



INDIAN JOURNAL OF
LEGAL REVIEW

VOLUME 5 AND ISSUE 9 OF 2025

INSTITUTE OF LEGAL EDUCATION



INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW

APIS – 3920 – 0001 | ISSN – 2583-2344

(Open Access Journal)

Journal's Home Page – <https://ijlr.iledu.in/>

Journal's Editorial Page – <https://ijlr.iledu.in/editorial-board/>

Volume 5 and Issue 9 of 2025 (Access Full Issue on – <https://ijlr.iledu.in/volume-5-and-issue-10-of-2025/>)

Publisher

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
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH

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BEST CITATION – AMRIT KUMAR SINGH, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, *INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR)*, 5 (10) OF 2025, PG. 974-980, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

Introduction

The relationship between pharmaceutical patents and public health represents one of the most critical and contested intersections in contemporary legal, economic, and ethical discourse. Pharmaceutical patents, by granting exclusive rights to inventors for a limited period, have played a pivotal role in fostering innovation, encouraging investment in research and development (R&D), and driving advancements in medical science.¹⁰⁴⁰ At the same time, these exclusive rights raise significant concerns about access, affordability, and equity, especially in contexts where life-saving medicines are priced beyond the reach of millions. This tension between the private interests of patent holders and the collective needs of public health forms the core of a complex and enduring policy dilemma.¹⁰⁴¹



¹⁰⁴⁰ Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 299, art 27.

¹⁰⁴¹ Carlos M Correa, *Intellectual Property and Public Health in the Developing World* (OUP 2016) 45.

Pharmaceutical research is an inherently costly, risky, and uncertain enterprise. It is estimated that developing a new drug from discovery to market approval can take **10 to 15 years** and require investments exceeding **\$1–2 billion USD**. Given the high failure rate of experimental compounds—where fewer than one in thousands make it to final approval—intellectual property rights serve as a critical incentive mechanism.¹⁰⁴² Patents provide innovators with a period of market exclusivity, allowing them to recoup their investments and generate profits to fund future innovation. This model, embedded in national patent laws and reinforced by international treaties such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), is premised on the idea that **without protection for intellectual property, firms would lack sufficient motivation to undertake the risks and costs associated with pharmaceutical R&D**.

The global HIV/AIDS crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s starkly illustrated the deadly consequences of patent-enforced monopolies on essential medicines. While antiretroviral therapies (ARVs) revolutionized HIV treatment in high-income countries, their patent-protected prices—exceeding **\$10,000 per patient per year**—rendered them inaccessible to the vast majority of people living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, home to the world’s highest HIV burden. It was only after sustained activism, legal challenges, and the use of **TRIPS flexibilities** like compulsory licensing¹⁰⁴³ that generic production and large-scale treatment access became feasible, saving millions of lives.¹⁰⁴⁴ This episode catalyzed a broader international reckoning over the balance between intellectual property rights and public health, leading to the adoption of the **Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001)**,

which affirmed the right of countries to prioritize public health over patent protection in cases of health emergencies or access challenges.¹⁰⁴⁵

A critical dimension of this debate lies in the varying interpretations and applications of patent law across jurisdictions. Countries differ in how they define patentable subject matter, the threshold of inventive step, and exceptions to patent rights. For example, **India’s Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970** imposes a stricter standard for pharmaceutical patentability by denying patents on new forms of known substances unless they demonstrate enhanced efficacy. This provision aims to prevent evergreening and ensure earlier market entry of generics, as upheld in the landmark **Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013)**¹⁰⁴⁶ decision. In contrast, jurisdictions like the United States and the European Union tend to permit broader patent claims, including for new uses, new formulations, or incremental innovations, thereby affording more expansive protection to pharmaceutical inventions.

The legal challenges over pharmaceutical patents also unfold in courtrooms, where competing interests of patent holders and generic manufacturers are litigated, shaping the contours of patent law and access. Cases such as **F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd. (2009)**¹⁰⁴⁷ in India, **Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2015)**¹⁰⁴⁸, and international disputes like **Eli Lilly v. Government of Canada (2017)**¹⁰⁴⁹ under NAFTA’s investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, highlight the contested nature of pharmaceutical patents in both domestic and international legal arenas. Each of these cases reflects broader questions: How much protection is too much? When does patent enforcement undermine public health? Should

¹⁰⁴² Joseph A DiMasi, ‘The Cost of Developing a New Drug’ (Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 2016).

¹⁰⁴³ World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (adopted 14 November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 299, art 31.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Peter K Yu, ‘The Global Politics of Access to Medicines’ (2008) 29 Wis Intl L J 563, 570.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Novartis AG v Union of India (2013) AIR SC 1311.

¹⁰⁴⁷ F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla Ltd (2009) 40 PTC 125 (Del HC).

¹⁰⁴⁸ Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp v Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd (2015) 63 PTC 257 (Del HC).

¹⁰⁴⁹ Eli Lilly and Company v Government of Canada, ICSID Case No UNCT/14/2, Final Award (16 March 2017).

access to essential medicines override intellectual property rights?

The COVID-19 pandemic further intensified these debates, laying bare the fragility of global access to medical innovations under an IP-protected regime. While the unprecedented speed of vaccine development demonstrated the potential of public-private partnerships, intellectual property barriers were cited as obstacles to scaling up vaccine production, particularly in low-income countries. The proposal for a temporary waiver of TRIPS obligations to facilitate broader manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics—spearheaded by India and South Africa—sparked global controversy, pitting proponents of equitable access against defenders of the IP system. Although the World Trade Organization’s eventual **“TRIPS Waiver”**¹⁰⁵⁰ outcome fell short of initial ambitions, it underscored the urgency of rethinking how intellectual property law interacts with public health imperatives during global emergencies.¹⁰⁵¹

Amid these debates, scholars, policymakers, and advocates have explored alternative models for incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation without relying solely on patents. Proposals range from **prize funds, advance market commitments, and patent pooling mechanisms** to open-source drug discovery and publicly funded research initiatives. While these alternatives show promise, they have yet to displace the dominant patent-driven model, raising questions about the feasibility and scalability of non-patent incentives in a market-driven pharmaceutical industry.

This dissertation seeks to critically examine the intersection of pharmaceutical patents and public health through a legal lens, analyzing how different jurisdictions navigate the balance between intellectual property protection and access to medicines. By evaluating key legal

frameworks, international treaties, and landmark case law, the study aims to unpack the legal, policy, and ethical dimensions of this balance. It further investigates the mechanisms—such as compulsory licensing, parallel importation, and strict patentability criteria—by which states seek to mitigate the exclusionary effects of patents in the interest of public health.

In doing so, this research contributes to the ongoing dialogue about the role of intellectual property in advancing human health, highlighting both the opportunities and limitations of the current system. It argues that the path forward requires not only legal reforms but also a broader reimagining of innovation and access as interdependent, rather than conflicting, objectives.

3.1 Impact on Drug Prices and Accessibility

Pharmaceutical patents give inventors exclusive rights to produce, sell, and distribute a new drug for a specific period—usually 20 years from the filing date. This exclusivity is meant to incentivize innovation by allowing companies to recover their investments in research and development (R&D).

However, in the context of public health, pharmaceutical patents can have both positive and negative impacts:

1) Impact on Drug Prices

- **Higher Prices During Patent Term:**
When a pharmaceutical product is under patent protection, the patent holder has a monopoly and can set prices without competition. This often leads to high drug prices, making medicines unaffordable for low-income patients and health systems.
- **No Generic Competition:**
Generic manufacturers are legally barred from producing cheaper versions of the drug until the patent expires. This delays the availability of low-cost generics, which are usually priced at a fraction of the original drug cost.

¹⁰⁵⁰ South Africa and India, ‘Proposal for Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement’ (WTO Doc IP/C/W/669, 2 October 2020).

¹⁰⁵¹ Ellen ‘t Hoen, ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines’ (2002) 3 Chi J Intl L 39, 42.

Example: Antiretroviral (ARV) drugs for HIV treatment were priced at \$10,000–\$15,000 per patient per year in the 1990s under patent protection—unaffordable for many developing countries. After generic competition began, prices dropped by over 90%.

2) Impact on Accessibility

- **Limited Access in Developing Countries:** High prices caused by patents restrict access in low- and middle-income countries, where healthcare systems and patients cannot afford monopoly prices. This contributes to health inequalities, especially for life-saving medicines.
- **Delayed Treatment:** Patients in poorer regions may have to wait for patents to expire before they can access affordable generics, delaying treatment for critical diseases.
- **Positive Side: Incentive for R&D:** Supporters argue that patents are necessary to encourage innovation in neglected diseases and rare conditions, though in practice, pharmaceutical R&D is often concentrated on profitable markets rather than global health priorities.

3) Policy Responses to Mitigate Impact

To balance innovation incentives with public health needs, several legal tools have been introduced:

- **Compulsory licensing:** Governments allow generic production without the patent holder's consent in public health emergencies.
- **Parallel importing:** Importing patented drugs sold cheaper elsewhere.
- **TRIPS flexibilities:** Legal mechanisms under the TRIPS Agreement enabling countries to prioritize public health.

The Doha Declaration (2001) reaffirmed that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent members from protecting public health and promoting access to medicines for all.

3.2 Compulsory Licensing in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Compulsory licensing is a legal mechanism that allows a government to authorize the production or importation of a patented product without the consent of the patent holder, usually in the interest of public health. It is an important tool under intellectual property law, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, to balance patent rights with access to affordable medicines.

1) Legal Basis

- Compulsory licensing is permitted under the TRIPS Agreement (Article 31), provided certain conditions are met, such as prior negotiation attempts with the patent holder (except in emergencies).
- The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001) reaffirmed the right of WTO members to issue compulsory licenses to protect public health and promote access to medicines.

2) Reasons for Compulsory Licensing in Pharmaceuticals

Governments may issue compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical products in situations like:

- Public health emergencies (e.g., HIV/AIDS, COVID-19, cancer epidemics)
- Excessive pricing or supply shortages of essential medicines
- Anticompetitive practices by the patent holder

3) Impact on Public Health

- **Increased Access:** Compulsory licensing allows generic manufacturers to produce lower-cost versions of patented medicines, improving access for low- and middle-income populations.
- **Lower Prices:** The introduction of generic competition forces price reductions, making medicines more affordable even in the private sector.

- Health System Savings: Governments can allocate resources to treat more patients within limited budgets.

Example:

- In 2007, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs (efavirenz and lopinavir/ritonavir) and later for a cancer drug (imatinib). This reduced drug costs by up to 80%, expanding access for thousands of patients.
- In India, a landmark compulsory license was granted in 2012 to Natco Pharma to produce a generic version of sorafenib tosylate (Nexavar), a cancer drug patented by Bayer. This reduced the price from ₹280,000 per month to ₹8,800, making it affordable for patients.

4) Challenges and Controversies

- International pressure: Countries issuing compulsory licenses may face diplomatic or trade retaliation from patent-holding countries or pharmaceutical companies.
- Limited local capacity: Some developing countries lack the manufacturing capability to produce complex drugs, limiting the use of compulsory licensing without imports.
- Patent holder pushback: Patent owners argue that compulsory licensing undermines incentives for innovation and investment in R&D.

3.3 Case Studies

1) Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013)

The case *Novartis AG v. Union of India* (2013) is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of India that significantly shaped the interpretation of patent law in India, especially concerning pharmaceutical inventions and public health.

Background of the Case

- Novartis, a Swiss pharmaceutical company, developed a cancer drug called Glivec (imatinib mesylate).
- In 1998, Novartis filed a patent application in India for the beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate (a modified version of an already known compound).
- India's Patent Office rejected the application under Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, which prohibits patents for new forms of known substances unless they show "enhanced therapeutic efficacy."
- Novartis challenged the decision, arguing that Section 3(d) was unconstitutional and not TRIPS-compliant, and that their drug deserved patent protection.

Key Legal Issue

- Does the beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate qualify as a patentable invention under Section 3(d) by demonstrating enhanced therapeutic efficacy over the known substance?

Supreme Court's Ruling

In April 2013, the Supreme Court of India:

- Upheld the rejection of the patent application.
- Held that Novartis's drug did not demonstrate a significant enhancement of therapeutic efficacy as required under Section 3(d).
- Stated that efficacy must mean "therapeutic efficacy" in the context of medicines, and minor improvements in physical properties (like better flow, stability, or bioavailability) were not sufficient to meet this standard.

The Court also upheld the constitutionality of Section 3(d), finding it consistent with India's obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and aimed at preventing evergreening—a practice where companies obtain patents for trivial changes to extend monopoly rights.

The Novartis v. Union of India (2013) case highlighted the tension between pharmaceutical patent rights and public health needs. By interpreting Section 3(d) strictly, the Supreme Court aimed to prevent evergreening and promote access to affordable medicines, setting an important example of how national patent law can incorporate public health considerations within the TRIPS framework.

2) South Africa v. Big Pharma (2001)

Also known as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Case or the Medicines Act Case, this was a landmark legal battle between the South African government and multinational pharmaceutical companies over access to affordable medicines during the HIV/AIDS crisis.

Background

- In 1997, the South African government passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act (Act 90 of 1997).
- The Act allowed measures such as parallel importing (importing cheaper patented drugs from other countries) and generic substitution to reduce medicine prices and improve access.
- At the time, South Africa was facing a devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic, with millions unable to afford life-saving antiretroviral drugs, priced at up to \$10,000–\$15,000 per patient per year under patent protection.

The Lawsuit

- In 1998, 39 multinational pharmaceutical companies (including Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis) and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association (PMA) sued the South African government.
- They argued that the Act violated: Their patent rights under South Africa's laws
South Africa's obligations under the TRIPS Agreement
- Essentially, they claimed the government's measures undermined

their intellectual property and profit rights.

Public Outcry and Global Pressure

- The lawsuit sparked international outrage, with activists, NGOs (like Médecins Sans Frontières), and governments criticizing the pharmaceutical companies for prioritizing profits over lives.
- Protests and campaigns worldwide accused "Big Pharma" of blocking access to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment in a country facing a humanitarian crisis.
- Even high-profile figures and countries publicly condemned the lawsuit.

Outcome

Faced with mounting global pressure, reputational damage, and bad publicity, the pharmaceutical companies:

- Withdrew the lawsuit in April 2001, effectively ending the case in favor of the South African government.

This allowed South Africa to implement its Medicines Act provisions to lower drug prices and import cheaper generics, paving the way for broader access to HIV/AIDS treatment.

Significance

- Marked a victory for public health over pharmaceutical patent monopolies.
- Showed that TRIPS flexibilities could be used by developing countries to prioritize health without necessarily violating international law.
- Triggered wider debates and reforms globally on balancing intellectual property rights and access to essential medicines.
- Inspired the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001), which reaffirmed the right of WTO members to protect public health and promote access to medicines.

Conclusion

The South Africa v. Big Pharma case is a powerful example of how public health challenges, legal frameworks, and international trade rules intersect. It showed the potential of domestic policy, civil society activism, and international solidarity to reshape access to medicines in favor of public interest, even against powerful corporate opposition.

3.4 Innovation vs. Accessibility

There is an inherent tension between promoting pharmaceutical innovation and ensuring public access to affordable medicines. Patents are designed to reward innovation, but they can also create monopolies that limit affordability and access.

1) Innovation (Why Patents Matter)

- **Pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) is costly and risky:** Developing a new drug can take 10–15 years and billions of dollars, with no guarantee of success.
- Patents give **exclusive rights for 20 years** to the inventor, allowing the company to set prices without competition and recoup its investment.
- Without patent protection, companies fear that others will copy their innovations cheaply, undermining their profits and incentive to invest in new medicines.

Therefore, strong patent protection is seen as necessary to sustain pharmaceutical innovation, especially for high-cost, high-risk drug development.

2) Accessibility (Why Patents Create Barriers)

- When a drug is under patent, no generic competition is allowed, leading to higher prices because the company holds a monopoly.
- This can make life-saving medicines unaffordable, especially in low- and middle-income countries.

- Patients and healthcare systems may have to wait until patents expire (or use mechanisms like compulsory licensing) to access cheaper generics.

3) The Policy Dilemma

The core policy challenge is:

- How can we reward innovation to encourage the development of new drugs while ensuring that those drugs are accessible and affordable to those who need them?

Efforts to balance this include:

- **TRIPS flexibilities** (e.g., compulsory licensing, parallel importing)
- **Price negotiations and differential pricing** for low-income markets
- **Limiting patents on minor modifications** (as India does under Section 3(d) to prevent evergreening)
- **Public-private partnerships** for neglected diseases

Conclusion

The debate between **innovation and accessibility** reflects a **delicate balance**:

- If patents are too weak risk underinvestment in new drugs.
- If patents are too strong → risk making medicines unaffordable and inaccessible.
- Effective patent policy must therefore balance these competing interests to support both pharmaceutical innovation and the right to health.