CITATION – ANILKUMAR B. PRAJAPATI & DR. RAKHI KATARIA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FOOD SAFETY GOVERNANCE: EMERGING APPLICATIONS, REGULATORY CHALLENGES, AND THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 934-939, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

Abstract

The integration of Artificial Intelligence into the governance of food safety in India is one of the most transformative developments in food safety regulation in the country in the 21st century. The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSSA), and its regulatory body, the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), provide the regulatory framework for food safety in India. The integration of AI into this framework will allow the authority to improve food safety through increased traceability of food products, increased efficiency in detecting food hazards, and reduced regulatory burdens on food businesses. This article aims to review how AI can be incorporated into food safety in India through the use of predictive analytics, machine learning to detect adulteration, computer vision to assess product quality, blockchain-AI systems to trace products, and natural language processing to monitor regulatory compliance. Furthermore, this article will review the gaps within current food safety regulations in India regarding AI. Finally, by comparing the approaches to AI regulation in the European Union, the United States, and China, this article will propose a framework for AI in food safety regulation in India that is compliant with the country’s constitution, specifically Article 21 and Article 47.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Food Safety, FSSAI, Machine Learning, Regulatory Governance, India, Food Adulteration, Traceability, Algorithm.

IMPLIED CONTRACTS: DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT, JUDICIAL TREATMENT, AND CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL APPLICATION

AUTHOR – HRITIK KUMAR SINGH, STUDENT AT LLOYD LAW COLLEGE

BEST CITATION – HRITIK KUMAR SINGH, IMPLIED CONTRACTS: DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT, JUDICIAL TREATMENT, AND CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL APPLICATION, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 928-933, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/IJLRV6I996

Introduction

Not every binding agreement is committed to paper. Contract law has long recognized that enforceable commitments can spring from conduct, surrounding circumstances, and the reasonable inferences drawn from them [1]. These are implied contracts—obligations the law upholds even when no one sat down to draft an express term—and they serve a critical gap-filling role in commercial life where formal agreements are absent or incomplete [2].

Consider an everyday scenario: a commuter hails a taxi, states a destination, and the driver begins the journey. No written agreement is exchanged, yet both sides understand that the passenger will pay the fare upon arrival. The law treats this as an enforceable contract because the essential elements—offer, acceptance, consideration, and an intention to create a legal relationship—are all present, merely inferred from conduct rather than spoken or written [2].

Two broad categories are recognized across common law systems. Implied-in-fact contracts arise from the parties’ mutual conduct and share every essential element of an express contract [2]. Implied-in-law contracts, conventionally called quasi-contracts, are not true contracts at all; they are judicial constructs imposed to prevent one party from being unjustly enriched at the other’s expense [4]. Both categories have evolved substantially from their ancient roots and continue to be reshaped by judicial interpretation and statutory reform across jurisdictions.

This blog traces the doctrine through four stages: its historical antecedents in Roman, medieval English, and pre-colonial Indian law (Section II); the statutory framework established by the Indian Contract Act of 1872 (Section III); judicial treatment with key case law from Indian courts (Section IV); and a comparative perspective spanning five major common law jurisdictions (Section V).

Keywords—Implied contracts, quasi-contracts, business efficacy, Indian Contract Act, unjust enrichment, good faith, comparative contract law

BHUWAN MOHAN SINGH VS MEENA, (2015) 6 SCC 353

AUTHOR – PRIYANSHI MISHRA, STUDENT AT CMR UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LEGAL STUDIES

BEST CITATION – PRIYANSHI MISHRA, BHUWAN MOHAN SINGH VS MEENA, (2015) 6 SCC 353, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (9) OF 2026, PG. 924-927, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

BENCH- Dipak Misra, V. Gopala Gowda

FACTS OF THE CASE-

The husband is appealing the Family Court ruling that awarded the wife and kid monthly support under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

On August 24, 2002, the wife submitted a support request, stating that the husband had abandoned her and their son, who was still a juvenile and had married another lady. The husband refuted the accusations and stated that he had legally divorced the wife in 1998 by issuing a talaq and had since provided for her mehr and maintenance following Islamic law. The Family Court ruled that the husband had failed to establish the legitimacy of the divorce and that, following Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, he was required to pay maintenance to the wife and son.

From the date of the order, or August 24, 2011, the Family Court granted the wife Rs. 3000 per month and the kid Rs. 2000 per month. The husband appealed the Family Court’s decision to the Supreme Court because it had legal and factual errors, had been unfairly delayed, and had granted too many adjournments.