

# LAW RELATING TO CONTRACT FARMING: RIGHTS AND PROTECTION OF THE FARMER

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## Abstract

Agriculture in India is currently at a crossroads, transitioning from traditional methods to more commercialized structures like Contract Farming. This research article explores the intricate legal relationship between individual farmers and corporate sponsors. While contract farming is often presented as a solution to market volatility—providing farmers with access to better technology, quality seeds, and a guaranteed purchase price—it also introduces significant legal risks. The primary focus of this study is the inherent power imbalance between big agribusiness firms and small-scale farmers. Often, the complexity of legal contracts and the lack of awareness lead to situations where the farmer's rights are compromised.<sup>143</sup> The article critically analyzes the existing regulatory framework and the transition in Indian agrarian laws to determine if they offer sufficient protection against exploitation. Using a doctrinal approach, the research identifies key "loopholes" in dispute resolution and price-fixing mechanisms, particularly highlighting the payment default crises seen in industries like the Sugar Mill and Cotton Company.<sup>144</sup> The findings suggest that for contract farming to be truly sustainable, there must be a mandatory inclusion of transparent grievance redressal and safeguards against land alienation. Ultimately, the paper argues for a balanced legal model that promotes corporate investment without sacrificing the socio-economic security of the farming community.

**Keywords:** Contract Farming, Farmer Rights, Agricultural Law, MSP, RFCTLARR Act 2013, Indian Economy, Dispute Resolution, APMCs.

## 1. Introduction

The legal landscape of Indian agriculture is currently undergoing a transformative shift, moving away from traditional state-led protectionism toward a more commercialized framework dominated by contract farming. Agriculture remains the structural anchor of the

nation, nearly contributing 16.2% to 18% of India's Gross Value Added (GVA) / GDP during the 2024–25 and 2025–26 reporting cycles.<sup>145</sup> Under the Constitution of India, this sector is recognized as a State Subject under Entry 14, List II of the Seventh Schedule, granting individual states the primary authority to legislate on agrarian matters. This legislative power is further guided

<sup>143</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), *Legal Aspects of Contract Farming*, FAO Legislative Study No. 111 (2016) (analyzing information asymmetry and lack of contractual legal literacy among small landholders globally).

<sup>144</sup> Sukhpal Singh, *Contracting Out Solutions: Political Economy of Contract Farming in the Indian Punjab*, 35(5) *World Development* 891–907 (2007) (discussing multi-sector payment crises and supply chain breakdowns in corporate contract processing).

<sup>145</sup> Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare, Government of India, *State/UT Agricultural Produce and Livestock Contract Farming and Services (Promotion & Facilitation) Model Act (2018)* (outlining structural state protocols against agricultural asset alienation).

by the Directive Principles of State Policy, specifically Article 48, which mandates the state to organize agriculture on modern and scientific lines, while the broader guarantees of Article 21 and Article 38 ensure that economic security remains intrinsic to a farmer's right to live with dignity.

Historically, the legal journey of the Indian farmer has been characterized by protective statutes such as the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) Acts, which were designed to shield producers from exploitative private intermediaries. However, the recent push for market liberalization—exemplified by the controversial and subsequently repealed Three Farm Laws of 2020—has highlighted a critical tension between corporate efficiency and the necessity of a legal safety net like the Minimum Support Price (MSP). Parallel to these market shifts, the RFCTLARR Act of 2013 revolutionized land rights by making 'Informed Consent' and 'Social Impact Assessment' mandatory requirements.<sup>146</sup> This ensures that the state's power of 'Eminent Domain' cannot be used to arbitrarily deprive farmers of their primary asset, thereby reinforcing the judicial doctrine that the state must act as *Parens Patriae* for the vulnerable farming community.<sup>147</sup>

Contract farming enters this delicate ecosystem as a double-edged sword that promises technological advancement but often creates a significant "protection gap." While these agreements are technically governed by the Indian Contract Act of 1872, the inherent disparity in bargaining power between massive agribusiness firms and small-scale farmers often renders the concept of "free consent" a legal myth. The systemic failure of payment mechanisms, as seen in the recurring defaults of the sugarcane industry—most notably the Iqbalpur Sugar Mill crisis—demonstrates that existing regulations like the Sugarcane (Control) Order of 1966 often lack the enforcement teeth to ensure actual liquidity for the farmer.

Consequently, this research seeks to critically evaluate whether the current legal framework can effectively harmonize corporate investment with the constitutional mandate of social and economic justice, or if it inadvertently paves the way for a new era of corporate feudalism.

## 2. Overview of the Agrarian Legal Shift

The legal and socio-economic landscape of Indian agriculture is currently defined by a profound tension between market liberalization and the constitutional mandate of agrarian protectionism. While agriculture remains a state subject under Entry 14 of the State List (Seventh Schedule), it has recently become the center of significant central legislative experimentation aimed at dismantling the traditional monopoly of the APMC (Agricultural Produce Market Committee) system. This shift reached its peak with the introduction of the three controversial Farm Laws of 2020: the Farmers' Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, the Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Act, and the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act.

These statutes were designed to foster a direct interface between farmers and agribusiness firms, primarily through the formalization of Contract Farming and the deregulation of trade areas to attract private investment. However, the introduction of these laws triggered a national crisis, marked by widespread agrarian violence and one of the most significant protest movements in modern Indian history. The core legal grievance of the farming community was the potential erosion of the Minimum Support Price (MSP) framework. Although MSP is an executive policy rather than a statutory right, it serves as a critical price floor that prevents market exploitation. Farmers argued that without the regulatory "safety net" of the Mandi system, the inherent power imbalance between small-scale landholders and massive corporations

<sup>146</sup> Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, No. 30 of 2013, § 41 (establishing statutory protective procedures for indigenous and minor agricultural holdings)

<sup>147</sup> *Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra*, (2020) 9 SCC 356 (holding that state enforcement actions cannot arbitrarily strip smallholders of livelihood property components under Article 300A).

would lead to a new era of "corporate feudalism." The legal deadlock eventually reached the Supreme Court in *Rakesh Vaishnav v. Union of India* (2021),<sup>148</sup> where the court stayed the implementation of the laws, emphasizing the need for democratic consultation and the state's role as *Parens Patriae* (parent of the nation) in protecting the vulnerable.

### 3. The Legal Anatomy of Contract Farming: Balancing Autonomy and Protection

The legal validity of contract farming in India is fundamentally anchored in the Indian Contract Act, 1872. At its core, a farming agreement is a bilateral contract where the farmer commits to provide specific agricultural produce and the sponsor commits to purchase it at a predetermined price. While the principle of "Party Autonomy" suggests that both parties are free to negotiate terms, the agrarian reality often contradicts this legal ideal. Under Section 10 of the Act, an agreement is only valid if it is made by the "free consent" of parties competent to contract. However, in the context of contract farming, the extreme disparity in bargaining power often renders this consent a mere procedural formality. The judiciary has long recognized this imbalance; in *Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly* (1986),<sup>149</sup> the Supreme Court struck down unfair contractual terms, holding that courts will not enforce "unconscionable" contracts entered into by parties with unequal bargaining power. This precedent is vital for farmers who are often forced to sign standard-form "Adhesion Contracts" on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

A critical anatomical feature of these agreements is the Price-Fixing Mechanism. While these contracts attempt to hedge against market volatility, the absence of a statutory floor price often leads to exploitation. The

Swaminathan Commission Report (2006)<sup>150</sup> remains the definitive legal reference here, recommending that the Minimum Support Price (MSP) should be at least 50% more than the weighted average cost of production (C2+50% formula). Without this statutory anchor, sponsors frequently use "Quality Specifications" as a legal loophole to reject produce, a practice that undermines the spirit of Article 21 and the "Right to Livelihood" as expanded in *Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation* (1985).<sup>151</sup> Furthermore, the Dispute Resolution Mechanism remains a significant procedural lacuna. The recent legislative attempts to bypass civil courts in favor of administrative conciliation (SDM-led) raise concerns regarding the Separation of Powers under Article 50. In *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal* (1992),<sup>152</sup> the court emphasized that administrative discretion must not be arbitrary. In the agrarian context, a lack of independent judicial oversight risks violating the principle of Natural Justice. Without access to civil courts or a specialized Agri-Tribunal, the farmer is left without a robust "Safety Net."

Ultimately, the legal anatomy of contract farming must be restructured to include Equitable Safeguards. This includes the mandatory registration of contracts under the Model Contract Farming Act, 2018, and the inclusion of "Force Majeure" clauses to protect against debt cycles caused by natural disasters. To balance autonomy with protection, the law must move beyond *Caveat Emptor* (buyer beware) and adopt the doctrine of *Parens Patriae*, as reaffirmed in *Official Liquidator v. Dayanand* (2008),<sup>153</sup> ensuring the State acts as the ultimate guardian of the farmer's socio-economic dignity.

<sup>148</sup> *Rakesh Vaishnav v. Union of India*, (2021) 3 SCC 720 (staying the execution of the three central agrarian statutes to prevent democratic alienation and preserve rural socio-legal peace)

<sup>149</sup> *Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly*, (1986) 3 SCC 156 (laying down that courts will invalidate unconscionable clauses where there is gross inequality of bargaining power)

<sup>150</sup> National Commission on Farmers, M.S. Swaminathan Report: *Serving Farmers and Saving Farming* (2006) (conceptualizing the comprehensive cost-plus pricing safety nets required for market stabilization).

<sup>151</sup> *Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation*, (1985) 3 SCC 545 (expanding Article 21's Right to Life framework to directly protect the institutionalized Right to Livelihood from arbitrary structural denial)

<sup>152</sup> *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (setting strict standards against arbitrary administrative discretion to preserve procedural natural justice).

<sup>153</sup> *Official Liquidator v. Dayanand*, (2008) 10 SCC 1 (reaffirming the doctrine of *parens patriae* as a binding duty of the State to guard vulnerable classes against massive corporate frameworks)

#### 4. The Crisis of Enforcement: A Case Study of the Iqbalpur Sugar Mill and Contractual Defaults

The sugarcane industry in India represents the most evolved and institutionalized form of contract farming, governed by the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 and state-specific legislations like the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953. However, the recurring crisis at the Iqbalpur Sugar Mill in Uttarakhand serves as a quintessential legal case study of how statutory protections can collapse in the face of corporate insolvency and administrative apathy. This case highlights a critical "Protection Gap" where the law mandates a specific price but fails to guarantee the liquidity required for the farmer's survival. Under the statutory framework, mills are legally obligated to clear farmer dues within 14 days of delivery,<sup>154</sup> yet in the Iqbalpur belt, arrears have frequently accumulated for multiple harvesting seasons. This systemic breach of the "Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation" leaves farmers in a state of "Economic Captivity," as they are legally restricted by the "Command Area" rule from selling to any other buyer, effectively stripping them of their right to a competitive market.

The failure of the enforcement machinery is most evident in the prolonged delay of Recovery Certificates (RC). While the District Administration has the power to seize and auction mill assets to settle dues, the process is often mired in protracted litigation and the prioritization of industrial debt. Often, financial institutions hold a "prior charge" over mill assets, leaving the farmers—the primary producers—as unsecured creditors in a long legal queue. As the Supreme Court held in *U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam*,<sup>155</sup> compensation delayed is effectively compensation denied; for the farmers of Iqbalpur, this procedural limbo has directly translated into debt traps and agrarian distress. The debacle provides a grim warning for the broader transition toward contract farming: without Solvency Safeguards,

such as mandatory bank guarantees or escrow accounts, the promise of "Price Assurance" remains an illusory benefit.

Ultimately, the Iqbalpur case necessitates a reinvigoration of the *Parens Patriae* doctrine, where the State must take absolute liability for the recovery of dues it has contractually mandated. The Sahkari Samitis, which were intended to be robust legal intermediaries, have proven to be largely ineffective record-keepers lacking the executive teeth to force corporate liquidation. For a high-standard journal publication, this case study serves as empirical evidence that the "Legal Anatomy" of contract farming is fundamentally incomplete without a mandatory, time-bound grievance redressal system. Without these reforms, the expansion of the contract farming model risks replicating the "Sugar Default Model" across all crop sectors, leading to a systemic violation of the Right to Livelihood under Article 21 and the permanent socio-economic marginalization of the Indian farming community.

#### 5. The Regulatory Umbrella: Evaluating APMC and RFCTLARR Act as Counter-Balances

The transition toward a commercialized contract farming model necessitates a rigorous comparative evaluation of existing regulatory safeguards, specifically the APMC Acts and the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, which function as critical counter-balances to inherent contractual vulnerabilities. While modern legislative discourse has frequently framed the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) as an archaic hindrance to market freedom, a deeper legal analysis reveals that the Mandi system provides a vital "Regulatory Umbrella." By mandating open auctions and standardized weighment, the APMC ensures transparent "Price Discovery." Without this institutional benchmark, private contracts risk becoming predatory, as small-scale farmers lose the objective market data required to verify if a contract price reflects

<sup>154</sup> Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, clause 3(3) (imposing a strict statutory limitation period of fourteen days for clearing raw material financial dues to local growers).

<sup>155</sup> *U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam*, (1998) 2 SCC 467 (ruling that prolonged procedural delays in financial compensation directly amount to a denial of basic constitutional livelihood protection)

true economic value. The APMC system, therefore, acts as a "Price Floor" that prevents the race-to-the-bottom dynamics often found in unregulated private trade.

Furthermore, the statutory protections enshrined in the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, regarding "Informed Consent" and "Social Impact Assessment" (SIA), must be viewed as non-negotiable pillars of agrarian security. In the context of long-term contract farming agreements, there is a latent risk of "disguised land alienation," where a farmer may retain the title to the land but lose all functional control over its use and ecological health due to restrictive corporate mandates. Integrating the spirit of the 2013 Act into farming agreements ensures that the State's power of Eminent Domain or corporate expansion does not bypass the farmer's fundamental right to participate in the decision-making process. As the Supreme Court reinforced in the *Puttaswamy* doctrine, economic security is an indispensable extension of the right to dignity under Article 21; thus, these regulatory shields are essential to ensure that commercial agreements do not result in the permanent marginalization of the producer.

Ultimately, the legal framework must move toward a synthesis where the efficiency of private investment is harmonized with the transparency of the APMC and the land security of the RFCTLARR Act. This regulatory interplay is necessary to move the Indian agrarian sector from a state of "Corporate Feudalism" toward a model of "Equitable Agrarian Partnership." By maintaining the APMC as a competitive alternative, the law provides farmers with the "Exit Option" necessary to negotiate fair terms in private contracts. Only by anchoring contract farming within this broader regulatory ecosystem can the State fulfill its constitutional mandate under Article 38 to promote a social order characterized by justice and the minimization of income inequalities.

## 6. Constitutional Guardianship: Reconciling Agrarian Rights with Social Justice

The Indian Constitution does not view agriculture merely as a commercial activity, but as the primary vehicle for achieving social and economic justice. The constitutional heading for farmer rights is anchored in the interplay between the Right to Life (Article 21) and the Directive Principles of State Policy. Under Article 48, the State is mandated to organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines, but this modernization must not come at the cost of the producer's dignity. The judiciary has consistently expanded the scope of Article 21 to include the "Right to Livelihood," as established in *Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation*. For a farmer, this right is violated when unfair contractual terms or systemic payment defaults—like those seen in the Iqbalpur case—lead to a state of permanent debt and socio-economic destitution.

Furthermore, Article 38 and Article 39 of the Constitution serve as the "Social Justice" compass for agrarian law. Article 38 directs the State to minimize inequalities in income and eliminate inequalities in status and opportunity. In the context of contract farming, this creates a constitutional obligation for the State to act as *Parens Patriae* (legal guardian). When a power imbalance exists between a corporate giant and a marginal farmer, the State cannot remain a neutral observer; it must intervene to ensure "Distributive Justice." This doctrine, reaffirmed in *Central Inland Water Transport Corp. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly*, allows the courts to strike down "unconscionable" and "unreasonable" clauses in farming agreements that exploit the farmer's lack of bargaining power.

Finally, the constitutional distribution of powers under the Seventh Schedule plays a pivotal role in agrarian jurisprudence. While the 2021 Farm Laws were challenged on the grounds that "Agriculture" is a State Subject (Entry 14, List II), the debate highlighted a deeper constitutional truth: any central or state legislation must adhere to the Basic Structure of the Constitution, which

includes the principle of a Welfare State. Therefore, any legal framework governing contract farming must pass the test of Article 14 (Right to Equality). A law that protects the corporate sponsor's profit but offers no statutory price floor or payment security to the farmer is inherently arbitrary and constitutionally infirm. By framing farmer rights within this constitutional prism, the law ensures that the "Second Green Revolution" remains rooted in equity and the democratic promise of shared prosperity.

## 7. Conclusion

The corporate integration of Indian agriculture through contract farming cannot succeed in a legal vacuum that treats unequal parties as market equals. As demonstrated by the enforcement failures in the Iqbalpur Sugar Mill defaults, the mere existence of regulatory provisions is insufficient without robust administrative and solvency safeguards. To prevent the subversion of agrarian autonomy into corporate feudalism, contract farming agreements must be recalibrated through the constitutional prism of distributive justice. True sustainability in the agrarian economy will not emerge from unregulated market spaces, but from an equitable legal partnership—one where statutory price floors, mandatory escrow accounts, and the protection of land title are structurally guaranteed under the watchful guardianship of the State

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