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## DE-DEMOCRATISING THE WORKPLACE: UK EMPLOYMENT LAW AS CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECT FROM VOLUNTARISM TO MANAGED INEQUALITY

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### **Abstract:**

By arguing that employment law changed from postwar voluntarism to a purposeful constitutional project that subordinated collective worker voice to executive and managerial authority, this article critically examines the decline of industrial democracy in the UK. Important interventions that enacted authoritarian legalism rather than neutral regulation, such as the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, the Trade Union Acts of 1984 and 2016, and the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act of 2023, substituted procedural compliance for substantive participation. The article frames this trajectory as de-democratisation of the economic sphere, leaving workplaces as areas of private despotism despite formal political democracy, drawing on Schmittian sovereignty concepts and research on authoritarianism in labour governance. The Employment Rights Act 2025 partially reverses this by repealing the 2023 Act immediately, relaxing ballot thresholds and notice rules, banning exploitative zero-hours contracts, introducing day-one unfair dismissal rights, and strengthening union recognition and protections against fire-and-rehire and harassment. These reforms are still primarily defensive and procedural, despite the fact that they promise benefits for more than 18 million workers, productivity increases, and closer OECD alignment. Instead of attaining true democratic reopening, the Act liberalises within neoliberal bounds in the absence of codetermination, mandatory sectoral bargaining, or constitutionally guaranteed participation. Two arguments are made by the analysis: first, collective power has been constitutively disciplined by UK employment law; and second, even recent progressive changes highlight enduring structural limitations. In order to address the disparity between economic power and democratic accountability, true industrial democracy necessitates rethinking the workplace as a constitutional polity, casting doubt on the validity of Britain's uncodified constitution.

### **1. Introduction - Trade Union Decline and the Erosion of Collective Industrial Democracy**

Trade unions in Great Britain experienced a prolonged decrease in at least two distinct aspects. Initially, it was observed that union membership experienced a decline beginning in the late 1970s. Secondly, there was a decline in the number of unions over an extended

timeframe, resulting in a heightened concentration of a diminished membership.<sup>1687</sup>

This decrease in union membership was observed throughout the Western world, yet it manifested more significantly in the United Kingdom compared to nearly all other locations. By 2022, trade union membership constituted approximately fifty percent of its peak in the 1980s, which was 13 million individuals, while the

<sup>1687</sup> Paul Willman, Alex Bryson and John Forth, 'UK Trades Unions and the Problems of Collective Action' (papers.ssrn.com18 July 2016) <[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2810454](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810454)>.

density experienced a more pronounced decline as the workforce expanded. In 2017, the quantity of labourers participating in strike activities decreased to the lowest point recorded since the 1890s. In contrast to the railway strike that occurred during the 1960s and the event referred to as the 'Winter of Discontent' in 1979, which involved over 4 million workers participating in strikes, the year 2017 recorded only 33,000 workers on strike, as reported by the Office for National Statistics.<sup>1688</sup>

Taken together, these trends reflect more than a numerical contraction of trade union activity; they signal a profound restructuring of the institutions that historically embodied collective industrial democracy in the UK. This transformation was not an inevitable consequence of economic or demographic change, but the outcome of deliberate political and legal interventions that systematically eroded the capacity of unions to organise, mobilise, and exercise influence. Understanding this process requires revisiting the institutional settlement that once sustained industrial democracy, and critically examining the mechanisms, be they legislative, judicial, and managerial – through which that settlement was incrementally destabilised and ultimately fragmented.

While existing scholarship has often analysed discrete episodes of British labour law reform, this article provides a unified critical account of how legal intervention has systematically reshaped industrial democracy itself. Rather than treating restrictions on trade unions, strike regulation, and worker participation as isolated or episodic measures, it locates them within a longer constitutional trajectory: from the postwar voluntarist settlement to increasingly authoritarian modes of labour governance. In doing so, the article advances two central claims. First, labour law has operated not merely as a neutral regulatory response to

industrial conflict, but as a constitutive mechanism that actively disciplines collective power and narrows the scope of democratic participation at work. Second, developments since 2016, including the Trade Union Act 2016, the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023, and the partial reversal in the Employment Rights Act 2025, mark a qualitative shift in the relationship between labour law and democracy that exceeds purely neoliberal or market-based explanations, revealing deeper authoritarian tendencies in the management of economic pluralism.

## **2. The Breakdown of Voluntarism and the Search for Legal Order**

By the late 1960s, the central challenge was managing the tensions arising from – or overlooked by – collective bargaining, including inflationary wage settlements, economic sustainability, and gender equity. These pressures contributed to the collapse of the *gesellschaft* model of collective bargaining by 1965, as third-party industrial relations bodies began exerting more control over bargaining units and their representatives. It became clear that providing stronger legal support for collective bargaining inevitably meant increasing legal oversight. With the fall of the *gesellschaft* model – which had given groups sole authority over the composition of bargaining units and the selection of their agents – the pressing task shifted to creating a labour law framework that could endure over the long term.<sup>1689 1690</sup>

The Donovan Royal Commission (1968) is often celebrated as the last defence of voluntarism, yet its recommendations reveal the inherent fragility of Kahn-Freund's collective *laissez-faire* model. Donovan advocated formalising workplace bargaining through joint procedures rather than legal compulsion, insisting that "the law should not seek to impose an orderly

<sup>1688</sup> Karl Hansen, 'How the Tories Tried to Make Strikes Impossible' (tribunemag.co.uk) 18 August 2022 <<https://tribunemag.co.uk/2022/08/thatcher-trade-unions-strike-industrial-action-solidarity-conservatives>> accessed 1 January 2026.

<sup>1689</sup> Jury Fudge, 'Trade Unions, Democracy and Power' (2011) 7 *International Journal of the Law in Context* 95.

<sup>1690</sup> Otto Kahn-Freund, 'Industrial Democracy' (1977) 6 *Industrial Law Journal* 65 <<https://academic.oup.com/ijl/article-abstract/6/1/65/707564>> accessed 10 February 2026.

pattern on industrial relations” but should instead support voluntary reform. This stance reflected a deep commitment to avoiding coercion, yet it underestimated the centrifugal forces – inflation, unofficial strikes, productivity gaps – that voluntary bargaining could not contain without state intervention. The Labour government’s 1969 White Paper ‘In Place of Strife’ exposed these limits. Proposals for cooling-off periods, compulsory ballots, and sanctions against unconstitutional strikes were withdrawn amid union resistance and Cabinet revolt. Critically, the episode demonstrated that voluntarism was not neutral abstention but a contingent political settlement dependent on union restraint and economic stability. When that broke down, the model offered no mechanism to resolve conflicts without risking either union dominance or state overreach. Donovan’s procedural optimism, in expanding bargaining while resisting enforceability, proved insufficient to manage the contradictions of late-Keynesian capitalism.<sup>1691 1692</sup>

This failure set the stage for the juridical counter-revolution. Rather than a pragmatic adjustment, the shift from 1971 onward constituted an active constitutional displacement: the state reclaimed sovereignty over the economic sphere by subordinating collective autonomy to legal discipline. The recent Employment Rights Act 2025 partially reverses this by repealing the 2023 Minimum Service Levels Act immediately and most 2016 restrictions from February 2026.<sup>1693</sup> Academic assessments affirm its economic rationale, indicating a small positive effect on employment (around 0.1% increase) and

alignment with evidence that stronger protections foster growth and fairer markets.<sup>1694</sup>

Yet, this procedural liberalisation does not restore substantive industrial democracy; it removes barriers without reconstructing positive collective power or embedding worker voice in enterprise governance. The Donovan-era dilemma endures: without constitutionalising economic democracy, voluntarism’s collapse leaves the workplace as a zone of managed inequality rather than joint regulation.

### **3. The Industrial Relations Act 1971: Legalism, Ideology, and Political Failure**

Internal Conservative divisions and the difficulties encountered in abolishing the trade union closed shop under the 1971 Industrial Relations Act were central to its failure. What appeared to be a clear and principled reform proved far more complex in both formulation and implementation. Senior Conservatives increasingly acknowledged the interdependent nature of industrial relations, yet policy efforts treated the closed shop as an isolated problem, generating contradictory outcomes that undermined the stated aim of industrial order and stability. Those most directly involved in designing the prohibition recognised that it was neither simple nor self-contained. Rather, it produced tensions within the Conservatives’ own objectives and required the rapid securing of the “consent of the governed” – in practice, trade union compliance – which the Heath government failed to achieve. Its heavily legalistic approach assumed that statutory intervention alone could recalibrate the balance between the state and organised labour, without persuading either unions or the wider public of the legitimacy of this shift. This misjudgement was exposed during the 1972 miners’ strike, when a Gallup poll showed that 52% of the public sympathised with the miners.

<sup>1691</sup> Mustifa Delican, ‘British Industrial Relations in Transition, 1960-1990’ (Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi 1998) <<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/9546>> accessed 31 December 2025.

<sup>1692</sup> Ruth Dukes, *The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law* (University of Glasgow 2014) <<https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/93380/>> accessed 10 February 2026.

<sup>1693</sup> ‘Plan to Make Work Pay and Employment Rights Act: Timeline Update’ (GOV.UK 3 February 2026) <<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/implementing-the-plan-to-make-work-pay-and-employment-rights-act/plan-to-make-work-pay-and-employment-rights-act-timeline-update>> accessed 10 February 2026.

<sup>1694</sup> C Carter and others, ‘Acknowledgements Assessing the Legal and Economic Implications of the Employment Rights Act 2025’ (2026) <<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/695e23e88832ab3a48513801/assessing-the-legal-and-economic-implications-of-the-employment-rights-act-2025.pdf>> accessed 10 February 2026.

Although public anxiety about trade union power grew during the 1970s and peaked during the 1978–79 Winter of Discontent, later scholarship demonstrated that the scale and impact of these disputes were frequently overstated for ideological and partisan ends. While the hardships experienced by individuals and communities were real, they were often generalised and attributed to “selfish” unions, obscuring the more limited and uneven nature of the disruption. The core weakness of the reform lay in its internally conflicting objectives and its departure from pragmatic industrial relations management in favour of ideological intervention. Policymakers such as Geoffrey Howe and Robert Carr recognised that abolishing the closed shop risked fostering multi-unionism or non-unionisation, both likely to increase workplace instability. Yet the intensity of opposition within industry to this aspect of reform was repeatedly overlooked. In practice, the strategy diminished both employer and union authority, contradicting the Act’s stated purpose and contributing to its ultimate failure.<sup>1695</sup>

Despite significant difficulties during the drafting process and repeated warnings from departmental officials that the Bill required substantial revision, ministers chose to rush it through Parliament with minimal consultation of employers or trade unions. This decision had predictable and damaging consequences. In particular, the government’s failure to engage seriously with employer criticisms proved costly, as many employers correctly anticipated the practical difficulties the legislation would generate. Once implemented, the Industrial Relations Act quickly unravelled in practice. In pursuing broader ideological objectives, most notably the reform of the closed shop, the Conservative Party abandoned a pragmatic approach to policymaking in industrial relations. Although the Act failed to dismantle the closed shop, evidence demonstrates that senior figures

within Heath’s administration continued to support these measures until the end. Following the twin electoral defeats of 1974, attitudes towards trade unions and the closed shop hardened further. While the Act collapsed both politically and institutionally, it nonetheless established a critical precedent: that industrial relations could be reshaped through legal compulsion rather than collective consent. When the Conservatives returned to power in 1979 in the aftermath of the Winter of Discontent, this precedent shaped a more incremental and strategic approach to trade union reform. Apparent restraint concealed a sustained determination to proceed despite anticipated union resistance. In an industrial relations landscape increasingly defined by individual rights, managerial authority, and labour market flexibility, the earlier model of voluntarism, social partnership, and acceptance of the closed shop was rapidly relegated to the past, alongside the 1971 Industrial Relations Act itself.<sup>1696</sup> What distinguished the post-1979 period was not the abandonment of legal intervention, but its recalibration into a longer-term strategy aimed at reshaping the balance of power at work.

#### **4. From Industrial Conflict to Coercive Pacification**

Analysis of the decline in strike activity was intended to illuminate the relative significance of the forces driving this transformation. The argument advanced located the explanation not in changing worker attitudes, but in the restructuring of strike-prone industries, such as coal mining, motor manufacturing, shipbuilding, and dock work, which had been centres of industrial militancy in the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1980s, these sectors experienced profound product-market restructuring, marked by mass redundancies and far-reaching changes to working practices that systematically weakened labour’s capacity to

<sup>1695</sup> Pete Dorey and Sam Warner, “The Conservative Party and the Closed Shop: Inherent Contradictions, Non-Compliance and the Failure of the Industrial Relations Act 1971” [2025] Contemporary British History 1.

<sup>1696</sup> James Moher, “Trade Unions and the Law - History and a Way Forward? - History & Policy” (History & Policy) <<https://historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/trade-unions-and-the-law-history-and-a-way-forward/>> accessed 21 January 2026.

resist. This period was characterised by what has been described as “coercive pacification,” as employers exploited new economic and political conditions to dismantle the existing balance of power. These strategies ranged from overt confrontation to more sophisticated forms of control, and are more accurately understood as a sustained episode of “class struggle from above.” Yet this dimension of the 1980s is often underplayed in retrospective accounts, displaced by a narrow focus on emblematic disputes. The elevation of events such as the miners’ strike (1984–85) and Wapping (1986–87) to symbolic status has tended to obscure the broader and more relentless assault on predominantly manual workers that unfolded throughout the decade and into the 1990s. The miners’ strike represented an extreme expression of this wider process rather than an isolated rupture. Ned Smith, then industrial relations director of the National Coal Board, later criticised Thatcher’s dismissive characterisation of mining and its workforce as a form of “outdoor relief.” His account of the dispute, which was written in 1986 but published only in 1997, had revealed the extent to which defeat and humiliation of the miners were treated as political objectives in their own right. From this perspective, the prolongation of the strike was not economically necessary: had it been approached as a conventional industrial dispute, a settlement acceptable to management could have been reached by September 1984.<sup>1697</sup>

The labour market restructuring of the 1980s cannot be reduced to a matter of economic necessity or adjustment. It represented a deliberate and systematic reassertion of managerial authority, in which legal instruments became a primary tool for neutralising collective resistance and curtailing industrial democracy. Law was not a passive accompaniment to broader economic change;

<sup>1697</sup> Dave Lyddon, ‘Why Trade Union Legislation and the Labour Party Are Not Responsible for the Decline in Strike Activity • International Socialism’ (International Socialism 19 April 2018) <<https://isj.org.uk/why-trade-union-legislation-and-the-labour-party-are-not-responsible-for-the-decline-in-strike-activity/>> accessed 31 December 2025.

it actively facilitated the entrenchment of employer power, codifying constraints on union activity and insulating the restructuring process from the challenge posed by organised labour.

### **5. Restricting Strike Action and Reconfiguring Union Power**

From 1980 to 1993, Conservative administrations enacted six core pieces of employment legislation, commencing with the Employment Act of 1980, aimed at limiting the authority of trade unions to engage in strike actions. The act of picketing experienced limitations. Solidarity strikes had been prohibited. The United Kingdom possessed, as a result of those regulations, the most stringent anti-union legislation in Europe. The legal framework afforded only minimal safeguards for a union in the event of being litigated against by the employer for contractual violations, and even these safeguards were significantly restricted. The individuals participating in industrial action received protection solely when the objective of the strike was industrial rather than political, and when the union conducted a ballot among its members while also informing the employer both prior to the ballot and subsequently regarding its outcome.<sup>1698</sup>

The Employment Act of 1982 served as the central component of their strategic approach. In instances where employers harboured suspicions of illegal activities, they possessed the option to petition the High Court for an interim injunction aimed at restraining a union from initiating or continuing a strike. This course of action was characterised by procedural biases unfavourable to unions, rendering it a more efficacious solution compared to pursuing a claim for damages, which was often protracted and failed to address the urgent matter at hand.<sup>1699</sup> The Employment Act of 1982

<sup>1698</sup> David Renton, ‘A Brief History of Britain’s Anti-Trade Union Laws’ (tribunemag.co.uk 23 June 2022) <<https://tribunemag.co.uk/2022/06/trade-union-laws-rmt-strike-industrial-relations-legislation/>> accessed 31 December 2025.

<sup>1699</sup> Dave Lyddon, ‘The Long View on UK Strikes: 1984–2024 in Historical Perspective’ (Revue Française De Civilisation Britannique 2025) <[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392784832\\_The\\_Long\\_View\\_o](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392784832_The_Long_View_o)>

also elevated the compensation levels for employees who were terminated due to their refusal to affiliate with a labour union. It was enacted by Norman Tebbit, the Employment Secretary within the Conservative administration. Subsequently characterised by the BBC as the individual pivotal in addressing the trade unions, Tebbit had previously engaged as an activist for the British Airline Pilots' Association before his foray into politics.<sup>1700</sup>

These measures signalled not merely episodic interference but the construction of a systematic legal apparatus aimed at disciplining collective labour action. By normalising judicial oversight as a routine component of industrial conflict, the 1982 Act entrenched a framework in which union activity was treated as inherently suspect and subject to external control. Once unions' capacity to exert influence externally had been constrained, regulatory attention shifted decisively inward, targeting internal governance and decision-making processes. In effect, the legislation extended state authority into the organisational autonomy of unions, embedding mechanisms of surveillance, compliance, and control that fundamentally altered the balance of power between labour and management.

### **6. Democracy, Accountability, and the Regulation of Union Autonomy**

On July 26, 1984, the United Kingdom implemented the Trade Union Act, which imposed novel limitations on the independence of trade unions. The legislation mandated that unions implement specified internal protocols aimed at improving the "democracy" within trade unions. The failure of a union to implement these provisions led to the forfeiture of immunity from civil and criminal liability. The Trade Union Act mandated that all voting

members of a union's executive council be elected through a secret ballot every five years. Moreover, the legislation established that the ratification through postal or secret ballots constituted a necessary condition prior to the initiation of any type of industrial action. Only individuals who were members of the union possessed the ability to initiate legal action aimed at enforcing the stipulations outlined in the Act. This legislation imposed additional limitations on the allocation of union dues for political objectives; specifically, it mandated that the general membership had to approve the continuation of any political fund through a secret ballot every decade. Exclusively funds derived from the financial reserve were utilised to advance the political aims of the union. Through the implementation of these procedural guidelines, the Conservative Government aimed to enhance union "democracy" by rendering ruling councils more accountable to the general membership. The Trade Union Act was enacted in 1984. The Trade Union Act initiated a renewed discussion regarding the extent of governmental oversight pertaining to trade unions, a contentious issue deeply rooted in English labour law. The extent of allowable statutory interference was contingent upon the government's perception of the legal classification of trade unions as either "voluntary," "quasi-corporate," or entirely "incorporate." It asserted that, should the government have perceived unions as incorporated entities, it could have provided a rationale for regulating the internal structure of the union as well as its external operations. In contrast, should the government have perceived union membership as a voluntary endeavour, it would have been able to rationalise limitations on external activities deemed "illegal" that individual members were not permitted to engage in legally. Ultimately, the classification of unions as quasi-corporate entities provided a rationale for the regulation of both legally permissible external activities in

n\_UK\_strikes\_1984-2024\_in\_Historical\_Perspective> accessed 31 December 2025.

<sup>1700</sup> Norman Tebbit: Outspoken Hero of the Conservative Political Right ' BBC News (8 July 2025) <<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3g9k91g3xo>> accessed 31 December 2025.

which individual members could engage and those deemed illegal.<sup>1701</sup>

It was essential to highlight that, in promoting the principles of union democracy, the Trade Union Act of 1984, which represented the third phase of the government's industrial legislation, exerted a dual impact on trade unions. Initially, it exerted an indirect influence on the internal matters of the union. Secondly, it offered the mechanisms through which the trade union movement in its entirety could have been both reinforced and undermined.<sup>1702</sup>

The emphasis on internal union democracy was profoundly ambivalent. While superficially presented as empowering members, these reforms functioned as instruments through which the state extended its reach into the internal governance of unions, effectively subordinating collective autonomy to regulatory oversight. Far from simply enhancing accountability, the Trade Union Act of 1984 created new mechanisms for intervention and control, raising enduring tensions between formal democratic processes and state-imposed constraints. This intrusion was reinforced by a wider judicialisation of industrial relations, in which courts and tribunals increasingly mediated disputes, embedding legal authority as a central arbiter of workplace conflict and further circumscribing the independent exercise of union power.

### **7. Industrial Conflict, Judicialisation, and the End of Voluntarism**

During the late 1980s, the concept of collective bargaining, particularly in its conventional, industry-wide form, appeared to undergo scrutiny, with judicial bodies frequently engaged in industrial disputes on a daily basis. Nonetheless, it remained uncertain whether this led to a reduction in wage expectations. As the

<sup>1701</sup> Bret J Pangborn, 'English Labour Law - the 1984 Trade Union Immunities Act and Its Effects on Unions Legal Status '[1986] Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law <<https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1760&context=gjicl>> accessed 31 December 2025.

<sup>1702</sup> JR Carby-Hall, 'Trade Union Democracy '(1984) 26 Managerial Law 1 <<https://www.emerald.com/ijlma/article-abstract/26/6/1/295632/Trade-Union-Democracy?redirectedFrom=fulltext>> accessed 31 December 2025.

economy experienced overheating and rising prices reemerged, certain industrial challenges reminiscent of the 1970s appeared to resurface. By the conclusion of the decade, it became feasible to form an initial assessment regarding the effectiveness of the newly established legal system, as it underwent evaluation through the resurgence of industrial disputes.<sup>1703</sup>

These trends did not dissipate with time. Later, the Trade Union Act of 2016 represented a historically significant shift in the ideological landscape surrounding the regulation of trade unions. It illustrated a more authoritarian approach to Conservative ideology and governance concerning trade union regulation, which was evident in three primary characteristics: (i) a repressive strategy aimed at de-democratisation, which undermined political opposition and suppressed dissent within the democratic framework; (ii) an increased dependence on direct State coercion, encompassing methods of criminalisation, in conjunction with the empowerment of employers to utilise civil law remedies against trade unions and workers engaged in industrial actions; (iii) the prioritisation of social order in the oversight of strike activities. The article subsequently examined the probable implications of the legislation, as well as the broader ideological importance of this shift towards authoritarianism within Conservative political thought in the context of moving beyond neo-liberalism. In his assessment, a significant transformation was observed within that intricate array of influences. The Trade Union Act of 2016 illustrated the increasing dominance of a more authoritarian approach within Conservative governance and political ideology; it transcended neo-liberalism, as it did not align with liberal principles in any respect. Dyzenhaus posited that Schmitt's political philosophy articulated the notion of politics as an imperative endeavour aimed at establishing

<sup>1703</sup> Andrew Hodge, 'The Curious History of Trade Union Law '(2012) 4 The Denning Law Journal 92 <<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0518/c1eeefc2719287cd3b0645514738f784056.pdf>> accessed 31 December 2025.

a normative condition from the disorder of pluralism through the enactment of a truly political and sovereign decision. The decision necessitated a clear distinction between allies and adversaries; it sought to create a society composed solely of individuals who met the standards of substantive homogeneity. This necessitated nothing short of the dismantling of parliamentary democracy and the eradication of pluralism. The leader of the political community was tasked with identifying the 'friend' within the pluralistic divide and repelling the 'enemy,' thereby ensuring the maintenance of a stable social order within the political community. This conception of politics allowed for minimal accommodation of dissenting voices. The limitations imposed by the constitution, the processes of democratic deliberation, the establishment of liberal rights, and the mechanisms of checks and balances inherent in parliamentary governance stifled the engagement in genuine political practices, wherein the supremacy of the sovereign's will was prominently highlighted. The economic and political crises that were experienced provided opportunities for what could be characterised as 'authentic' politics to emerge beyond the constraints of the constitutional framework.<sup>1704</sup>

### **8. Reinterpreting the Winter of Discontent and Its Legacy**

The 'Winter of Discontent' (1978–79) has been retrospectively weaponised as the original sin justifying four decades of restrictive labour law. Widespread strikes, triggered by Ford's 17% settlement and spreading to public services, had produced genuine disruption: fuel shortages, unburied bodies, hospital pickets. Yet the dominant narrative exaggerated union "excess" to legitimise a fundamental rebalancing of power. Critically, this was ideological reconstruction rather than neutral history. The strikes repudiated Labour's wage

restraint, reflecting real pay erosion for public and skilled private-sector workers amid stagflation. Empirical accounts show the chaos was localised and often overstated for partisan ends. Nonetheless, the memory of inconvenience, amplified by media and Conservative rhetoric has cemented public consent for legal rollback after 1979.<sup>1705</sup> The strikes signified a repudiation by numerous labour groups of the Labour government's income strategy, which resulted in a decline in real pay for public sector workers and thousands of skilled workers in the private sector.<sup>1706</sup>

The Employment Rights Act 2025 disrupts the post-1979 trajectory. Repeal of the 2023 Act and most 2016 provisions restores easier industrial action, extends ballot mandates to 12 months, and introduces electronic balloting. This represents one of the most significant pro-union shifts since the postwar settlement.<sup>1707 1708 1709</sup>

Yet the critical question remains: does this mark genuine democratic reopening, or merely procedural adjustment within a neoliberal constitutional frame? The reforms dismantle barriers but do little to rebuild sectoral bargaining, embed codetermination, or challenge managerial prerogative. Without positive rights to economic voice, the Winter's legacy persists: political democracy coexists with economic disenfranchisement, and labour

<sup>1704</sup> Alan Bogg, 'Beyond Neo-Liberalism: The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Authoritarian State' (Oxford Academic 2016) <<https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:51bd75f1-93f5-4e60-b61f-e8ed36814dad/files/m90df5d88415071c3767c4139da86724f>> accessed 31 December 2025.

<sup>1705</sup> Joseph O'Kane, 'The Ford Strike of 1978 and the "Winter of Discontent"' (History Workshop 11 January 2023) <<https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/labour/the-ford-strike-of-1978-and-the-winter-of-discontent/>> accessed 31 December 2025.

<sup>1706</sup> 'Winter of Discontent', A Dictionary of Human Resource Management (Oxford University Press 2008) <<https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803124216563>>.

<sup>1707</sup> GOV.UK, 'Employment Rights Bill: Factsheets' (GOV.UK2024) <<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/employment-rights-bill-factsheets>> accessed 10 February 2026.

<sup>1708</sup> Simona Kalnina, 'Employment Rights Act: Electronic Balloting and Unpaid Carers' Rights' (Peoplemanagement.co.uk 15 January 2026) <<https://www.peoplemanagement.co.uk/article/1945246/employment-rights-act-electronic-balloting-unpaid-carers-rights>> accessed 10 February 2026.

<sup>1709</sup> Luke Woodward, 'What Does Trade Unionism Mean to Me?' (Workersliberty.org 2026) <[https://www.workersliberty.org/blogs/2026-02-10/what-does-trade-unionism-mean-me?language\\_content\\_entity=en](https://www.workersliberty.org/blogs/2026-02-10/what-does-trade-unionism-mean-me?language_content_entity=en)> accessed 10 February 2026.

law continues to manage, rather than realise, worker self-government.

### **9. Beyond the Single Channel: Reimagining Worker Representation**

Conservative policies sought to reintroduce common law into industrial relations, but stripped of collective resistance, “free market” conditions mainly disempowered workers under the guise of individualism. In this context, collective laissez-faire remained valuable, as it preserved space for trade unionism – a key safeguard for social justice. With postwar consensus eroding and British society marked by increasing class inequality, protecting collective laissez-faire required more than government non-interference; it demanded active legal safeguards that upheld workers’ rights and supported, rather than undermined, free trade unionism.<sup>1710</sup>

Nonetheless, Ewan McGaughey has challenged the prevailing UK labour law view that trade unions were the sole (“single channel”) form of workplace representation, rooted in an adversarial view of corporations. He highlighted a historical context of workers’ voting rights in British businesses, advocating a constitutional corporate governance framework allowing employee participation without requiring capital ownership. Historically, Britain led in promoting worker involvement. Universities, among the earliest corporate entities, granted staff voting rights from the mid-19th century, such as under the Oxford University Act of 1854. During the 20th century, “second channel” representation appeared in pension boards, while “third channel” board-level participation emerged in sectors like ports (Port of London Act 1908), gas, postal services, steel, and bus industries. Political parties, including Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour, had intermittently proposed workplace voting, often linked to nationalisation or voluntary schemes. The notion of a “single channel,” formalised in a 1967 Labour policy, prioritised unions over

alternatives like works councils or codetermination. This partly stemmed from scepticism toward employee share schemes, which tied voting to capital ownership, marginalising non-owners. Early experiments, such as Briggs’ colliery (1865) and South Metropolitan Gas (1896), largely failed due to strikes and power imbalances. Post-World War I initiatives, including coal nationalisation (1919) and railway codetermination (1920), also faltered amid employer resistance and union divisions. Post-World War II nationalisation efforts, including the Iron and Steel Act 1967, introduced limited worker directors, but these measures in steel and postal sectors were short-lived. The Bullock Report (1977) proposed union-nominated board seats but faced business opposition and internal Labour Party splits. Thatcher’s government (from 1979) dismantled these structures in favour of share ownership, while later EU directives established consultative councils. McGaughey argued that the “single channel” narrative ignored the variety of historical models. With union coverage declining – 72% of workers remained unrepresented – codetermination, granting board positions or general meeting voting rights to employees, aligned with EU practices, enhancing efficiency, accountability, and fairness without displacing unions. Britain’s history showed that a singular approach to enterprise regulation was insufficient, making minimum voting rights a vital element of a modern economic constitution.<sup>1711</sup>

These historical experiments challenge the assumption that trade unionism and workplace democracy are mutually exclusive. Instead, they suggest that democratic participation at work has taken multiple institutional forms, many of which were prematurely abandoned rather than systematically evaluated. European integration would partially reopen this institutional space, introducing alternative models of worker participation that sat uneasily alongside the UK’s adversarial tradition.

<sup>1710</sup> Ruth Dukes, ‘Wedderburn and the Theory of Labour Law: Building on Kahn-Freund’ (2015) 44 *Industrial Law Journal* 357.

<sup>1711</sup> Ewan McGaughey, ‘Votes at Work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the “Single Channel”’ (2018) 47 *Industrial Law Journal*.

## **10. European Works Councils and Transnational Labour Democracy**

A European Works Council (EWC) is a consultative entity that was established by employers to fulfil the obligations related to informing and consulting employees at the European level, specifically within enterprises or groups that employed a minimum of 1,000 individuals across the member states of the European Economic Area, as well as at least 150 employees in two or more of those member states, as stipulated by the European Works Councils Directive 2009/38/EC. Only individuals who were employed in countries within the European Economic Area had the ability to request their employer to establish a European Works Council. As of 1 January 2021, employees in the United Kingdom were prohibited from requesting the establishment of an EWC; however, UK employees retained the ability to engage in an EWC if the founding agreement permitted such participation.<sup>1712</sup>

An article regarding its implementation in 2000 analysed the implementation of the 1994 European Works Councils (EWCs) Directive, which established transnational information and consultation rights for employees in 'Community-scale' multinational undertakings operating across the EU and EEA. The Directive favoured negotiated EWC agreements over prescriptive statutory models, with subsidiary requirements influencing practice on matters such as the composition of EWCs, annual meetings, confidentiality, and consultation in exceptional circumstances. By early 2000, approximately 600 EWCs had been concluded, following coordinated transposition overseen by a European Commission working party that allowed national adaptation while maintaining broad consistency. UK implementation was delayed by the Maastricht social chapter opt-out and was completed through the Transnational Information and Consultation of

Employees Regulations 1999, which came into force in January 2000 and extended coverage to around 200 additional undertakings, many UK-based. Reflecting the UK's voluntarist industrial relations system and limited workplace representation, the Regulations relied on workforce ballots to appoint UK members of special negotiating bodies and statutory EWCs, applied proportional rules for allocating UK seats, and provided enforcement through the Central Arbitration Committee and Employment Appeal Tribunal, with financial penalties of up to £75,000. Transitional provisions allowed certain EWCs negotiated under other Member States' laws to transfer to UK jurisdiction. Overall, the Regulations represented a significant step in Europeanising UK labour law by embedding statutory rights to transnational information and consultation, while highlighting structural gaps in domestic employee representation.<sup>1713</sup>

In March 2000, BMW's sudden sale of its British subsidiary Rover Cars to the Alchemy Partnership shocked workers, unions, and politicians. The UK Trade and Industry Committee condemned the move for alleged incompetence and excessive secrecy, sparking protests in Birmingham. Despite BMW's cooperative German governance model, Rover's workforce received no consultation, highlighting the European Works Council's (EWC) ineffectiveness. Rover's history, from 1877 to BMW's 1994 acquisition, had involved repeated restructuring, partnerships, and ownership changes. BMW aimed for economies of scale but faced losses from outdated models, high costs, and a strong pound. By 2000, the crisis had peaked, with union negotiator Tony Woodley suggesting the board acted defensively to avoid unprecedented losses. Industrial relations had been strong: IG Metall in Germany and the TGWU in the UK represented most workers, and the 1994 EWC included UK and German representatives to bridge cultural differences. Despite this, during the sale, UK unions learned of decisions through the media,

<sup>1712</sup> Glossary - European Works Council '(Practical Law) <[https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Glossary/UKPracticalLaw/1250174c3e8db11e398db8b09b4f043e0?transitionType=Default&contextData=\(sc.Default\)&firstPage=true](https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Glossary/UKPracticalLaw/1250174c3e8db11e398db8b09b4f043e0?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true)> accessed 1 January 2026.

<sup>1713</sup> Mark Carley and Mark Hall, 'The Implementation of the European Works Councils Directive' (2000) 29 *Industrial Law Journal*.

the council had not met since October 1999, and British workers lacked board representation. Management's control and the German-centric structure enabled secrecy. The EWC Directive applied to large transnational firms, guaranteeing information and consultation on cross-border issues, but remained labour law rather than company law. Participation was limited to advice without decision-making power, and uneven national implementation often favoured management. Political pressure forced BMW to sell Rover to the Phoenix Consortium for £10, showing that corporate decisions could have public consequences. The case exposed EWC weaknesses and demonstrated that meaningful employee participation required multi-level involvement and stronger EU labour and company law recognising wider stakeholder interests.<sup>1714</sup>

The Rover episode underscored the inherent weaknesses of consultation mechanisms that lack genuine decision-making authority, revealing how nominal transnational labour rights can be rendered meaningless in the absence of enforceable corporate governance powers. It highlighted the structural vulnerability of European Works Councils, which, despite formal recognition, were subordinated to management discretion and constrained by national implementation gaps. Moreover, the case demonstrated that transnational labour democracy is contingent not only on legal frameworks, but also on political will and institutional support; once these foundations are eroded, even the most carefully designed consultative bodies are incapable of safeguarding workers' influence in high-stakes corporate decisions.

## **11. From Exceptionalism to Europeanisation**

An article critically examined the 2002 EC Framework Directive on information and consultation, framing it as a direct challenge to the UK's longstanding refusal to mandate

workplace representation. In contrast to most EU Member States, the UK's absence of a compulsory participation system rendered the directive a decisive intervention, forcing alignment with the European social model of employee involvement in decision-making. The author argued that EU integration, through the Maastricht Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, had embedded social citizenship rights, including worker participation, within the Union's economic framework, undermining the UK's market-centred approach to labour regulation and its reliance on weak or non-existent representative structures. While the directive formally required information and consultation mechanisms in organisations with at least 50 employees from 2005, the Blair government deliberately delayed and diluted its implementation. By exploiting the flexibility of Article 10, the UK, alongside Ireland, had set inflated thresholds and extended timelines, effectively suspending participation rights for large sections of the workforce until 2008. This strategy exposed a clear attempt to neutralise the directive's transformative potential while preserving managerial prerogative. The directive's insistence on effective, independent representation and meaningful dialogue sat uneasily with the UK's minimalist consultation culture and ballot-based legitimacy model. Although framed as cooperative, its emphasis on effectiveness and consensus implicitly constrained unilateral employer action. UK resistance, manifested in weakened sanctions and the removal of meaningful consequences for non-compliance, reflected a persistent culture of labour law exceptionalism. Nonetheless, the author concluded that the directive marked a structural rupture: by embedding participation rights within EU citizenship and reinforcing them through Article 27 of the EU Charter, it signalled the erosion, if not the end, of British industrial relations exceptionalism.<sup>1715</sup>

<sup>1714</sup> Charlotte Villiers, 'Commentary - the Rover Case (1) the Sale of Rover Cars by BMW - the Role of the Works Council' (2000) 29 Industrial Law Journal.

<sup>1715</sup> Brian Bercusson, 'The European Social Model Comes to Britain' (2002) 31 Industrial Law Journal.

Lorber's 2004 'Industrial Law Journal' article critically analysed the forthcoming review of the European Works Councils (EWC) Directive, highlighting the UK's persistent resistance to meaningful transnational worker participation. Although the Directive required large multinationals to establish information and consultation mechanisms, the UK initially opted out and only implemented it in 1997 under Labour, through the deliberately minimalist Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999. This approach reflected a deep-seated preference for regulatory flexibility and employer autonomy rather than enforceable participation rights. UK-headquartered companies were permitted to rely on voluntary, pre-existing arrangements akin to Article 13 agreements, enabling them to circumvent the more robust statutory model and contributing to the low number of fully negotiated EWCs. This deregulatory stance advantaged employers while leaving UK employee representatives structurally disadvantaged: the absence of strong domestic consultation frameworks meant they entered transnational forums underprepared and disempowered. Lorber was particularly critical of the UK government's 2003 discussion paper, 'The UK Experience of European Works Councils,' which framed the review around efficiency and administrative convenience rather than the expansion of worker rights. By questioning the need for reform and attributing weak uptake to employee disinterest, the government marginalised trade union critiques and obscured the Directive's structural deficiencies. Lorber concluded that while EWCs modestly improved dialogue in multinational firms, the UK's entrenched pragmatism and deregulatory prejudice rendered any substantive strengthening of the Directive politically improbable.<sup>1716</sup>

In their 2004 article, Paul Davies and Claire Kilpatrick critically analysed the UK's shift from a

union-dominated "single channel" model of worker representation to a fragmented, EU-influenced multi-channel system. Historically, UK labour law rejected dual structures such as works councils, relying instead on voluntary trade union recognition. EU directives from the 1970s onwards imposed information and consultation (I&C) obligations, initially channelled through recognised unions, but a 1994 ECJ ruling condemning union monopolies for excluding non-union workers forced wider reform. The authors identified four representation functions: collective bargaining, general I&C, bargained adjustments to statutory standards, and individual worker support. They argued for a principled hierarchy prioritising unions for their expertise and representativity, with elected representatives as a last resort. This "union priority rule" sought to balance inclusivity with effective representation in a context of low private-sector union density. However, Davies and Kilpatrick were critical of the UK's implementation, which systematically privileged elected representatives and direct workforce agreements, sidelining both recognised and non-recognised unions. General I&C regimes under EWCs and the Information and Consultation Directive mandated elected representatives, while draft ICE Regulations legitimised pre-existing agreements without representativity safeguards. Bargained adjustments and direct representation further diluted collective structures. The authors concluded that this approach actively weakened trade unions, entrenched unrepresentative and unstable forms of participation, and fractured workplace representation. Rather than enabling coherent, integrated systems, the UK's model undermined collective bargaining and risked ineffective consultation in non-unionised workplaces, exposing the limits of EU-inspired reform filtered through a persistently deregulatory national framework.<sup>1717</sup>

<sup>1716</sup> Pascale Lorber, 'European Developments - Reviewing the European Works Council Directive: European Progress and United Kingdom Perspective' (2004) 33 Industrial Law Journal.

<sup>1717</sup> Paul Davies and Claire Fitzpatrick, 'UK Worker Representation after Single Channel' (2004) 33 Industrial Law Journal.

In 2017, Denis McShane contrasted labour relations across Europe: Britain relied on company-by-company, often adversarial, wage bargaining; France had highly politicised unions that, despite representing only 7% of workers, could negotiate broadly binding agreements; Germany had stronger coordinated systems. Many key labour issues, like pay, working hours, and redundancies, were set nationally, limiting the impact of European Works Councils (EWCs). EWCs, however, were valuable for company-wide communication, allowing managers and employees to resolve issues before they escalated. There were around 1,000 EWCs in Europe, covering 19 million employees, with significant participation from German firms, moderate from French, and fewer from British and American firms. Post-Brexit, UK companies operating in the EU still had to comply with EWC obligations, leading many to consider relocating EWC management to English-speaking EU countries, particularly Ireland. McShane argued that Brexit risked weakening workers' rights in the UK: British employees could lose legally enforceable participation in EWCs, undermining dialogue on Europe-wide operations. He warned that diminishing such forums could worsen worker disenfranchisement, making the loss of EWCs both symbolic and practically detrimental.<sup>1718</sup>

## **12. Brexit and the Unravelling of Transnational Worker Representation**

As of 1 January 2021, the United Kingdom ceased to be a Member State of the European Union and the European Economic Area (EEA). The non-regression clause established in the recent Trade and Cooperation Agreement guaranteed that Brexit would not result in a diminishment or weakening of workers' rights in relation to the existing agreement. In accordance with legislation enacted in the United Kingdom in 2018, regulations, decisions, and domestic laws derived from European Union directives, including the directive pertaining to European

Works Councils, were subsequently integrated into UK domestic law without the need for further action. According to the domestic legislation of the United Kingdom, representatives of UK employees within European Works Councils, as well as those involved in works councils and corporate boards of entities governed by the *Societas Europaea* statute, retained their rights. Despite the attainment of an agreement, multinational corporations potentially exploited Brexit to undermine the rights of workers concerning information, consultation, and participation. This held particular significance due to the ambiguity present in the stipulations of the agreement. Over 700 multinational corporations that possessed an EWC or had implemented a SE statute conducted operations within the UK. A minimum of 2,400 representatives of UK employees within European Works Councils and Social Enterprises expressed uncertainty regarding their future.<sup>1719</sup>

As Zahn points out, the EWC Directive and TICER have had little impact in the UK, with adoption being comparatively low. European Works Councils (EWCs) are positioned precariously within the United Kingdom's worker representation framework. Brexit presented a distinct difficulty as European Works Councils (EWCs) are intrinsically cross-border and rely on transnational collaboration for their proper functioning. The modifications to TICER, in conjunction with the Commission notification, put UK-based EWC members in a state of uncertainty. The European Commission notice, although not opposing further UK employee involvement in current EWCs, explicitly safeguarded solely the rights of EU/EEA EWC members, but the UK government's modifications lacked clarity about their objective. The CA in *EasyJet*<sup>1720</sup> has clarified that the continuation of current UK-based EWCs post-Brexit is commendable, as it safeguards

<sup>1718</sup> Denis MacShane, 'European Works Councils - Another Brexit Victim' (Social Europe 5 January 2017) <<https://www.socialeurope.eu/european-works-councils-another-brexit-victim>> accessed 1 January 2026.

<sup>1719</sup> EWCs to Get Prepared for Brexit' (ETUC | European Trade Union Confederation 2021) <<https://www.etuc.org/en/ewcs-get-prepared-brexit>> accessed 1 January 2026.

<sup>1720</sup> *EasyJet plc v EasyJet European Works Council and another* [2023] EWCA 756

the entitlements to information and consultation for the impacted workers. Nonetheless, UK-based European Works Councils have several operational challenges that have been exacerbated by the recent litigation involving Adecco Group. In light of a possible amendment to the EWC Directive that could establish a presumption of transnationality in various instances, the litigation in *Adecco*<sup>1721</sup> may lead to UK-based EWCs having a more restricted scope of authority compared to their EU/EEA counterparts within the same group of undertakings. Any alterations in this context would exacerbate the operational challenges for UK-based EWCs striving to achieve their objectives under the statute.<sup>1722</sup>

Brexit has thus intensified long-standing weaknesses in the UK's system of worker representation, amplifying the risks associated with regulatory fragmentation and democratic retrenchment.

Sarah Veale CBE reflected on her long experience in the trade union movement and spoke as an Executive member of the Institute of Employment Rights (IER), outlining its 2016 Manifesto for a Revision of Workers' Rights. She welcomed the fact that many of its proposals appeared in Labour's successful 2017 manifesto and described the document as a contribution to a long-overdue debate on the future of labour law. She argued that most of Britain's 31 million workers now face insecurity, stress and falling living standards due to economic change and restrictive labour laws introduced since the 1980s. The fragmented, mobile workforce has made union organisation harder, while declining membership income and restrictive legal frameworks have seriously weakened unions. Veale contended that unions need stronger, positive legal rights – including a clear right to strike – and that collective bargaining must be rebuilt on a new, state-

supported footing aligned with wider economic policy. The IER's key proposals included: establishing a powerful Ministry of Labour; restoring sectoral collective bargaining through Joint Industrial Committees; easier union recognition and check-off rights; effective individual representation for workers; continued statutory protections on equality, pay and safety; reforming the Living Wage Commission to eliminate low pay; replacing weak enforcement with labour inspectors and a strengthened tribunal system; abolishing tribunal fees; reforming freedom of association law; criminalising blacklisting; creating a specialist Labour Court; and repealing the Trade Union Act 2016 in full.<sup>1723</sup> These reformist proposals stand in sharp contrast to the direction of recent legislative developments, which have continued to prioritise control over participation.

### **13. Authoritarian Legalism and the Future of Industrial Democracy**

In reference to the controversial Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023, Ioannis Katsaroumpas makes three key points. First, the Act embodies “coercive disciplinary unilateralism,” combining executive and employer control with legal uncertainty and punitive sanctions. Second, the Government's claims that the Act complies with ILO standards and Article 11 ECHR are misleading. Third, while the Act aligns with markers of authoritarianism and introduces some innovations over the Trade Union Act 2016, it reflects a “strong-weak” state seeking to protect neo-liberalism amid post-2008 challenges. Katsaroumpas articulated that by embedding an “executivist political technology” into strike restrictions, the Act risks undermining democratic and constitutional norms, edging Great Britain closer to Hailsham's “elective dictatorship.” Its impact extends beyond labour law, serving as a test of constitutional democracy and human rights,

<sup>1721</sup> *Olsten (UK) Holdings Ltd v Adecco Group European Works Council Appeal and Cross Appeal* [2022] EAT 183

<sup>1722</sup> Rebecca Zahn, “The Status of European Works Councils in UK Law Post-Brexit: A Commentary on *EasyJet PLC v EasyJet European Works Council and Olsten (UK) Holdings Limited v Adecco Group European Works Council*” (2024) 53 *Industrial Law Journal*.

<sup>1723</sup> The Future of UK Labour Law (History & Policy Trade Union Forum at King's College, London 2017) <[https://historyandpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/original/img/news/uploads/The\\_Future\\_of\\_UK\\_Labour\\_Law.pdf](https://historyandpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/original/img/news/uploads/The_Future_of_UK_Labour_Law.pdf)>.

with the ongoing trajectory of restrictive strike policies threatening broader democratic principles.<sup>1724</sup>

As Katie Barnes-Monaghan and Douglas Gerrard argue in 'Tribune,' worker democracy provides a vital lens for addressing gendered power imbalances in employment law, particularly via employment tribunals. The 2013 introduction of tribunal fees of up to £1,200, part of Chris Grayling's wider assault on access to justice, was ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court in 2017 after UNISON's challenge. Claims surged and over £4 million was repaid, underscoring trade unions' enduring capacity to resist. Yet this victory barely touches the scale of workplace abuse. In 2018, around 5.5 million women reported experiencing or witnessing sexual harassment at work, while only eighteen cases reached tribunal. Even a dramatic rise in litigation would fail to reflect the extent of violations, exposing the limits of a purely legalistic response. Removing fees, extending legal aid, or lengthening time limits may widen access, but tribunals remain a blunt instrument within a structurally unequal system. Abuse is rooted in economic inequality, disproportionately affecting workers in insecure employment, particularly women on zero-hours contracts, hospitality workers, and Black women. A 2018 TUC survey found that no BAME woman felt her harassment complaint was handled satisfactorily, and similar class dynamics shape other breaches, from unpaid wages to illegal hours, leaving workers isolated and silenced. Harassment is not confined to formal hierarchies; it reflects a deeper, gendered imbalance of power that persists across organisational forms. Recognising this shifts attention towards structural remedies: redistributing power rather than merely reforming procedures. Worker democracy, from German-style board representation to radical models like Spain's Mondragon co-operative, where authority rests with worker-owners -

<sup>1724</sup> Ioannis Katsaroumpas, 'Crossing the Rubicon: The Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023 as an Authoritarian Crucible' (2023) 52 *Industrial Law Journal* 513.

offers a means to collectivise harms otherwise treated as private grievances. While democratisation may initially increase claims, it holds the potential to transform workplace culture and curb abuse at its source.<sup>1725</sup>

These dynamics underscore the limits of individualised legal remedies in addressing structurally embedded power imbalances, reinforcing the case for collective and democratic forms of workplace governance.

Writing in 2021, Charlotte Villiers examined changes to the UK Corporate Governance Code intended to encourage employee engagement. The Code offered companies flexibility, operating on a "comply or explain" basis, but its narrow focus on shareholder primacy and mixed motives limited its effectiveness. As a result, few companies appointed worker directors, and those that had often did so tokenistically, without union involvement, allowing management to control the process. Villiers concludes by asserting that true workplace democracy is about human dignity, yet capitalism tends to resist meaningful worker participation. She declares that, to build trust and improve corporate outcomes, stronger legal protections - including genuine boardroom representation and union involvement in decision-making - are essential.<sup>1726</sup>

#### **14. Conclusion: Democracy at Work and the Future of Labour Law**

Without meaningful structures of collective participation, labour law risks becoming a mechanism for managing dissent rather than a foundation for democratic legitimacy in the economy. A recurring theme throughout this analysis is the narrowing of democracy to procedure. Ballots, notice periods, consultation mechanisms, and internal governance rules

<sup>1725</sup> Katie Barnes-Monaghan and Douglas Gerrard, 'Winning Equality through Worker Democracy' (Tribunemag.co.uk 2019) <<https://tribunemag.co.uk/2019/04/winning-equality-through-worker-democracy>> accessed 21 January 2026.

<sup>1726</sup> Charlotte Villiers, 'Corporate Governance, Employee Voice and the Interests of Employees: The Broken Promise of a "World Leading Package of Corporate Reforms"' (2021) 50 *Industrial Law Journal* 159.

have increasingly been treated as substitutes for substantive participation. Yet procedural compliance, divorced from meaningful power, risks hollowing out democracy rather than securing it. This is evident in the limited effectiveness of European Works Councils (especially post-Brexit), the erosion of collective bargaining, and the expansion of executive authority over industrial action.

With ever-increasing digitalisation, the world of work stands at a crossroads. Digitalisation could either empower employees – enhancing knowledge sharing, workplace democracy, and worker co-operative models – or deepen precarity through intensified surveillance and job instability. Traditional employment based on subordination is increasingly inadequate, as meaningful social protection and participation require co-determination and democratic structures. Labour law must therefore change to balance employee protection, company competitiveness, and genuine workplace democracy. While some worker co-operatives demonstrate that democracy at work is possible, without employee ownership or access to strategic decisions, workplace democracy remains incomplete and can even encourage self-exploitation. Ultimately, the challenge extends beyond individual companies: digitalisation highlights the need not just for workplace democracy, but for a broader economic democratisation, offering a path to empower workers, revitalise trade unions, and pursue alternative economic models.<sup>1727</sup>

If UK employment law continues to privilege industrial order over meaningful worker participation, and procedural discipline over genuine collective voice, it will entrench an increasingly illiberal settlement that operates beneath the veneer of formal democratic institutions. The Employment Rights Act 2025, while welcome in dismantling some of the most repressive elements of the post-2016 regime,

remains predominantly defensive and procedural in character: it removes barriers to industrial action and strengthens individual protections, yet it stops well short of positively constitutionalising economic democracy through mandatory sectoral bargaining, enforceable codetermination, or legally guaranteed worker representation in enterprise governance. In doing so, it liberalises within the inherited neoliberal frame rather than dismantling it, offering a tactical thaw that leaves the deeper imbalance between economic authority and democratic accountability largely intact.

This persistent refusal to treat the workplace as a constitutional polity, rather than a zone of private prerogative, exposes a fundamental tension at the heart of Britain's uncodified constitution: political democracy is formally preserved, while economic democracy is systematically subordinated. The result is not merely a policy failure, but a constitutional pathology. When the economic sphere remains a site of managerial despotism shielded by law, the legitimacy of the wider democratic order is placed under strain. The fate of industrial democracy is therefore more than a barometer of labour relations; it is a litmus test for the coherence and moral seriousness of constitutional democracy itself. Absent a radical reimagining – one that re-conceives an enterprise as a site of shared sovereignty, instead of unilateral control – the UK risks perpetuating a bifurcated polity in which citizens are equal at the ballot box but subjects in the boardroom. The question is no longer whether reform is possible, but whether the political will exists to make democracy at work a constitutional reality, rather than an aspirational footnote.

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