PREDATORY PRICING AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIANCE JIO’S MARKET ENTRY UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

AUTHORS – JATIN MEENA, HARSHRAJ CHOUHAN & KAVYA JOHAR

STUDENTS AT NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY

BEST CITATION – JATIN MEENA, HARSHRAJ CHOUHAN & KAVYA JOHAR, PREDATORY PRICING AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIANCE JIO’S MARKET ENTRY UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (1) OF 2026, PG.998-1007, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

Abstract

The entry of Reliance Jio Infocom Ltd into the Indian telecommunications market in 2016 marked one of the most disruptive episodes in the history of Indian competition law. Through prolonged free voice services, heavily subsidised data offerings, and aggressive customer acquisition strategies, Jio rapidly acquired substantial market share, triggering allegations of predatory pricing by incumbent telecom operators. Complaints were filed before the Competition Commission of India (CCI), alleging violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, particularly predatory pricing under Section 4(2)(a)(ii). The CCI dismissed the allegations, holding that Jio was not dominant in the relevant market at the time of its entry and therefore could not be guilty of abuse. This paper undertakes a doctrinal and economic analysis of predatory pricing under Indian competition law and critically evaluates the reasoning adopted by the CCI in assessing Jio’s conduct. By examining statutory provisions, jurisprudence, economic theory, and comparative international standards, the paper argues that while the CCI’s formal conclusion may be legally defensible under the dominance-first framework of Section 4, the Jio episode exposes structural limitations in India’s ex post abuse-based model when confronted with disruptive, capital-intensive market entry strategies in network industries. The paper concludes that predatory pricing doctrine in India requires conceptual refinement to address modern telecom and digital platform markets without undermining pro-competitive market entry.