

# A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MENS REA AND MODUS OPERANDI IN UNORGANIZED VERSUS ORGANIZED CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES

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## Abstract

Criminal conspiracy stands as one of the most complex inchoate offenses in criminal jurisprudence, predicated on the fundamental principle that the "meeting of minds" to commit an illegal act is, in itself, a danger to societal order. However, as criminology has evolved, the sociological manifestation of conspiracy has splintered into two distinct categories: unorganized conspiracies and organized criminal syndicates. This extended research article provides an exhaustive comparative analysis of the mens rea (guilty mind) and modus operandi (method of operation) governing these two paradigms. By tracing the historical development of statutory frameworks from the colonial-era Sections 120A and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, to the modern, transformative provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 (specifically Sections 61 and 111) this paper evaluates how legislative strategies have adapted to the escalating sophistication of crime. Unorganized conspiracies are characterized by ad-hoc, localized mens rea and simplistic, direct modus operandi. Conversely, organized criminal syndicates demonstrate a continuous, corporate-like mens rea and highly sophisticated, compartmentalized modus operandi that insulates the criminal leadership. Through an in-depth analysis of landmark judicial pronouncements, evidentiary challenges under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, and comparative international statutes such as the US RICO Act, this article underscores the legal necessity of treating organized crime as an enterprise rather than a mere aggregation of individual offenses.

**Key Words:** Criminal conspiracy, Mens rea, Unorganized crime, Organized crime, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, criminal syndicates

## CHAPTER I – Introduction

### 1.1 The Jurisprudential Foundation of Conspiracy

In criminal law, liability generally requires the concurrence of two fundamental elements: mens rea (the mental intent or guilty mind) and actus reus (the physical commission of the act). Criminal conspiracy represents a unique departure from standard liability models

because it is an "inchoate" or incomplete crime. In a conspiracy, the actus reus is the agreement itself; the physical manifestation of the crime need not be consummated for criminal liability to attach.<sup>794</sup> The paramount focus of judicial scrutiny therefore shifts entirely to the mens rea the intent to agree and the shared intent to achieve an unlawful objective.<sup>795</sup>

<sup>794</sup> Smith, J. C., & Hogan, B. (2002). *Criminal Law* (10th ed.). Butterworths, p. 289.

<sup>795</sup> The foundational Latin maxim *actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea* an act does not make a person guilty unless their mind is also guilty is the absolute

bedrock of establishing criminal liability in conspiracy under common law jurisdictions.

While the foundational legal theory of conspiracy applies universally, the sociological and criminological reality of how conspiracies operate is not monolithic. The spectrum of conspiracy ranges from unorganized groups where a few individuals spontaneously agree to commit a singular, isolated offense to organized criminal conspiracies, which function as transnational syndicates, characterized by rigid hierarchies, continuous illicit enterprises, and vast economic infrastructures.<sup>796</sup>

The modus operandi (the method or pattern of operation) of an unorganized group differs drastically from that of a drug cartel or a terror syndicate. Consequently, the legal threshold for proving the mens rea and mapping the modus operandi demands distinct judicial approaches. A mechanical application of traditional conspiracy laws is wholly inadequate to dismantle modern organized syndicates. This paper explores these dichotomies in depth, relying on the latest statutory provisions, special enactments, constitutional interpretations, and international legal standards.

## 1.2 Need for the Study

The contemporary criminal justice system is currently standing at a legislative and jurisprudential crossroads. For decades, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors struggled

to dismantle organized crime syndicates using the colonial-era provisions of the IPC. Traditional conspiracy laws require proof of a direct agreement, which is virtually impossible to establish when syndicate bosses insulate themselves through multi-layered hierarchical structures, ensuring they never directly communicate with the foot soldiers executing the actus reus.

With the enforcement of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, the legal landscape has fundamentally transformed. The introduction of

"Organised Crime" under Section 111 of the BNS necessitates a complete recalibration of how courts interpret continuous intent and enterprise-driven modus operandi. There is an urgent, pressing need to academically dissect these new statutory frameworks to understand how the evidentiary burden of proving the "meeting of minds" shifts when dealing with highly sophisticated, digitally encrypted, and compartmentalized criminal networks versus ad-hoc, unorganized groups.

## 1.3 Significance of the Study

This study holds profound significance for multiple stakeholders within the criminal justice and socio-legal ecosystems:

1. **For the Judiciary and Legal Practitioners:** As trial courts and appellate benches begin to adjudicate cases under the new BNS framework, this study provides a critical interpretative guide on distinguishing the mens rea required for Section 61 (general conspiracy) from the continuous mens rea required for Section 111 (Organised Crime).
2. **For Law Enforcement Agencies:** By comparatively analyzing the modus operandi of organized syndicates, the research underscores the necessity of modernizing investigatory techniques, emphasizing the shift from localized evidence gathering to tracking transnational financial and cyber-trails.
3. **For Academic Jurisprudence:** The study bridges a critical gap in Indian legal literature by correlating the psychological element of crime (mens rea) directly with its sociological execution (modus operandi), evaluating the efficacy of the enterprise liability doctrine in the Indian context.

<sup>796</sup> Legal, B. (2026). India's legislative response to organized crime. White Black Legal, 3(6). The literature notes that the introduction of organized crime

provisions in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, represents an important shift by creating a nationwide substantive offence targeting syndicates.

#### 1.4 Review of Literature

To contextualize the research, a comprehensive review of existing jurisprudential texts, statutory commentaries, and criminological reports was conducted:

- **Traditional Criminal Jurisprudence:** Glanville Williams in *Criminal Law: The General Part* and Smith & Hogan in *Criminal Law* extensively dissect the nature of inchoate offenses, establishing that conspiracy is an offense of pure intent. However, these foundational texts primarily address traditional, unorganized combinations without accounting for modern corporate-style syndicates.
- **Indian Statutory Commentaries:** Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's *The Indian Penal Code* provides exhaustive judicial interpretations of the repealed Section 120B IPC. Recent literature, such as scholarly articles analyzing the *Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023*, emphasizes that the BNS has successfully codified the realities of syndicate crimes that were previously only addressed by special regional laws like the *Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), 1999*.
- **Criminological Perspectives on Organized Crime:** Jay S. Albanese, in *Organized Crime: From the Mob to Transnational Syndicates*, details the evolution of criminal networks from local gangs to international cartels. Albanese highlights that the *modus operandi* of organized crime is fundamentally economic, functioning as a parallel illicit market that necessitates a distinct legal approach.
- **Judicial Precedents and Law Commission Reports:** The Supreme Court of India's ruling in *State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah (2008)* is heavily reviewed, as it constitutionalized the legal differentiation

of organized crime. Furthermore, reports by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) establish the transnational nature of modern syndicates, emphasizing the inadequacy of traditional domestic conspiracy laws.

#### 1.5 Research Gap

While substantial literature exists on the general principles of criminal conspiracy under the old IPC, and separate criminological studies detail the socio-economic impacts of organized crime, there is a glaring jurisprudential void linking the two. Most existing legal literature treats *mens rea* as a static concept. There is limited doctrinal research that comparatively analyses how the nature of *mens rea* inherently changes (from finite to continuous) based on the *modus operandi* (from unorganized to organized). Furthermore, with the very recent transition to the *Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023*, there is an absolute dearth of comprehensive academic literature analysing how Sections 61 and 111 will interact in practice to address these distinct forms of criminality. This study intends to fill this critical void.

#### 1.6 Research Problem

The traditional legal framework of criminal conspiracy has proven systematically inadequate in prosecuting organized crime syndicates, as it erroneously applies the same evidentiary standards of *mens rea* and intent to both unorganized, ad-hoc criminal combinations and sophisticated, highly compartmentalized criminal enterprises. The core research problem is to evaluate whether the modern legislative shift particularly the introduction of organized crime provisions in the *Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023* sufficiently addresses the distinct *modus operandi* and continuous *mens rea* of criminal syndicates, and to identify the evidentiary challenges in adjudicating these divergent forms of conspiracy.

### 1.7 Research Questions

To address the research problem, this study seeks to answer the following specific questions:

1. How does the jurisprudential concept of mens rea structurally differ when applied to an unorganized criminal conspiracy versus an organized criminal syndicate?
2. In what ways does the modus operandi of organized crime (e.g., compartmentalization, money laundering) frustrate the traditional evidentiary burdens of proving a "meeting of minds"?
3. To what extent does Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, resolve the historical inadequacies of the repealed Section 120B of the IPC in prosecuting syndicate leadership?
4. How do Indian evidentiary standards under the new Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, align with international standards (such as the US RICO Act) in proving enterprise-level conspiracy?

### 1.8 Hypothesis

This research proceeds on the following hypothesis: "The structural integrity of an unorganized criminal conspiracy relies on a finite, simultaneous mens rea and a direct modus operandi, which can be effectively prosecuted through traditional conspiracy laws. Conversely, organized criminal syndicates operate on a continuous, enterprise-driven mens rea and an insulated modus operandi, rendering traditional laws obsolete and necessitating the specialized 'enterprise liability' frameworks and electronic evidentiary standards introduced under the modern Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023."

### 1.9 Aims and Objectives

**Aim:** The primary aim of this research is to critically and comparatively analyze the fundamental elements of mens rea and modus operandi in unorganized versus organized

criminal conspiracies, evaluating the efficacy of India's shifting legislative response to these crimes.

#### Objectives:

1. To trace the jurisprudential evolution of criminal conspiracy from the colonial IPC framework to the modern BNS, 2023 framework.
2. To dissect the nature of intent (mens rea) in ad-hoc conspiracies versus continuous criminal enterprises (wheel and chain conspiracies).
3. To analyze how the sophisticated modus operandi of organized syndicates insulates leadership and complicates standard evidentiary procedures.
4. To critically examine landmark judicial pronouncements that differentiate the liability of a peripheral conspirator from a syndicate mastermind.
5. To recommend policy and investigatory reforms required to effectively implement the new organized crime laws in India.

### 1.10 Research Methodology

The present study adopts a Doctrinal and Analytical Research Methodology.

- **Primary Sources:** The research heavily relies on statutory frameworks, primarily the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023; the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023; the repealed Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860; special state enactments like MCOCA, 1999; and international statutes like the US RICO Act, 1970. Landmark judgments of the Supreme Court of India, the High Courts, and relevant foreign appellate courts form the core of the judicial analysis.
- **Secondary Sources:** The research utilizes authoritative legal treatises, textbooks on criminal jurisprudence, peer-reviewed law journals, law commission reports, and international criminological assessments

(such as UNODC reports) to build a robust theoretical framework.

- **Approach:** A comparative and qualitative approach is applied to juxtapose unorganized conspiracy with organized crime, examining the theoretical definitions against practical, evidentiary applications in courts of law.

## 1.11 Scope and Limitations

**Scope:** The scope of this research is primarily confined to the substantive criminal law of India. It meticulously examines the transition from the IPC to the BNS, 2023. The study limits its comparative international scope to specific benchmark legislations, primarily the US RICO Act and fundamental English common law principles, to provide a comparative analysis of enterprise liability. Conceptually, the scope is restricted to the intersection of the mental element (*mens rea*) and the method of execution (*modus operandi*).

**Limitations:** The primary limitation of this research is temporal. Because the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) were enacted recently (in late 2023/early 2024), there is a limited corpus of long-term empirical data or exhaustive Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting Section 111 (Organised Crime) in its fully mature state. Consequently, portions of the analysis regarding the future application of the BNS rely on statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and analogies drawn from the jurisprudence of state-level acts like MCOCA.

## 1.12 Chapterisation

To systematically address the aims and objectives, the thesis is structured into the following chapters:

- **Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Design** The current chapter outlining the foundational framework, methodology, and objectives of the study.
- **Chapter 2: The Jurisprudential Evolution of Criminal Conspiracy:** Tracing the

history of inchoate offenses from English Common Law to the IPC (Sections 120A/120B) and mapping the transition to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.

- **Chapter 3: Anatomy of Unorganized Conspiracies:** An in-depth analysis of ad-hoc conspiracies, focusing on finite *mens rea*, rudimentary *modus operandi*, and the application of BNS Section 61.
- **Chapter 4: The Corporate Machinery of Organized Crime:** Examining syndicates as illicit enterprises, dissecting the continuous *mens rea* (Wheel and Chain doctrines), compartmentalized *modus operandi*, and the specific implications of BNS Section 111.
- **Chapter 5: Evidentiary Burdens and Judicial Adjudication:** A comparative assessment of the challenges in proving "meeting of minds" in unorganized vs. organized crimes, analyzing the impact of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, electronic evidence, and landmark judicial precedents.
- **Chapter 6: Landmark Judicial Pronouncements:** The evolution of conspiracy jurisprudence in India and abroad provides profound insights into how courts interpret the intersection of *mens rea* and *modus operandi*.
- **Chapter 7: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations:** Summarizing the findings of the comparative analysis, validating the hypothesis, and proposing specialized investigatory and policy frameworks to combat modern syndicates effectively.

## CHAPTER II – Jurisprudential Evolution of Criminal Conspiracy in India

### 2.1 The Traditional Approach: The Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860

Historically, the concept of criminal conspiracy was formalized in India through the Criminal Law

Amendment Act, 1913, which inserted Chapter V-A into the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

- Section 120A IPC defined criminal conspiracy as an agreement by two or more persons to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means.<sup>797</sup>
- Section 120B IPC prescribed the punishment for this offense.

Under the IPC framework, the law did not strictly differentiate between the structural complexity of the conspiring group. An agreement by three petty thieves to rob a local grocery store was adjudicated under the same foundational legal principles and evidentiary standards as a sophisticated, multi-layered terror module plotting to assassinate a head of state.<sup>798</sup> This homogenizing approach created severe prosecutorial bottlenecks when dealing with masterminds who operated through layers of subordinates.

## 2.2 The Inadequacies of Traditional Law

As India transitioned into a globalized economy in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the structural and evidentiary limitations of Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) became glaringly apparent. Economic liberalization opened the floodgates not only to legitimate foreign capital but also to highly sophisticated, borderless criminal enterprises that weaponized technological advancements. Organized syndicates rapidly abandoned localized, transactional crimes in favour of complex hawala networks, transnational drug and weapons smuggling corridors, and anonymous, cyber-enabled financial fraud.

Under traditional conspiracy laws governed by Section 120B, the prosecution was burdened with proving an explicit, unified "meeting of minds"

among all co-conspirators. This legal standard became virtually impossible to achieve when dealing with modern, compartmentalized syndicates engineered with intentional, multi-layered human and digital buffers. In these operations, a syndicate kingpin harboring the ultimate mens rea sits in a completely different country, routing commands through encrypted channels to a middleman, who then hires localized "foot soldiers" (actus reus) to execute a specific task such as planting explosives, picking up a hawala consignment, or deploying malware. Because the street-level actors and the supreme directors never directly communicate, possess no mutual knowledge of each other's identities, and act within isolated silos, traditional Indian jurisprudence struggled to legally connect the localized execution to the shadow leadership. This profound enforcement paralysis ultimately underscored that 19th-century penal concepts, designed for static and localized criminal plots, were fundamentally toothless against globalized, decentralized syndicates a crisis that eventually forced the Indian legislature to discard Section 120B's transaction-bound approach in favour of the systemic, enterprise-oriented model codified under Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.<sup>799</sup>

## 2.3 The Modern Paradigm: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023

Recognizing the absolute necessity for a legislative framework that aligns with contemporary technological and criminological realities, the Indian Parliament enacted the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, effectively replacing the colonial-era IPC.<sup>800</sup>

- Section 61 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 mirrors the traditional definition of criminal conspiracy

<sup>797</sup> Indian Penal Code, 1860, Act No. 45 of 1860, §§ 120A, 120B (Repealed by BNS, 2023).

<sup>798</sup> Council, G. (2013). Indian Academy of Forensic Medicine (IAFM). Journal of Indian Academy of Forensic Medicine, 35(3). The application of Section 120B required strict adherence to proving the agreement, a standard applied across varying degrees of crime severity.

<sup>799</sup> GILL, M.R.G. (2025). ORGANIZED CRIMES IN INDIA: AN INSIGHT FROM BHARTIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023. ILE Multidisciplinary

Journal, 4(1). Organized crimes have evolved into a transnational phenomenon, transcending geographical boundaries and national jurisdictions, rendering traditional laws inadequate.

<sup>800</sup> Mawar, S. (2025). BNS: A New Dawn for Indian Criminal Law? Analysing the Shift in India's Legal Landscape. IJLRP, 2(1). The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita marks a profound and progressive step towards a more just and modern legal framework in India, consolidating inchoate offenses.

previously found under Sections 120A and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), but it strategically rationalizes the offense within a modernized, structurally cohesive statutory framework designed to encompass contemporary crimes. Under Section 61(1), the substantive definition of conspiracy remains untouched: it criminalizes an agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or a lawful act by illegal means, maintaining the historical *sine qua non* that the agreement itself constitutes an inchoate offense requiring no overt act if the target is a formal crime. However, the true modernization lies in how Section 61 consolidates both the definition and the multi-tiered punishment structure into a single, unified section—collapsing the old bifurcated IPC arrangement to enhance statutory readability and streamline trial procedures. Furthermore, by being housed within the BNS alongside newly codified chapters on transnational organized crime (Section 111), cyberterrorism, and sophisticated economic fraud, Section 61 is repositioned to act as the baseline penal anchor for multi-layered offenses. This structural rationalization ensures that while traditional unorganized plots (like a localized robbery) are prosecuted smoothly under standard principles of shared *mens rea*, the baseline law of conspiracy seamlessly integrates with the evidentiary shifts of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhinyam (BSA), 2023, allowing modern digital footprints, encrypted communications, and electronic records to be admitted as primary evidence to prove the underlying meeting of minds.<sup>801</sup>

- Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 represents a watershed

moment in Indian criminal jurisprudence. For the first time in a central, substantive penal statute, "Organised Crime" has been explicitly defined and criminalized, effectively filling the massive statutory void that previously forced the central government to rely on fragmented state-specific laws like MCOCA. Section 111 recognizes that syndicates engage in continuous unlawful activities such as extortion, cyber-crime, human trafficking, and economic offenses, and it imposes strict joint and several liability on those acting "singly or jointly, either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate." Under this groundbreaking provision, the prosecution is armed with a robust statutory formula to legally establish the structural existence of a syndicate by defining a "continuing unlawful activity" as any cognizable offense punishable by three or more years of imprisonment, provided that more than one charge-sheet has been filed before a competent court within the preceding ten years and judicial cognizance has been taken. This formula effectively bypasses the steep evidentiary hurdles of traditional conspiracy under the old IPC Section 120B, allowing trial courts to infer a persistent, collective *mens rea* directly from an established pattern of institutionalized criminality rather than a singular, transaction-bound agreement<sup>802</sup>. Furthermore, Section 111 targets the entire anatomy of an enterprise by introducing specialized clauses that independently criminalize and heavily penalize ranging from five years to the death penalty—not just the execution of the crime, but the distinct acts of conspiring, facilitating, holding membership in the syndicate, harboring its operatives, or possessing

<sup>801</sup> Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 61 (Criminal Conspiracy). This section restates the traditional definition while updating the language and structural placement within the code.

<sup>802</sup> Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 111 (Organised Crime). Section 111 provides a comprehensive framework for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of individuals operating within criminal syndicates.

unexplained assets and proceeds derived from organized racketeering.

## 2.4 Precursors and Special Legislations

Prior to the enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, states severely affected by rampant gang violence, extortion rackets, and underworld syndicates took the legislative initiative to enact specialized local laws to plug the severe loopholes in India's central penal framework. The Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), 1999, and its subsequent mirror legislation, the Karnataka Control of Organised Crime Act (KCOCA), 2000, pioneered the domestic legal recognition of the unique, highly insulated modus operandi of criminal syndicates. The state legislatures explicitly recognized that conventional evidentiary standards under the old Indian Evidence Act, 1872, were fundamentally paralyzed when dealing with organized crime, as syndicate leaders systematically utilized multi-layered human buffers to distance their executive mens rea from the physical execution of predicate offenses. To aggressively pierce this structural insulation and break the "code of silence" inherent in organized crime, these specialized acts introduced extraordinary statutory provisions. Most notably, they legalized the interception of electronic, wire, and oral communications as primary evidence, and made confessions made to high-ranking police officers (not below the rank of Superintendent of Police) admissible in court a radical departure from traditional Indian criminal law designed to counter the extreme intimidation of witnesses.<sup>803</sup>

Internationally, this paradigm shifts heavily mirrored the philosophy of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act of 1970 in the United States, which served as the foundational global blueprint for modern anti-syndicate legislation. The genius of the RICO Act lay in its creation of a new category of crime: it stopped looking at offenses as isolated

transactional conspiracies, choosing instead to target and punish the "enterprise" itself and the "pattern of racketeering activity" used to sustain it. This precise Western concept of penalizing the structural continuity and economic modus operandi of a criminal collective deeply informed the drafting of MCOCA and KCOCA, creating a robust provincial matrix of organized crime jurisprudence in India that eventually culminated in the nationwide codification of these extraordinary powers under Section 111 of the BNS.

## CHAPTER III – Unorganized Criminal Conspiracies

### 3.1 Mens Rea in Unorganized Conspiracies

In the context of unorganized criminal conspiracies, the mens rea is typically finite, localized, spontaneous, and short-lived. The required "meeting of minds" is formed for a singular, distinct objective for instance, a spontaneous plan to commit a bank robbery, an isolated homicide driven by a personal vendetta, or a localized kidnapping for ransom. Because these ventures lack an enduring organizational framework or long-term financial motives, the criminal agreement automatically dissolves the moment the specific illegal act is either successfully executed or definitively foiled. This structural transience means that the evidentiary trail is entirely transaction-bound, requiring the prosecution to establish a precise nexus between a localized set of actors and a solitary crime scene, rather than mapping an ongoing institutional enterprise. Consequently, the legal culpability in these unorganized plots remains strictly confined to the immediate participants of that singular event, preventing the expansive, systemic liability often applied to continuous criminal syndicates.<sup>804</sup>

- Simultaneous Awareness: The intent is direct. Members of an unorganized conspiracy usually share a collective, simultaneous awareness of the entire

<sup>803</sup> Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA). The state legislature recognized the failure of conventional evidentiary standards in proving the continuous mens rea of syndicate leaders.

<sup>804</sup> Ormerod, D. (2011). Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law (13th ed.). Oxford University Press, p. 433.

plot. Each conspirator knows the identities of the others and understands the exact scope of the intended crime. Unlike the fragmented, tiered structure of an organized crime syndicate where foot soldiers operate in blind isolation from the leadership, unorganized conspirators act with a horizontal, transparent unity of purpose. This shared clarity means that every individual involved enters the agreement with an explicit, unmediated understanding of the criminal target, leaving no legal ambiguity regarding their mens rea. Consequently, the prosecution is not required to pierce complex corporate or digital buffers to prove culpability; instead, the immediate, concurrent knowledge of all participants links them directly to the shared criminal enterprise, making the entire group uniformly liable for the singular infraction.

- **Extinguishment of Intent:** Once the objective is either successfully achieved or foiled by law enforcement, the mens rea and the conspiracy automatically extinguish. There is no lingering intent to form an ongoing criminal enterprise or to commit a continuous series of future crimes. This definitive expiration marks the fundamental boundary of unorganized liability, as the criminal agreement possesses no independent lifespan beyond its solitary, immediate goal. Unlike organized syndicates that adapt, survive, and shift to new illicit ventures after a job, the unorganized cell fractures and disperses permanently upon the resolution of the act. Consequently, the legal existence of the conspiracy is strictly bounded by the timeline of the specific offense, preventing law enforcement from using past actions to infer a continuous,

ongoing criminal status or a perpetual shared intent.<sup>805</sup>

### 3.2 Modus Operandi in Unorganized Conspiracies

The modus operandi of unorganized conspiracies lacks the systemic insulation, financial backing, and structural sophistication of organized syndicates.

- **Direct Participation and Proximity:** Conspirators are usually directly involved in both the planning and the physical execution of the crime. The masterminds are physically present at the scene or in direct, traceable contact with the perpetrators. Unlike organized crime syndicates where bosses rely on insulated, multi-tiered buffer layers to distance themselves from the street-level offense, unorganized plots feature a flat structure where the line between the architect and the executor is virtually non-existent. This physical or immediate proximity creates a highly visible, linear trail of evidence, making it much easier for law enforcement to establish a direct nexus between the planning stage and the actual crime scene. Consequently, the mens rea in these scenarios is not inferred from complex structural patterns or continuous financial flows, but from the clear, unmediated participation and explicit, traceable communication among the immediate actors.
- **Absence of Rigid Hierarchy:** There is rarely a distinct, institutionalized hierarchy of a "boss," "underboss," and "foot soldier." Participants act as co-equals or informal partners in the commission of the crime, operating on a flat, lateral plane rather than a vertical command structure. Unlike an organized syndicate enterprise that relies on strict, military-style tiers to command operations from a safe distance, unorganized conspirators

<sup>805</sup> Bimbhai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2003 SC 436. The Supreme Court observed that spontaneous unlawful assemblies or brief conspiracies formed in

the heat of the moment lack the continuous enterprise element necessary for organized crime classification.

collaborate through fluid, peer-to-peer relationships based on immediate utility or personal alignment. This lack of structural stratification means that decision-making is typically decentralized or consensus-driven, without a centralized executive authority insulating itself from the ground reality. Consequently, the legal liability under frameworks like Section 120B of the IPC or Section 61 of the BNS does not require the prosecution to prove a complex web of subordination or corporate-like delegation; instead, each participant is held equally accountable as a direct partner in a shared criminal venture.<sup>806</sup>

- **Amateur Traces and Evidentiary Vulnerability:** Because they lack the financial resources to engage in complex cover-ups, their planning often involves direct, traceable communication, such as standard cellular calls and physical meetings in public spaces. They do not employ sophisticated money laundering tactics, shell companies, or offshore accounts to mask their financial footprints. Consequently, the evidentiary trails left behind are generally linear and straightforward, making it significantly easier for local law enforcement to uncover, map, and prosecute the offense under standard evidentiary rules. Unlike organized syndicates that leave complex, multi-layered digital and financial puzzles, unorganized conspirators generate a localized, easily reconstructible chain of custody. This intrinsic vulnerability means that traditional investigative techniques, like analysing call detail records (CDRs) or reviewing local CCTV footage, are usually more than sufficient to definitively prove

the mens rea and secure a conviction without relying on extraordinary statutory presumptions.<sup>807</sup>

## CHAPTER IV – Organized Criminal Conspiracies

### 4.1 Mens Rea in Organized Conspiracies: The Corporate Intent

The mens rea in organized crime is fundamentally divergent from standard criminal intent. As codified under Section 111 of the BNS and established in MCOCA jurisprudence, the mental element is characterized by a "continuous and perpetual intent" to maintain an illegal enterprise for financial, economic, or strategic gain.<sup>808</sup>

To understand the mens rea in complex syndicates, modern jurisprudence relies on two distinct structural models:

- **Chain Conspiracies:** This model is ubiquitous in transnational narcotics smuggling and illicit arms trafficking. The conspiracy operates like a supply chain: the manufacturer in one country, the smuggler across the border, the regional distributor, and the local street dealer. These individuals may never meet or know each other's identities. However, the law imputes a shared mens rea because each link in the chain knows that their success depends on the success of the entire enterprise. The intent is to further the overall illegal supply chain.<sup>809</sup>
- **Wheel (or Hub-and-Spoke) Conspiracies:** In this model, a central "hub" (the syndicate boss) directs multiple "spokes" (hitmen, extortionists, money launderers). The spokes may be completely oblivious to the existence of the other spokes. However, they share a common mens rea with the hub to further the syndicate's objectives.

<sup>806</sup> Albanese, J. S. (2014). *Organized Crime: From the Mob to Transnational Syndicates*. Routledge, p. 14.

<sup>807</sup> *Topandas v. State of Bombay*, AIR 1956 SC 33. The court outlined how direct, localized circumstantial evidence is typically sufficient to connect unorganized conspirators who lack sophisticated cover-ups.

<sup>808</sup> Section 111, *Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita*, 2023, expressly defines organized crime by highlighting the "continuing unlawful activity" and the use of violence, intimidation, or coercion for pecuniary benefits.

<sup>809</sup> Marcus, P. (2010). *The Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Conspiracy Cases*. LexisNexis. The text provides extensive commentary on the practical application of wheel and chain structural models in federal prosecutions.

The Doctrine of Tacit Consent: In organized crime, the law does not require the prosecution to prove that a syndicate member knew every intricate detail of the conspiracy. "Tacit consent" or "implied knowledge" is sufficient. The mental requisite is merely the intent to participate in and further the broader criminal enterprise, regardless of one's specific, isolated role.<sup>810</sup>

#### 4.2 Modus Operandi in Organized Conspiracies

Organized conspiracies operate akin to multinational, highly disciplined corporate entities. Their modus operandi is meticulously designed to insulate the leadership from the predicate offenses.

- **Strict Compartmentalization:** Information within the syndicate is shared strictly on a need-to-know basis. The foot soldiers committing the physical actus reus (e.g., pulling the trigger in a contract killing) are entirely separated from the masterminds harboring the core mens rea and providing the funding.<sup>811</sup>
- **Financial Infrastructure and Laundering:** The ultimate goal of organized crime is wealth accumulation. Syndicates utilize a highly sophisticated financial modus operandi, employing hawala channels, shell companies, real estate investments, and crypto-assets (such as routing USDT through decentralized exchanges) to launder illicit proceeds and integrate them into the legitimate economy.<sup>812</sup>
- **Systemic Corruption and Intimidation:** Violence in organized crime is rarely a passionate outburst; it is a calculated, cold-blooded business tool used to enforce internal discipline, eliminate market competition, or coerce victims.

Furthermore, organized syndicates dedicate a portion of their illicit profits to systematically corrupt public officials, law enforcement, and politicians to ensure the longevity of the enterprise.<sup>813</sup>

- **Cyber-Syndicates:** With the advent of the digital age, the modus operandi has evolved from physical extortion to transnational cyber-crime, including ransomware attacks, dark-web trafficking, and massive data breaches, operating across multiple sovereign jurisdictions simultaneously.<sup>814</sup>

#### CHAPTER V – Comparative Analysis: Evidentiary Challenges and Adjudication

The structural differences between unorganized and organized conspiracies create drastically different evidentiary burdens for the prosecution during trial.

##### 5.1 Comparative Matrix

| Legal Parameter             | Unorganized Conspiracy                                                                        | Organized Conspiracy (Syndicates)                                                                                    |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Nature of Intent (Mens Rea) | Temporary and finite; extinguishes immediately upon the completion or failure of the singular | Continuous and perpetual; a corporate intent to sustain and grow the criminal syndicate indefinitely. <sup>815</sup> |

<sup>810</sup> Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 540. The Supreme Court established that there may be instances where a conspirator does not know the other conspirators, yet they are bound by the common illegal design, affirming the concept of tacit consent.

<sup>811</sup> UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). (2018). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment.

<sup>812</sup> HON'BLE, M. (2026). high court of judicature for rajasthan at - Verdictum. This recent judicial order highlighted a case under BNS Section 111 where the accused engaged in buying and selling USDT cryptocurrency through the

BINANCE app to circumvent daily transaction limits on behalf of an organized syndicate.

<sup>813</sup> GILL, M.R.G. (2025). The author notes that organized crime is marked by entrepreneurial systems, hierarchical structures, steady profits, and strict discipline, often functioning as parallel governments.

<sup>814</sup> Legal, B. (2026). Contemporary criminal syndicates often function through flexible networks, increasingly engaging in cyber-enabled fraud, which represents a massive shift in modern modus operandi.

<sup>815</sup> Finckenauer, J. O. (2005). Problems of definition: What is organized crime? Trends in Organized Crime, 8(3), 63-83.

| Legal Parameter                      | Unorganized Conspiracy                                                                                       | Organized Conspiracy (Syndicates)                                                                                                      | Legal Parameter | Unorganized Conspiracy                                                         | Organized Conspiracy (Syndicates)                                                                       |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                      | planned crime.                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                        |                 | (e.g., call data records between two accused, physical presence at the scene). | activity" and establishing the existence of the "enterprise" itself (e.g., Sec 111 BNS). <sup>818</sup> |
| Knowledge of the Plot                | Conspirators usually know each other personally and understand the full scope of the specific criminal plan. | Highly compartmentalized; members only possess "tacit knowledge" of their specific roles within the larger machine. <sup>816</sup>     |                 |                                                                                |                                                                                                         |
| Method of Execution (Modus Operandi) | Direct physical action, limited financial resources, amateur planning, and localized geographic reach.       | Multi-layered hierarchy, use of advanced encrypted technology, transnational reach, and sophisticated money laundering. <sup>817</sup> |                 |                                                                                |                                                                                                         |
| Evidentiary Standard                 | Proved via direct circumstantial evidence                                                                    | Requires proving a "pattern of continuous unlawful                                                                                     |                 |                                                                                |                                                                                                         |

## 5.2 The Evidentiary Burden

Proving mens rea in organized crime is notoriously difficult due to the intentional "buffer" layers protecting the leadership. In traditional unorganized conspiracy under the old IPC Section 120B, the prosecution had to prove an explicit agreement. Because syndicate bosses never put agreements in writing and rarely speak directly to perpetrators on unencrypted lines, they frequently escaped liability. This systemic failure necessitated the shift to specialized statutes and BNS Section 111, which allows courts to draw adverse inferences regarding mens rea based on the modus operandi specifically, the accumulation of wealth on behalf of a crime syndicate. Furthermore, the integration of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023 (which replaces the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), specifically modernizes the admissibility of electronic records, recognizing that modern syndicates operate heavily via digital communication.

To systematically dismantle these buffer layers, Section 61 of the BSA, 2023, elevates electronic

<sup>816</sup> BNS, 2023, Section 111 integrates the concept of acting "singly or jointly, either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate," addressing compartmentalized knowledge.

<sup>817</sup> The shift from physical extortion to transnational digital crimes requires an understanding of how syndicates utilize technology to expand their modus operandi globally.

<sup>818</sup> State of Maharashtra v. Shiva @ Shivaji Ramadasan, (2015). A detailed evidentiary analysis of how syndicate operations are adjudicated under the MCOCA framework.

and digital records to the status of primary evidence, ensuring that encrypted chats, server logs, and virtual ledger entries can be presented directly to prove a kingpin's command without the restrictive procedural bottlenecks of the old regime. This digital modernization works in tandem with the financial presumptions of BNS Section 111, effectively shifting the evidentiary burden onto the accused to explain the source of unexplained assets tied to a syndicate. Consequently, if the prosecution establishes a continuous trail of illicit wealth flowing upward through a structured network, the court can legally infer the boss's guilty mind based entirely on economic modus operandi, rendering physical detachment from the crime scene obsolete. This legislative overhaul marks a paradigm shift from a "transaction-based" inquiry to a "structure-and-effect-based" prosecution, ensuring that structural insulation no longer guarantees legal immunity. Ultimately, by marrying advanced digital forensics with statutory inferences on illicit wealth, India's new criminal laws effectively weaponize a syndicate's own operational and financial trail to definitively prove the hidden mens rea of its leadership.<sup>819</sup>

## CHAPTER VI – Landmark Judicial Pronouncements

The evolution of conspiracy jurisprudence in India and abroad provides profound insights into how courts interpret the intersection of mens rea and modus operandi.

### 6.1 Unorganized and General Conspiracy Jurisprudence

#### 1. *Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)* (AIR 1988 SC 1883)<sup>820</sup>

In the tragic aftermath of the 1984 assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Supreme Court of India faced the monumental task of parsing highly secretive plots, ultimately delivering foundational rulings most notably crystallized in *Kehar Singh v. State* (1988) that

fundamentally redefined the jurisprudence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120A of the Indian Penal Code. The Court recognized a pragmatic reality of criminal law: because conspiracies are inherently hatched in absolute secrecy, requiring the prosecution to produce direct evidence, such as eyewitnesses to the actual plot or written agreements, would render the law entirely toothless. Instead, the Court ruled that the mens rea, or the essential meeting of minds, must be judicially inferred from a holistic examination of the modus operandi, the subsequent conduct of the parties, and the surrounding circumstantial evidence.

This legal evolution established that in unorganized, highly compartmentalized, or deeply secretive plots, the prosecution is completely absolved from proving the precise moment, date, or geographical location where the criminal agreement was formed. Under this framework, a conspiracy is viewed as a continuing offense where the final, highly coordinated concerted action itself serves as retroactive proof that a prior agreement must have existed. To bridge the evidentiary gaps inherent in such secretive crimes, this jurisprudence relies heavily on the principle of implied agency under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, which dictates that once a prima facie case of conspiracy is established, the acts, words, or writings of one conspirator bind all others, even if individual members never met face-to-face. However, to prevent this low evidentiary threshold from becoming a tool for malicious prosecution, the Court erected vital safeguards, strictly mandating that grave suspicion can never substitute for legal proof, and that the chain of circumstantial evidence must be so seamless and complete that it rules out any hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused.

<sup>819</sup> The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, significantly broadens the scope of digital and electronic evidence, which is crucial for proving the mens rea in organized cyber-conspiracies.

<sup>820</sup> *Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)*, AIR 1988 SC 1883.

## 2. State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini (1999 5 SCC 253)<sup>821</sup>

The landmark Supreme Court judgment in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, officially cited as *State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini and Others* (1999), stands as a monumental judicial counterweight in Indian criminal jurisprudence by meticulously dissecting the boundaries between *mens rea* (guilty intent) and "knowledge." Decided by a three-judge bench, the ruling addressed a critical overreach where the prosecution sought to implicate several peripheral individuals who had merely provided shelter, logistics, or domestic aid to the core Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) plotters under the sweeping dragnet of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Supreme Court flatly rejected this blanket attribution of collective guilt, creating a strict legal firewall by distinguishing between "active participation" and "mere knowledge." The Court held that "mere association" with prime perpetrators, or having a passive awareness that irregular or unlawful activities are afoot, does not automatically transmute an individual into a co-conspirator. For a conspiracy charge to hold, the prosecution must prove a much higher threshold: an explicit "meeting of minds" characterized by a shared, specific intent to accomplish the exact ultimate illegal objective—in this case, the assassination of the former Prime Minister.

This judgment is of paramount importance to unorganized and highly compartmentalized conspiracy jurisprudence because it acts as a vital shield protecting peripheral, minor, or dependent actors from being unfairly swallowed by the liability of core masterminds. The Court recognized that in large-scale operations, individuals are often manipulated into performing routine tasks out of blind utility, friendship, or fear, completely oblivious to the grand, lethal design. Under the Nalini doctrine, the Supreme Court mandated that courts cannot view multi-defendant cases as a

monolith; instead, the evidentiary chain must be applied to each accused individually to prove they acted with a shared criminal mind. A profound manifestation of this principle occurred when the Supreme Court meticulously evaluated the charges under the stringent Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA). The Court shockingly overturned the TADA convictions for all the accused, ruling that the conspiracy was born out of a specific, localized animosity toward Rajiv Gandhi rather than a generalized intent to terrorize the Indian public or overawe the state. By strictly confining convictions to regular IPC provisions and acquitting those who exhibited a merely passive attitude, Nalini ensured that the state cannot elevate secondary, minor offenses like harboring an offender into capital conspiracy charges, firmly establishing that grave suspicion can never substitute for the exact proof of a shared guilty mind.

## 3. State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996 4 SCC 659)<sup>822</sup>

The Supreme Court of India firmly consolidated this principle by establishing that to validate a charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120A of the Indian Penal Code, a precise, conscious knowledge about indulging in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is an absolute, non-negotiable prerequisite. In the context of sprawling, unorganized, or highly compartmentalized conspiracies where different actors operate in isolated silos without direct communication with one another the Court emphasized that an accused's physical presence at the exact scene or moment of the crime is entirely irrelevant to determining guilt. What remains legally paramount is that the prior meeting of minds, or the *mens rea* to execute the specific unlawful design, must be unequivocally established through an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence. This jurisprudence ensures that a mastermind who operates entirely from the shadows, miles away from the actual execution, is held just as liable as the foot

<sup>821</sup> *State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini*, (1999) 5 SCC 253.

<sup>822</sup> *State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa*, (1996) 4 SCC 659.

soldier pulling the trigger, provided their shared intent is proved. Conversely, by demanding strict proof of this conscious knowledge and agreement, the framework prevents the state from retroactively ensnaring innocent bystanders or minor, peripheral actors whose actions might have inadvertently facilitated a crime, reinforcing that a conspiracy conviction cannot rest on mere proximity or grave suspicion, but must rely on a seamless, proven alignment of criminal minds.

## 6.2 Organized Crime and Syndicate Jurisprudence

### 4. State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah (2008 13 SCC 5)<sup>823</sup>

The landmark Supreme Court of India judgment in *State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah* (2008) stands as the definitive legal cornerstone validating the constitutional authority of extraordinary legislation like the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) to confront the realities of modern syndicate operations. In this pivotal ruling, the apex court explicitly recognized that organized crime syndicates operate via a highly sophisticated, deeply entrenched, and financially driven modus operandi aimed at securing massive pecuniary benefits a systemic threat that traditional penal frameworks, such as Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), are fundamentally ill-equipped to handle due to their reliance on localized, isolated criminal agreements. Utilizing the constitutional "doctrine of pith and substance," the Supreme Court upheld the legislative competence of the state to enact MCOCA, firmly validating the statutory inclusion of extraordinary investigative tools, specifically Sections 13 to 16, which authorize the interception of wire, electronic, and oral communications. The Court astutely observed that because the criminal mens rea of ultimate syndicate bosses is carefully insulated within a shroud of secrecy allowing kingpins to direct lethal operations and manage illicit capital without ever physically participating in the predicate offenses the state

must be legally armed with the power of electronic wiretaps to uncover this hidden meeting of minds. By ruling that such interceptions are reasonable restrictions on the right to privacy under Article 21 when governed by robust statutory safeguards, the judgment established a monumental legal precedent: extraordinary systemic crimes demand extraordinary evidentiary mechanisms, effectively ensuring that the law can pierce the corporate-like anonymity of organized crime networks to hold their insulated directors fully accountable.

### 5. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra (2013 13 SCC 1)<sup>824</sup>

In adjudicating the monumental 1993 Bombay Blasts case officially cited as *Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra* (2013) the Supreme Court of India confronted one of the most complex, transnational, and highly compartmentalized organized conspiracies in modern legal history. The prosecution faced the immense challenge of proving a unified criminal agreement under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code among hundreds of accused who operated in completely isolated silos: one group was smuggled to Pakistan for weapons training, another handled the maritime landing of deadly RDX explosives along the Konkan coast, while an entirely separate faction planted the bombs across Mumbai, meaning these individuals often had absolutely no mutual knowledge or direct communication with one another. To bridge these vast operational gaps, the Supreme Court masterfully applied the "Chain Conspiracy" doctrine, a specialized legal framework tailored for unorganized yet highly structured syndicates.

Under this doctrine, the Court ruled that in a large-scale, sequential operation, each participant functions as a vital link in a singular criminal chain; even if a foot soldier planting a bomb does not know the identity of the operative who smuggled the explosives, they are legally deemed to have known that their individual act was part of a larger, continuous illegal design.

<sup>823</sup> *State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah*, (2008) 13 SCC 5.

<sup>824</sup> *Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra*, (2013) 13 SCC 1.

The apex court astutely observed that the sheer, catastrophic scale of the operation, the specialized nature of the military-grade ordnance used, and the coordinated execution inherently implied a shared, overarching mens rea to wage a terrorist strike against the State. By characterizing the plot as a single, unified conspiracy rather than a series of disconnected, independent crimes, the judgment established a powerful precedent in anti-terror jurisprudence, holding the entire transnational network jointly liable and ensuring that the masterminds, financiers, and peripheral logicians could not escape accountability through the defense of compartmentalization.

#### 6. International Perspectives: United States v. Elliott (571 F.2d 880, 5th Cir. 1978)<sup>825</sup>

In one of the earliest and most profound interpretations of the US Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismantled the traditional limitations of conspiracy law by recognizing that modern organized crime does not operate through isolated agreements, but through an "enterprise" that functions as a continuous modus operandi. Under traditional conspiracy doctrine, the prosecution was historically bound by specific transactional chains, forced to prove that every individual member of a mafia family had direct knowledge of, and explicitly agreed to, every specific murder, extortion plot, or loan-sharking operation conducted by the group. The Fifth Circuit shattered this restrictive framework by holding that under RICO, prosecutors only need to establish that a defendant possessed the mens rea to participate in the overarching "enterprise" itself through a distinct "pattern of racketeering activity," effectively rendering any individual act committed by the syndicate attributable to its members as long as they intended to further the collective enterprise.

This groundbreaking American philosophy heavily influenced modern Indian legislative drafting, serving as a conceptual blueprint for the introduction of Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, which formally codified "Organized Crime" into India's national penal code for the first time. Mirroring the American "enterprise" concept, Section 111 shifts the focus away from isolated criminal conspiracies by targeting a "continuing unlawful activity" executed by an "organized crime syndicate" defined as a group of two or more persons acting singly or jointly to secure direct or indirect material or financial benefits. Much like its RICO predecessor, Section 111 bypasses the steep evidentiary hurdles of traditional conspiracy under Section 120B of the old IPC by allowing the prosecution to establish a systematic pattern of criminality through a statutory formula: requiring that multiple charge-sheets (more than one) have been filed before a competent court within the preceding ten years, and that the court has taken cognizance of those offenses. By focusing on the structural pattern of the syndicate spanning cybercrimes, human trafficking, contract killings, and mass economic fraud and imposing severe penalties (ranging from five years to the death penalty for fatal outcomes), the BNS adopts the core spirit of the RICO Act: it treats membership, abetment, and the deliberate intent to further a criminal collective as a distinct, monolithic offense, giving Indian law enforcement an extraordinary, systemic tool designed to match the sophisticated anonymity of modern criminal networks.

#### 7. R v. Shillam ([2013] EWCA Crim 160)<sup>826</sup>

This critical distinction within British jurisprudence was famously articulated by the Court of Appeal in the landmark case of R v Griffiths (1965) and later reinforced in R v Mehta (2012), where the judiciary drew a sharp line of demarcation between a single, massive organized conspiracy and multiple separate,

<sup>825</sup> United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978). This judgment is globally recognized for interpreting the "enterprise" liability model in racketeering cases.

<sup>826</sup> R v. Shillam, [2013] EWCA Crim 160. Ruling on the necessity of a shared mens rea across complex wheel and chain configurations under English law.

unorganized conspiracies. The Court issued a stern warning against prosecutorial overreach, noting that simply because multiple, independent criminal groups buy drugs or illicit contraband from the same central supplier does not automatically synthesize them into a singular, giant organized conspiracy. This legal reality is frequently illustrated in criminal law through the structural contrast between a "Chain Conspiracy" and a "Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy."

In a classic hub-and-spoke configuration, the central supplier acts as the "hub," and the various independent buyers act as the "spokes." The Court of Appeal ruled that for a single, comprehensive conspiracy to exist, there must be a "rim" connecting the spokes; in other words, the individual buyers must possess a shared, collective mens rea to further the overarching enterprise as a unified whole. If Buyer A and Buyer B have no knowledge of each other, no financial interdependence, and are merely competing customers of the same supplier, their activities constitute separate, distinct, and parallel conspiracies with the hub, rather than one monolithic criminal agreement. By enforcing this strict evidentiary standard, the UK Court of Appeal protected peripheral defendants from being unfairly overwhelmed by the massive scale and severe sentencing liabilities of a larger criminal network, establishing a foundational global precedent that a common source of supply can never substitute for a genuinely shared criminal intent.

## **CHAPTER VII – Conclusion and Policy Recommendations**

The metamorphosis of criminal conspiracies from unorganized, ad-hoc agreements to highly organized, transnational, financially structured syndicates represent one of the most formidable challenges to modern criminal justice systems. In unorganized conspiracies, the mens rea is singular, localized, and finite, while the modus operandi is rudimentary. This allows traditional legal frameworks, which rely on linear chains of evidence, to effectively prosecute offenders.

Conversely, organized crime operates on a continuum of unlawful intent. Syndicates utilize rigid hierarchies, deep financial structuring, and cyber-anonymity as their modus operandi, creating vast buffers to separate the masterminds from the actus reus. The transition from the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 specifically the landmark inclusion of Section 111 marks a necessary, aggressive watershed moment. It formally codifies the reality that prosecuting the modus operandi of organized crime requires recognizing the "enterprise" itself as the criminal entity.

Suggestions for Future Legal Application and Policy Reform:

1. **Creation of Specialized Investigatory Architectures:** With the invocation of BNS Section 111, India must develop centralized, federal investigatory architectures capable of mapping the complex financial modus operandi of syndicates. State police forces are restricted by territorial jurisdictions, whereas organized crime is inherently borderless. A unified task force focusing exclusively on syndicate enterprise liability is essential.
2. **Modernizing Digital Forensics and Cyber-Mens Rea:** As organized crime heavily shifts into cyber-fraud, ransomware, and dark-web operations, courts must interpret mens rea based on digital footprints. The evidentiary integration of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, must be supported by massive investments in blockchain analysis and encrypted data decryption to establish the "virtual meeting of minds."
3. **Statutory Witness Protection Programs:** The sophisticated intimidation tactics used in organized modus operandi fundamentally undermine the justice system. To ensure that the evidentiary chain linking the foot soldiers to the syndicate bosses remains unbroken,

India requires a robust, federally funded, statutory witness protection program, providing anonymity and relocation to whistleblowers and approvers.

4. International Treaty Alignment: Since organized conspiracies frequently route their modus operandi (especially money laundering) through international safe havens, India must strengthen its Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and extradition protocols, aligning its interpretation of organized crime under the BNS with the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC).

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