

# PREDATORY PRICING AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIANCE JIO'S MARKET ENTRY UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

**AUTHORS** – JATIN MEENA, HARSHRAJ CHOUHAN & KAVYA JOHAR

STUDENTS AT NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY

**BEST CITATION** – JATIN MEENA, HARSHRAJ CHOUHAN & KAVYA JOHAR, PREDATORY PRICING AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIANCE JIO'S MARKET ENTRY UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (1) OF 2026, PG. 998-1007, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

## Abstract

The entry of Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd into the Indian telecommunications market in 2016 marked one of the most disruptive episodes in the history of Indian competition law. Through prolonged free voice services, heavily subsidised data offerings, and aggressive customer acquisition strategies, Jio rapidly acquired substantial market share, triggering allegations of predatory pricing by incumbent telecom operators. Complaints were filed before the Competition Commission of India (CCI), alleging violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, particularly predatory pricing under Section 4(2)(a)(ii). The CCI dismissed the allegations, holding that Jio was not dominant in the relevant market at the time of its entry and therefore could not be guilty of abuse. This paper undertakes a doctrinal and economic analysis of predatory pricing under Indian competition law and critically evaluates the reasoning adopted by the CCI in assessing Jio's conduct. By examining statutory provisions, jurisprudence, economic theory, and comparative international standards, the paper argues that while the CCI's formal conclusion may be legally defensible under the dominance-first framework of Section 4, the Jio episode exposes structural limitations in India's ex post abuse-based model when confronted with disruptive, capital-intensive market entry strategies in network industries. The paper concludes that predatory pricing doctrine in India requires conceptual refinement to address modern telecom and digital platform markets without undermining pro-competitive market entry.

## I. INTRODUCTION: MARKET DISRUPTION AND COMPETITION LAW ANXIETY

Competition law operates at the intersection of market structure and legal regulation. It seeks to prevent the distortion of competitive processes without penalising aggressive, efficiency-enhancing conduct. Few events have tested this balance in India as dramatically as the entry of Reliance Jio into the telecommunications sector.

Prior to Jio's entry, the Indian telecom market was characterised by multiple incumbent operators, high tariff structures, spectrum

constraints, and uneven technological rollout. In September 2016, Jio launched nationwide 4G services accompanied by unprecedented pricing strategies, including extended periods of free voice calls and free or deeply discounted data services. The resulting market response was swift and severe: tariff reductions across competitors, consolidation within the industry, and eventual exit or merger of several players.

Incumbent operators, including Bharti Airtel and others<sup>2209</sup>, approached the Competition

<sup>2209</sup> Bharti Airtel Ltd v Reliance Industries Ltd & Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd, Case No 81 of 2016, CCI Order under s 26(2)

Commission of India alleging that Jio's pricing constituted predatory pricing within the meaning of Section 4(2)(a)(ii)<sup>2210</sup> of the Competition Act, 2002. The central allegation was that Jio was pricing below cost with the intention of eliminating competition and later recouping losses.

The CCI rejected these allegations, primarily on the ground that Jio was not dominant in the relevant market at the time of its alleged predatory conduct. Since Section 4 prohibits abuse only by a dominant enterprise, absence of dominance was dispositive.

This episode raises foundational questions:

- Can a new entrant ever be guilty of predatory pricing?
- Is dominance a precondition that structurally shields aggressive entry?
- Does the Indian statute adequately capture recoument-based predation?
- Are telecom markets particularly vulnerable to capital-driven strategic pricing?

This paper addresses these questions through a doctrinal analysis of Section 4, economic theory of predatory pricing, and critical evaluation of the Jio decisions.

## II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: SECTION 4 AND PREDATORY PRICING UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

### A. Structure of Section 4

Section 4 of the Competition Act<sup>2211</sup>, 2002 prohibits abuse of dominant position. It does not prohibit dominance per se. The provision reflects the modern competition law principle that market power is not unlawful unless abused.

Section 4(1) states that no enterprise shall abuse its dominant position.

Section 4(2) provides illustrative categories of abuse. Among them, Section 4(2)(a)(ii) specifically identifies predatory pricing.

The statutory definition of predatory pricing is provided in the Explanation to Section 4. It defines predatory price as:

“the sale of goods or provision of services, at a price which is below the cost, as may be determined by regulations, of production of the goods or provision of services, with a view to reduce competition or eliminate competitors.”

Two elements are therefore required:

1. Pricing below cost; and
2. Intent to reduce competition or eliminate competitors.

Crucially, this prohibition applies only where the enterprise is dominant in the relevant market.

Thus, the analytical sequence under Indian law is:

1. Define relevant market (Section 2(r), 2(s), 2(t)<sup>2212</sup>);
2. Determine dominance (Section 4 read with Section 19(4)<sup>2213</sup>);
3. Examine abusive conduct (including predatory pricing).

This dominance-first structure becomes central in evaluating the Jio case.

### B. Determination of Dominance

Dominance is defined under the Explanation to Section 4<sup>2214</sup> as a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market in India which enables it to:

- Operate independently of competitive forces; or
- Affect competitors, consumers, or the relevant market in its favour.

Section 19(4) provides factors for assessing dominance, including:

<sup>2210</sup> Competition Act 2002, s 4(2)(a)(ii).  
<sup>2211</sup> Competition Act 2002, s 4

<sup>2212</sup> Competition Act 2002, ss 2(r), 2(s), 2(t)  
<sup>2213</sup> Competition Act 2002, s 19(4).  
<sup>2214</sup> Competition Act 2002, s 4 Explanation (a).

- Market share;
- Size and resources;
- Economic power;
- Vertical integration;
- Dependence of consumers;
- Entry barriers;
- Countervailing buying power.

Therefore, dominance is not merely about market share but about structural power.

In telecom markets, assessing dominance is complex due to:

- High capital intensity
- Spectrum allocation regimes
- Network effects
- Switching costs

The Jio case required careful application of these factors.

### C. Cost Benchmark in Predatory Pricing

The Competition Commission of India (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations, 2009 provide that “cost” generally refers to average variable cost (AVC) as a benchmark for predation.

This reflects influence from European jurisprudence, particularly the AKZO standard, where pricing below average variable cost is presumed abusive, and pricing between average variable cost and average total cost may be abusive if exclusionary intent is proven.

Indian law, however, does not explicitly codify recoupment as a requirement – unlike the US Supreme Court decision in *Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp*<sup>2215</sup>, which requires proof of likelihood of recoupment.

This doctrinal divergence becomes important in analysing Jio’s pricing strategy.

### III. THE JIO COMPLAINTS BEFORE THE COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA

#### A. Factual Background: Jio’s Entry Strategy

Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd commercially launched its telecom services in September 2016 after an initial beta phase branded as the “Welcome Offer.” The launch strategy was unprecedented in scale and duration. Jio offered free voice calls and free data services for an extended promotional period, followed by tariffs that were substantially lower than prevailing market rates. The pricing strategy was accompanied by heavy investment in nationwide 4G infrastructure, bundled data-centric services, and rapid customer onboarding.

Within months, Jio acquired tens of millions of subscribers. Competitors responded by lowering tariffs, increasing data allocations, and introducing matching offers. Several operators faced financial distress, leading to mergers and exits from the market. The industry consolidated significantly in the subsequent years.

Incumbent telecom operators, including Bharti Airtel and Idea Cellular, approached the Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleging that Jio’s pricing amounted to predatory pricing under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. The complainants argued that Jio was offering services below cost with the intention of eliminating competitors and subsequently recovering losses once market power was secured.

The CCI considered these complaints in cases such as *Bharti Airtel Ltd v Reliance Industries Ltd & Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd* and related proceedings. The core legal question was whether Jio’s pricing conduct constituted abuse of dominance through predatory pricing.

#### B. Relevant Market Definition

Under Indian competition law, analysis must begin with the definition of the relevant market under Sections 2(r), 2(s), and 2(t) of the Competition Act, 2002.

<sup>2215</sup> *Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp*, 509 US 209 (1993).

The CCI defined the relevant market as the market for provision of wireless telecommunications services in India. It rejected narrower segmentation based on technology (e.g., 4G-only services), reasoning that consumers viewed telecom services as substitutable across providers irrespective of underlying technology.

This approach was significant. Had the relevant market been defined narrowly as 4G LTE services at the time of Jio's entry, Jio might have appeared stronger due to its technological advantage. By adopting a broader market definition, the CCI ensured that market share calculations included all incumbent operators.

Market definition in telecom is inherently complex due to:

- Rapid technological change
- Bundling of voice and data
- Multi-sided aspects (consumers and content)
- Regulatory spectrum allocation

The CCI adopted a conventional demand-substitutability approach, focusing on consumer choice rather than technological distinction.

Critically, this broader market definition diluted Jio's relative share and became central to the conclusion that Jio was not dominant.

### C. Assessment of Dominance

Once the relevant market was defined broadly, the CCI examined Jio's market position.

At the time of the complaint, Jio was a new entrant with rapidly increasing subscriber numbers but still significantly lower market share than incumbents such as Airtel, Vodafone, and Idea.

The CCI observed that dominance requires the ability to operate independently of competitive forces. A new entrant aggressively expanding market share, even through disruptive pricing,

could not be presumed dominant merely due to rapid growth.

The Commission emphasised that:

- Jio had entered a market already populated by established players.
- Incumbents collectively held substantial subscriber base and infrastructure.
- There was intense competitive response to Jio's entry.

Therefore, Jio was not in a position of strength enabling it to act independently of market forces.

This finding was dispositive. Since Section 4 prohibits abuse only by a dominant enterprise, absence of dominance rendered further inquiry into predatory pricing unnecessary.

### IV. CAN A NEW ENTRANT EVER BE PREDATORY? A DOCTRINAL TENSION

The CCI's reasoning reveals a structural tension in abuse-of-dominance regimes.

Predatory pricing doctrine historically addresses conduct by dominant firms that temporarily sacrifice profits to eliminate competitors and later recoup losses. However, in dynamic markets, aggressive pricing by entrants may appear similar in effect, even if undertaken without pre-existing dominance.

Under the Indian statutory structure, dominance is a threshold requirement. Thus:

- A non-dominant firm cannot commit abuse.
- Predatory pricing is conceptually tied to existing dominance.

This creates a doctrinal paradox. If an enterprise must already be dominant before it can be accused of predatory pricing, then predation during entry – before dominance crystallises – may fall outside Section 4 scrutiny.

In telecom markets characterised by high fixed costs and economies of scale, an entrant backed by deep financial resources may price aggressively, acquire market share, and

subsequently attain dominance. Yet the initial pricing phase may escape legal scrutiny if dominance was absent at the time.

This reveals a limitation of ex post dominance-based models.

#### V. ECONOMIC THEORY OF PREDATORY PRICING

To assess whether Jio's strategy fits predatory theory, economic foundations must be examined.

##### A. Classical Model

The classical predatory pricing model requires:

1. Pricing below cost (often below average variable cost);
2. Elimination or disciplining of competitors;
3. Recoupment of losses through supra-competitive pricing later<sup>2216</sup>.

Without recoupment, predation is irrational.

##### B. US Approach: Brooke Group Standard

In *Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp*, the US Supreme Court held that predatory pricing requires:

- Below-cost pricing; and
- A dangerous probability of recouping losses.

The recoupment requirement ensures that courts do not penalise aggressive but pro-competitive price competition.

##### C. EU Approach: AKZO Standard

In *AKZO Chemie BV v Commission*<sup>2217</sup>, the European Court of Justice held that:

- Pricing below average variable cost is presumed abusive;
- Pricing between average variable cost and average total cost may be abusive if exclusionary intent is shown.

EU law does not require explicit proof of recoupment<sup>2218</sup>.

Indian law resembles the EU model more closely, focusing on below-cost pricing and intent to eliminate competition, without explicit recoupment requirement.

#### VI. APPLYING ECONOMIC THEORY TO JIO

Was Jio pricing below cost?

The complainants argued that prolonged free services necessarily implied below-cost pricing. However, telecom pricing involves complex cost structures:

- High fixed infrastructure costs
- Low marginal cost per additional user
- Spectrum licensing
- Promotional cost allocation

The CCI did not undertake detailed cost benchmarking because it found absence of dominance.

However, even if below-cost pricing were assumed, the recoupment question remains critical.

For predation to succeed, the predator must later raise prices above competitive levels to recover losses.

In Jio's case:

- Tariffs remained relatively low even after promotional periods.
- Regulatory oversight by TRAI constrained arbitrary price hikes.
- Telecom markets remained oligopolistic rather than monopolised.

These factors weaken recoupment theory.

Moreover, disruptive pricing may reflect:

- Penetration pricing
- Economies of scale strategy
- Network expansion
- Data-driven business model

<sup>2216</sup> Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, 'Predatory Pricing and Related Practices' (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 697.

<sup>2217</sup> AKZO Chemie BV v Commission (C-62/86) [1991] ECR I-3359.

<sup>2218</sup> AKZO Chemie BV v Commission.

Such strategies may be pro-competitive rather than exclusionary.

### VII. NETWORK INDUSTRIES AND CAPITAL-DRIVEN ENTRY

Telecom markets are network industries characterised by:

- Strong economies of scale
- Network effects
- High entry barriers
- Spectrum constraints

An entrant with deep capital resources can sustain initial losses to build subscriber base rapidly.

However, aggressive entry in concentrated markets may also enhance consumer welfare by breaking incumbency inertia.

The CCI's cautious approach reflects recognition that over-enforcement against entrants may deter competition.

If competition law penalises disruptive entry simply because it harms incumbents, it risks protecting competitors rather than competition.

### VIII. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CCI'S APPROACH

The CCI's dominance-first approach is doctrinally consistent with Section 4. However, it raises deeper policy questions.

#### Strengths of the Decision:

- Prevents chilling aggressive entry.
- Avoids protecting inefficient incumbents.
- Maintains statutory fidelity to dominance requirement.

#### Weaknesses:

- Fails to consider potential dynamic dominance creation.
- Does not engage deeply with cost analysis.
- Leaves structural capital asymmetry unaddressed.

The Indian statute does not currently recognise "collective dominance" or structural predation by entrants without dominance. Therefore, the CCI was legally constrained.

The Jio case demonstrates that the statutory framework prioritises static dominance over dynamic market transformation.

### IX. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTITUTIONAL SEQUENCING: THE SUPREME COURT IN BHARTI AIRTEL LTD V CCI

While the predatory pricing complaints against Reliance Jio were dismissed by the CCI on grounds of absence of dominance, the broader Jio episode also generated significant litigation concerning jurisdictional overlap between the Competition Commission of India (CCI) and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). This issue reached the Supreme Court in *Bharti Airtel Ltd v Competition Commission of India*<sup>2219</sup>.

The dispute concerned allegations that incumbent telecom operators had denied adequate interconnection points to Jio during its entry phase, thereby restricting competition. The CCI initiated investigation under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002<sup>2220</sup>. The incumbents challenged this action, arguing that issues relating to interconnection and technical compliance fell primarily within TRAI's regulatory domain.

The Supreme Court held that where sectoral regulatory issues are foundational to a competition law determination, the sectoral regulator should first decide technical and jurisdictional aspects before the CCI proceeds. The Court emphasised the principle of institutional comity and functional complementarity between regulators.

This decision is doctrinally significant for three reasons.

First, it reinforces that competition law does not operate in isolation. In network industries like telecom, regulatory architecture and

<sup>2219</sup> *Bharti Airtel Ltd v Competition Commission of India* (2019) 2 SCC 521.

<sup>2220</sup> Competition Act 2002, s 26(1).

competition enforcement intersect. The Court recognised that TRAI possesses technical expertise regarding spectrum allocation, interconnection norms, and tariff frameworks.

Second, the decision does not exclude CCI jurisdiction. Rather, it sequences it. Once TRAI determines regulatory compliance, the CCI may examine competition law implications.

Third, the judgment reflects judicial sensitivity to regulatory overlap in capital-intensive sectors. In markets such as telecom, pricing structures, promotional schemes, and tariff models are often shaped by sector-specific regulatory rules.

In the context of predatory pricing analysis, this jurisdictional dimension matters. TRAI regulates tariff transparency and promotional offers. If sectoral regulation permits certain pricing strategies, competition law scrutiny must carefully distinguish between regulatory compliance and abuse of dominance.

Thus, the Jio litigation illustrates the layered regulatory environment in which predatory pricing allegations must be evaluated.

#### X. RECOUPMENT DEBATE AND THE INDIAN POSITION

A central controversy in predatory pricing doctrine globally concerns whether recoupment must be established.

##### A. Absence of Explicit Recoupment Requirement in Indian Law

Section 4(2)(a)(ii) defines predatory price as below-cost pricing “with a view to reduce competition or eliminate competitors.” The statute does not expressly require proof of future recoupment.

Unlike the US Supreme Court in *Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp*, which made recoupment an essential element, Indian law adopts a structural approach closer to EU jurisprudence.

However, absence of explicit statutory reference does not eliminate the economic logic of recoupment. Predatory pricing without the

possibility of recoupment is economically irrational. If prices remain competitive after elimination of rivals, the predator never recovers losses.

In the Jio context, several structural constraints weaken recoupment probability:

- Continued regulatory oversight by TRAI
- Oligopolistic market structure post-consolidation
- Consumer price sensitivity
- Technological evolution lowering entry barriers for future players

Therefore, even if below-cost pricing were assumed, proof of sustainable recoupment would be difficult.

##### B. Dynamic Competition and Investment-Led Entry

Modern telecom markets operate differently from traditional manufacturing markets where predatory pricing theory emerged.

Telecom infrastructure involves massive sunk costs and extremely low marginal cost per additional user. An entrant may rationally price aggressively to rapidly expand subscriber base, amortise fixed costs, and exploit network effects.

This strategy may appear exclusionary but may simply reflect penetration pricing in network industries.

If competition law penalises such strategies without clear evidence of dominance and recoupment, it risks deterring pro-competitive entry.

The CCI’s refusal to intervene against Jio may therefore be understood as a conscious restraint grounded in dynamic efficiency considerations.

#### XI. SHOULD SECTION 4 BE RECONSIDERED IN NETWORK MARKETS?

The Jio episode exposes a structural question: is the dominance-first model under Section 4 sufficient in rapidly evolving network markets?

Two competing concerns arise:

1. Over-enforcement risk: Penalising aggressive entrants protects incumbents and reduces competition.
2. Under-enforcement risk: Capital-rich conglomerates may strategically use below-cost pricing to consolidate markets before dominance is formally recognised.

Indian competition law currently addresses only unilateral abuse by dominant enterprises. It does not provide a framework for addressing below-cost pricing by non-dominant firms even where structural capital asymmetry exists.

Some jurisdictions have debated whether competition law should incorporate structural or “incipient dominance” standards. However, such expansion risks overreach and legal uncertainty.

In the Jio context, the dominance threshold functioned as a safeguard against premature intervention. The telecom market ultimately consolidated into a smaller number of players, but consumer prices remained relatively low and data usage expanded dramatically.

From a welfare perspective, the net outcome was increased consumer surplus in the short to medium term.

## **XII. COMPARATIVE REFLECTION: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES**

Under EU law, if Jio had been dominant at entry and priced below average variable cost, a presumption of abuse could have arisen under the AKZO doctrine. However, EU law also requires dominance.

Under US law, even if dominance existed, plaintiffs would need to prove dangerous probability of recoupment under *Brooke Group*. Given telecom regulatory constraints and sustained competitive pricing, this burden would be substantial.

Thus, under both major comparative systems, establishing predatory pricing in the Jio scenario would be challenging.

This comparative alignment reinforces that the CCI’s decision was not aberrational but consistent with global predatory pricing standards.

## **XIII. NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT: PROTECTING COMPETITION VS PROTECTING COMPETITORS**

The core normative dilemma in the Jio controversy was whether competition law should shield incumbent firms from disruptive entry.

Competition law protects competitive processes, not individual competitors. Harm to rivals is not equivalent to harm to competition.

Jio’s pricing strategy undoubtedly harmed incumbents. However, competition law requires demonstration of harm to the competitive structure of the market.

In the absence of dominance and clear recoupment probability, intervention would have risked protecting inefficient incumbents rather than preserving competition.

The CCI’s cautious approach reflects fidelity to this principle.

## **XIV. CONCLUSION**

The entry of Reliance Jio into the Indian telecommunications market presented one of the most significant stress tests for India’s competition law regime. Allegations of predatory pricing under Section 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Competition Act<sup>2221</sup>, 2002 forced the Competition Commission of India to confront the tension between aggressive market entry and unlawful exclusionary conduct.

The CCI dismissed predatory pricing allegations primarily on the ground that Jio was not dominant in the relevant market at the time of its alleged conduct. Given the statutory structure of Section 4, this conclusion was doctrinally consistent. Abuse under Indian law

<sup>2221</sup> 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Competition Act

presupposes dominance. Without dominance, no abuse inquiry can proceed.

A deeper economic and comparative analysis supports the CCI's restraint. Predatory pricing requires below-cost pricing coupled with exclusionary intent<sup>2222</sup> and plausible recoupment. In network industries such as telecom, aggressive pricing by entrants may reflect rational penetration strategy rather than exclusionary design. Regulatory constraints, technological evolution, and oligopolistic competition reduce recoupment likelihood.

The Jio episode nevertheless exposes structural limitations in India's dominance-based abuse model when confronted with capital-intensive disruptive entry. While the present framework appropriately prevents over-enforcement against new entrants, it leaves limited space for addressing strategic below-cost pricing prior to formal dominance.

Ultimately, the case illustrates the delicate balance competition law must maintain: it must deter exclusionary conduct without discouraging innovation and investment-led disruption. The CCI's approach in the Jio matters leaned decisively toward protecting dynamic competition rather than incumbent stability.

In doing so, it reaffirmed a foundational principle of competition law – that the objective is not to insulate competitors from competitive pressure, but to ensure that the competitive process itself remains open, contestable, and welfare-enhancing.

### References

1. Government of India: *Competition Act, 2002*. Act 12 of 2003.
2. Competition Commission of India: *Determination of Cost of Production Regulations, 2009*. CCI Notification No. 1/2009.
3. Competition Commission of India: *Bharti Airtel Ltd v Reliance Industries Ltd & Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd*. Case No. 81 of 2016 (CCI Order).
4. Competition Commission of India: *Idea Cellular Ltd v Reliance Industries Ltd & Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd*. Case No. 03 of 2017 (CCI Order).
5. Supreme Court of India: *Bharti Airtel Ltd v Competition Commission of India*. (2019) 2 SCC 521.
6. European Court of Justice: *AKZO Chemie BV v Commission*. Case C-62/86 [1991] ECR I-3359.
7. United States Supreme Court: *Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp*. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
8. Motta, M.: *Competition Policy: Theory and Practice*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004).
9. Areeda, P., Turner, D.: *Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act*. *Harvard Law Review* 88 (1975) 697–733.
10. Whish, R., Bailey, D.: *Competition Law*. 9th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2018).
11. Fox, E.M., Sullivan, L.A.: *Antitrust—Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?* *New York University Law Review* 62 (1987) 936–976.
12. Hovenkamp, H.: *Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice*. 5th edn. West Academic Publishing, St. Paul (2016).
13. Posner, R.A.: *Antitrust Law*. 2nd edn. University of Chicago Press, Chicago (2001).
14. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI): *Telecom Tariff Orders and Interconnection Regulations*. New Delhi.

<sup>2222</sup> Competition Commission of India (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations 2009



INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW [IJLR – IF SCORE – 7.58]

VOLUME 6 AND ISSUE 1 OF 2026

APIS – 3920 – 0001 (and) ISSN – 2583-2344

Published by  
Institute of Legal Education

<https://iledu.in>

15. Singh, A., Kathuria, V.: *Competition Law in India: A Commentary*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi (2019).

