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No. 08, Arul Nagar, Seera Thoppu,

Maudhanda Kurichi, Srirangam,

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Phone : +91 73059 14348 – info@iledu.in / Chairman@iledu.in



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SHARPENING THE SWORD: REFINING LEGAL TESTS AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS TO TACKLE PREDATORY PRICING AND EXCLUSIVE DEALING IN INDIA

AUTHOR – RETHIGA RAMESH, LL.M 2ND YEAR IN BUSINESS LAW, TAMILNADU DR.AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF EXCELLENCE IN LAW, TAMILNADU, CHENNAI.

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ABSTRACT

The paper delves into the significance of fair competition in India's market and the challenges posed by predatory pricing and exclusive dealing practices. It describes how these actions might reduce customer choice, discourage innovation, and impede the entry of new competitors. It evaluates the efficiency of the present legal system, which includes the Competition Act of 2002, in combating these kinds of conduct. It recommends improving legal standards and enforcement procedures in light of the difficulties in identifying and prosecuting these cases. The study uses international best practices to support the need for more precise standards and thresholds for identifying antitrust infractions. In order to speed resolution, it emphasizes the necessity of cooperative efforts between regulatory organizations, the judiciary, and stakeholders. In order to support enforcement, it also suggests improvements to resource allocation and investigative methods. Ultimately, policymakers may foster a competitive market that supports innovation, consumer welfare, and economic progress by improving legislative requirements and enforcement strategies, supporting the fundamentals of fair competition in India.

Keywords: Fair competition, Predatory pricing, Exclusive dealing practices, Antitrust violations, Enforcement mechanisms, Regulatory bodies

1. INTRODUCTION

Fair competition is the cornerstone of a healthy economy, fostering innovation, enhancing consumer choice, and driving down prices. When businesses compete on a level playing field, markets thrive, benefiting consumers and the broader economy. However, unfair practices like predatory pricing and exclusive dealing threaten this balance. Predatory pricing involves firms deliberately lowering prices below cost to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices later. Exclusive dealing restricts competitors' access to essential markets or resources through binding agreements, limiting competition and consumer choice⁹⁹³.

In India, the Competition Act, 2002, aims to prevent such anti-competitive conduct and promote a competitive marketplace. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) is the statutory body entrusted with enforcing this law. Despite a robust legal framework, enforcement faces challenges due to the complex economic and legal intricacies of identifying and prosecuting unfair practices. Predatory pricing and exclusive dealing often involve subtle market dynamics and sophisticated tactics that complicate detection and legal action.

To address these challenges, refining legal tests—clear criteria for identifying unfair conduct—and strengthening enforcement mechanisms are imperative. This involves enhancing investigative capabilities, judicial collaboration, and procedural clarity. This paper explores these themes, offering strategies to

⁹⁹³ Adam, R. (2023). Predatory Pricing for E-Commerce Businesses from a Business Competition Law Perspective. *Journal of Law and Sustainable Development*, 11(8), e1438–e1438. <https://doi.org/10.55908/sdgs.v11i8.1438>

sharpen India's competition law enforcement, safeguard consumer welfare, and ensure sustainable economic growth⁹⁹⁴.

2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Existing Competition Laws and Regulations in India

India's competition law landscape is primarily governed by the Competition Act, 2002, which aims to foster fair competition, prevent anti-competitive practices, and protect consumer interests in Indian markets. The Act establishes the Competition Commission of India (CCI) as the central regulatory authority responsible for investigating, adjudicating, and enforcing competition laws.

Under the Competition Act, various anti-competitive practices are prohibited, including cartels that restrict competition, abuse of dominant market positions, and combinations (i.e., mergers and acquisitions) that may substantially lessen competition. Notably, predatory pricing and exclusive dealing are specifically scrutinized under the Act as forms of abuse of dominance or restrictive agreements⁹⁹⁵.

The Act initially provided for the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) to hear appeals against CCI orders; however, COMPAT was dissolved in 2017, transferring its functions to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The NCLAT now adjudicates competition law appeals, providing an essential judicial recourse.

Besides the Competition Act, India's competition framework includes a network of sector-specific and ancillary laws. The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act), Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (TRAI Act), and Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999 (IRDA Act) govern their respective sectors with competition

mandates. Additionally, provisions in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, complement competition enforcement by targeting unfair trade practices and consumer rights⁹⁹⁶.

Recent amendments have further modernized the Competition Act to address emerging market dynamics⁹⁹⁷. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, for instance, introduced a deal value threshold (DVT) requiring pre-merger approval for transactions above INR 2,000 crore involving entities with substantial business operations in India—a key development addressing acquisitions in digital and other innovative sectors. The Combination Regulations, 2024 clarified implementation rules, including defining “control” to encompass material influence beyond ownership. Additionally, the CCI has introduced flexible, case-by-case assessment guidelines moving away from rigid sector-specific benchmarks, notably in pricing regulation.

2.2 Regulatory Authorities Responsible for Enforcing Antitrust Measures

The Competition Commission of India (CCI), constituted under the Competition Act, 2002, is the primary enforcement agency overseeing competition law compliance. Comprising a Chairperson and appointed members with expertise in economics, law, and commerce, the CCI wields broad investigatory and adjudicatory powers. It can conduct inquiries, issue cease-and-desist orders, impose penalties, and promote competition advocacy nationwide⁹⁹⁸.

The CCI's enforcement extends to investigating predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, cartels, and other anticompetitive conduct, often collaborating with sectoral regulators such as SEBI, TRAI, and IRDA to ensure sectoral

⁹⁹⁴ Schwartz, Warren F. "An overview of the economics of antitrust enforcement." *Geo. IJ* 68 (1979): 1075.

⁹⁹⁵ Singh, Vijay Kumar. "Competition law and policy in India: The journey in a decade." *NUJS L. Rev.* 4 (2011): 523.

⁹⁹⁶ International Test Commission. "International guidelines for test use." *International Journal of testing* 1.2 (2001): 93-114.

⁹⁹⁷ Calkins, Stephen. "An Enforcement Official's Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions." *Ariz. L. Rev.* 39 (1997): 413.

⁹⁹⁸ Elhaage, E. R. (2012). *Research handbook on the economics of antitrust law*. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Gultinan, J. P., & Gundlach, G. T. (1996). *Aggressive and Predatory Pricing: A Framework for Analysis*. *Journal of Marketing*, 60(3), 87–102. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002224299606000306>

compliance⁹⁹⁹. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) provides policy oversight, supervises the CCI's activities, and issues regulatory directions as necessary.

Appeals against CCI decisions are heard by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), ensuring judicial review and due process. The appellate mechanism is critical in maintaining decision accountability and fairness.

2.3 Comparison with International Legal Standards and Best Practices

Evaluating India's competition law framework alongside jurisdictions like the United States, European Union, and Australia reveals areas for enhancement. Many developed economies maintain explicit legal definitions, clear evidentiary thresholds, and robust investigative powers enabling effective enforcement, including dawn raids and compelled testimony¹⁰⁰⁰.

Compared to these, India's Competition Committee's investigative powers are somewhat limited, impacting the swiftness and effectiveness of enforcement. Strengthening these capacities and expanding leniency and whistleblower programs—successful tools abroad—could significantly improve detection and enforcement outcomes¹⁰⁰¹.

Judicial mechanisms in many countries feature specialized competition courts or tribunals expediting expert adjudication and consistency. India's NCLAT has similarly enhanced judicial review but could benefit from further specialization and streamlined procedures.

By adopting clearer legal standards, bolstering investigatory authority, incentivizing corporate cooperation, and refining adjudicatory frameworks, India can align its competition

regime with best international practices, fostering a fair, competitive, and innovation-friendly market environment.

3. CHALLENGES AND CASE STUDIES

3.1 Difficulty in Detecting Predatory Pricing and Exclusive Dealing

Competition authorities in India face significant challenges in detecting predatory pricing and exclusive dealing due to the subtle and complex nature of these practices. Distinguishing predatory pricing from legitimate competitive discounts involves intricate economic analysis of cost structures, pricing intentions, and market conditions. Proving intent to drive out competitors and the likelihood of loss recoupment necessitate thorough investigation of market dynamics and firm strategies.

Exclusive dealing adds layers of complexity; agreements that restrict supplier or distributor access may be disguised as procompetitive loyalty or volume rebates¹⁰⁰². Assessing their anticompetitive effects requires detailed scrutiny of contractual terms and market impact, often compounded by opaque supply chains¹⁰⁰³.

3.2 Impact on Market Dynamics and Consumer Welfare

Such practices distort market competition, reducing consumer choice and innovation. Predatory pricing can eliminate rivals, leading to monopolistic dominance and higher future prices. Exclusive dealing limits competitor market access, affecting product variety and pricing. These distortions diminish long-term consumer welfare despite possible short-term benefits¹⁰⁰⁴.

3.3 Legal Ramifications: Recent Case Studies

Recent enforcement efforts highlight these difficulties. The CCI's investigation into Uber's

⁹⁹⁹ Gouri, Geeta, and Kalyani Pandya. "The Indian competition law experience—its history and its (digital) future." *Indian Law Review* 4.3 (2020): 276-300.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Goel, Shivam. "Regulation of Combinations under the Competition Law in India." Available at SSRN 2485557 (2014).

¹⁰⁰¹ Pantaleo, Luca. "Investment Disputes under CETA: From Gold Standards to Best Practices?." *European Business Law Review* 28.2 (2017).

¹⁰⁰² Moore, Derek W., and Joshua D. Wright. "Conditional discounts and the law of exclusive dealing." *Geo. Mason L. Rev.* 22 (2014): 1205.

¹⁰⁰³ Williamson, Oliver E. "Predatory pricing: A strategic and welfare analysis." *The Yale Law Journal* 87.2 (1977): 284-340.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Mendez, Mario. *The legal effects of EU agreements*. Oxford University Press, 2013.

discounted fares was dismissed due to insufficient evidence of predatory intent and recoupment potential. Similarly, pharmaceutical sector exclusive dealing cases unveiled challenges proving foreclosure effects amid complex regulations. The cement cartel case emphasized risks of collusion in opaque markets. These underscore the need for refined legal tests, enhanced enforcement, and judicial clarity to effectively tackle anticompetitive conduct in India's evolving marketplace.

4. REFINING LEGAL TESTS

4.1 Criteria Used to Determine Predatory Pricing Behavior

Predatory pricing is an anticompetitive strategy whereby a firm deliberately sets prices below cost to eliminate competitors and subsequently raise prices to recover incurred losses. Refining legal tests to accurately identify predatory pricing is essential for effective enforcement in India.

The principal criterion is pricing below cost, encompassing production, variable, and an appropriate share of fixed costs. Establishing this requires sophisticated cost accounting and market context analysis to differentiate predatory pricing from legitimate competitive pricing or promotional discounts.

Intent plays a pivotal role; regulators and courts assess whether the pricing aims to exclude competitors and includes examining internal data such as strategic communications¹⁰⁰⁵. Another critical factor is the likelihood of recoupment—the firm's ability to raise prices post-elimination of competition, considering market structure, barriers to entry, and market power.

The competitive effects on consumer choice, market innovation, and entry conditions are analyzed to establish harm. Courts look for sustained below-cost pricing not transient dips while assessing the dominant firm's financial

capability to sustain losses and endure competitor retaliation.

Impact on consumer welfare and overall market efficiency is weighed, balancing short-term consumer gains against long-term losses from reduced competition¹⁰⁰⁶. By integrating these criteria, India can sharpen enforcement against predatory pricing, safeguarding fair competition and consumer interests.

4.2 Factors Considered in Assessing Exclusive Dealing Arrangements

Exclusive dealing¹⁰⁰⁷ restricts competitors' market access via binding agreements between firms and suppliers or distributors¹⁰⁰⁸. Legal tests focus on the market power of the parties, as dominance heightens foreclosure risks. Duration and scope of agreements matter; broader and longer contracts more severely impede competition.

Competitive effects are critical—foreclosure of rival access limits market dynamism and harms consumer welfare. However, procompetitive justifications such as brand loyalty, quality control, and investment incentives are balanced against adverse effects.

The impact downstream on distribution channels and innovation incentives is also evaluated. Bargaining power dynamics shed light on the presence of coercion or undue influence. Ultimately, a holistic assessment of market efficiency, innovation, and consumer choice guides enforcement decisions against anticompetitive exclusive dealing.

4.3 Need for Clearer Guidelines and Thresholds for Antitrust Violations

India's evolving market complexity demands clearer, consistent, and predictable antitrust enforcement guidelines¹⁰⁰⁹. Ambiguity in legal

¹⁰⁰⁵ Koller, Roland H. "The myth of predatory pricing: An empirical study." *Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev.* 4 (1970): 105.

¹⁰⁰⁶ McGee, John S. "Predatory pricing revisited." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 23.2 (1980): 289-330.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Klein, B., & Murphy, K. M. (2008). Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for Distribution. *Antitrust Law Journal*, 75, 433. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/antil75&div=19&id=&page=>

¹⁰⁰⁸ Baumol, William J. "Principles relevant to predatory pricing." *The Pros and Cons of Low Prices* 15 (2003): 23-25.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Adelman, Morris Albert. "Effective competition and the antitrust laws." *Harvard Law Review* 61.8 (1948): 1289-1350.

tests leads to enforcement inconsistency and legal uncertainty for businesses, impeding compliance and innovation.

Clear thresholds foster transparency, accountability, and focused resource allocation within enforcement agencies. Judicial efficiency benefits from standardized tests, enabling courts to adjudicate promptly with clarity on evidentiary standards.

Moreover, harmonized guidelines facilitate international cooperation in cross-border antitrust enforcement, aligning India's regime with global best practices. Enhanced competition advocacy stemming from clear standards promotes a culture of compliance, ultimately cultivating a more competitive, innovative, and consumer-friendly Indian marketplace.

5. STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

5.1 Collaboration Between Regulatory Authorities and the Judiciary

Effective enforcement of competition law in India hinges on robust collaboration between regulatory bodies—primarily the Competition Commission of India (CCI)—and the judiciary. Regulatory authorities possess the technical expertise, investigative capabilities, and economic analysis skills crucial for detecting and prosecuting anti-competitive practices like predatory pricing and exclusive dealing. Meanwhile, the judiciary provides legal clarity, adjudicates disputes, interprets statutes, and reviews enforcement actions to ensure due process.

The symbiotic partnership allows for the exchange of critical expertise: regulatory authorities bring market insights and economic data analysis, while courts offer nuanced legal interpretations and precedent guidance. Such collaboration ensures that enforcement actions are grounded in sound economics and adhere to constitutional principles, thus enhancing their legitimacy and efficacy.

Consistency is another vital outcome. Coordinated efforts reduce the risk of contradictory decisions and foster a coherent jurisprudence on competition matters across India¹⁰¹⁰. Furthermore, joint training programs and workshops help improve institutional capacity, equipping regulators and judges alike with the requisite skills to manage increasingly complex antitrust cases.

This cooperation fosters innovation in enforcement techniques, prompting adaptive responses against evolving anticompetitive strategies in sectors such as digital platforms. Together, they reinforce the rule of law, bolster public confidence, and promote a fair, competitive market environment essential to India's economic growth.

5.2 Enhancing Investigative Techniques and Resources

To effectively counter predatory pricing and exclusive dealing, Indian competition authorities must embrace advanced investigative tools and receive adequate resource allocation. In an era dominated by digital transactions and large data volumes, data analytics, machine learning, and predictive modeling stand out as indispensable assets¹⁰¹¹. These techniques enable quicker detection of suspicious pricing or contracting patterns, prioritization of cases, and focused deployment of investigative resources¹⁰¹².

Proactive market surveillance strategies—such as sector inquiries and real-time monitoring—can help detect anticompetitive conduct before significant harm occurs. Collaborative intelligence-sharing with other domestic regulators and international counterparts further amplifies investigative power, particularly given the cross-border nature of many anti-competitive practices.

¹⁰¹⁰ Leslie, C. R. (2013). Predatory Pricing and Recoupment. *Columbia Law Review*, 113(7), 1695. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/clr113&div=45&id=&page=>

¹⁰¹¹ Scott, Colin. "Accountability in the regulatory state." *Administrative Law*. Routledge, 2018. 397-419.

¹⁰¹² Dorf, Michael C., and Charles F. Sabel. "A constitution of democratic experimentalism." *Colum. L. Rev.* 98 (1998): 267.

Adequate budgets and staffing are non-negotiable. The CCI and associated bodies require skilled economists, legal analysts, and technical staff, as well as up-to-date IT infrastructure. Independence from political or corporate influence is paramount to preserve impartiality in investigations. Transparency and accountability mechanisms, including clear procedural rules and public reporting, enhance trust and enforcement accountability¹⁰¹³.

5.3 Timely Resolution of Competition Law Cases and Enforcement Actions

Delays weaken deterrence and undermine regulatory credibility. Hence, accelerating adjudicatory timelines is imperative. This can be achieved through streamlined case management protocols, firm deadlines for submissions and rulings, and prioritization of high-impact cases.

Enhanced coordination between the CCI, judiciary, and sectoral regulators reduces procedural overlap and duplication, facilitating swifter resolutions. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation and consent decrees provide flexible, less adversarial pathways to settle anti-competitive disputes, reducing court burdens.

Judicial expertise is crucial for timely decisions. Investing in training judges specialized in competition law supports informed adjudication¹⁰¹⁴. Digital case management systems, electronic filings, and virtual hearings expedite procedures, while AI-assisted analytics optimize case prioritization.

Transparency in adjudication promotes compliance and confidence among stakeholders. Clear, accessible explanations of decisions empower businesses to self-regulate and consumers to understand enforcement rationale, creating a virtuous cycle bolstering competition policy effectiveness in India.

6. CONCLUSION

Sharpening legal tests and enforcement mechanisms to effectively tackle predatory pricing and exclusive dealing in India is crucial for promoting fair competition, protecting consumers, and fostering a dynamic market environment¹⁰¹⁵. This study highlights the need for clear, objective criteria to assess anticompetitive conduct and practical enforcement enhancements to adapt to evolving market complexities.

Predatory pricing and exclusive dealing present significant enforcement challenges due to their sophisticated economic underpinnings and subtle market impacts. Refinement of legal tests such as pricing below cost, intent to harm competition, likelihood of recoupment, and market power assessment can provide better clarity and predictability for regulators, courts, and businesses.

Strengthening enforcement requires increased investigative resources, advanced analytical tools, and enhanced collaboration between the Competition Commission of India (CCI), judiciary, and sectoral regulators. Transparency, accountability, and timely adjudication remain essential to bolstering public confidence.

Despite progress, challenges persist, including CCI's limited enforcement authority, procedural delays, and rapid market innovation—especially in digital sectors. A holistic and cooperative approach leveraging technology, capacity building, and best international practices can empower India's competition regime.

Ultimately, all stakeholders must cooperate to ensure competition remains central to India's economic policy, fostering innovation, consumer welfare, and sustainable growth in an increasingly competitive global market.

¹⁰¹³ Danov, Mihail, Florian Becker, and Paul Beaumont, eds. *Cross-border EU competition law actions*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.

¹⁰¹⁴ Wright, J. (2009). *Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete*: Comment. *American Economic Review*, 99(3), 1070–1081. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.1070>

¹⁰¹⁵ Cook, Christopher J. "Commitment decisions: the law and practice under Article 9." *World Competition* 29.2 (2006).