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“JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE”

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ABSTRACT: -

The doctrine of judicial activism, specifically in relation to the separation of powers, is an important aspect of constitutional law that has developed through the active interaction between the Judiciary, Legislature, and Executive. The paper discusses the balance and tension between judicial activism and the constitutional principle of separation of powers in democratic governments, with specific reference to India. Judicial activism, while necessary in the defense of fundamental rights and remedy for legislative or executive inaction, tends to create apprehensions about judicial overreach and erosion of the autonomy of other branches of government. The paper examines the historical development of the doctrine of separation of powers and how the Judiciary has interpreted and applied this principle in resolving issues of governance, public interest, and constitutional interpretation. Through an analysis of milestone cases, judicial principles, and the effect of judicial intervention on public policy, this research emphasizes the importance of a fine balance between judicial activism and the maintenance of democratic constitutional frameworks. In addition, the paper addresses the changing role of the Judiciary in protecting the Constitution and ensuring that governance is responsive to the people's needs without compromising the functions of the other constitutional bodies.

KEYWORDS:

Judicial Activism, Separation of Powers, Constitutional Law, Judicial Review, Public Interest Litigation (PIL), Indian Constitution

1. INTRODUCTION

The Indian Constitution is a complex structure founded on democratic principles, federalism, and the primacy of the rule of law. One of its constitutional principles is the doctrine of separation of powers, which defines the functional limits between the three organs of the State: the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each organ is supposed to discharge its assigned functions without trespassing on the functions of the other organs. Yet, the Indian model is not one of the absolute separation but of a functional overlap that permits checks and

balances to work in a dynamic and evolving constitutional setting. Under this framework, judicial activism has become an essential and sometimes contentious tool by which the judiciary interprets and enforces constitutional standards, venturing into areas traditionally the domain of the legislature or executive from time to time. This tension between judicial activism and separation of powers continues to be a major source of academic, political, and judicial debate.¹ Judicial activism means the active role of the judiciary in ensuring justice, accountability, and safeguarding fundamental

rights when the legislature or executive does not perform its function properly. Based on the principle that the Constitution is a living document, judicial activism gives the courts, particularly the higher judiciary, the authority to interpret the law creatively and to bridge legislative or policy gaps to further constitutional objectives. The phenomenon achieved prominence within India in the late 20th century, specifically with the growth of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), whereby courts started acknowledging the rights of the marginalized and underprivileged even without immediate legal standing. Such an approach tremendously expanded the reach of the judiciary to deal with issues of environmental protection, prison reform, corruption, gender justice, and administrative inefficiencies.²

Yet this intrusive role of the judiciary has also generated fierce controversies regarding its mandate in a constitutional democracy pledged to the division of powers. Detractors contend that judicial activism tends to cross the threshold into judicial encroachment, where the judiciary oversteps its role as an interpreter to actually legislate or rule. This undermines the sovereignty of the elected legislature and the administrative independence of the executive. Supporters, however, see judicial activism as a necessary bulwark against arbitrary rule and systemic collapse. They highlight the role of the judiciary as the custodian of the Constitution and the defender of basic rights, especially where political institutions are either unable or unwilling to act firmly in the public interest.³ Indian doctrine of separation of powers, though not stated directly in the Constitution, has been identified and discussed through several judicial pronouncements. The Constitution framers envisioned balanced allocation of powers instead of compartmentalization of powers. While Articles such as 50 speak of separation of the judiciary from the executive, the overall plan contemplates an interdependent yet independent functioning of all three organs. The Supreme Court, in a

number of milestone cases including *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*, *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain*, and *I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu*, has emphasized the need to preserve institutional integrity as well as the essential framework of the Constitution. Simultaneously, in cases such as *Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan* and *Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms*, the judiciary has filled legislative gaps by establishing guidelines where Parliament had remained silent.⁴ This intricate relationship between judicial activism and the separation of powers doctrine highlights the dynamic and flexible character of constitutional interpretation in India. It is indicative of a changing constitutional culture where the judiciary is not only perceived as a court of dispute resolution but also as an active contributor to the formation of public policy and the actualization of constitutional values. Whereas this has occasioned paradigmatic judgments which have reshaped legal and social paradigms, it is also raising questions that are essential concerning institutional frontiers, democratic legitimacy, and accountability. The issue is one of ensuring judicial activism stays within constitutional propriety limits without eroding the fundamental fabric of democratic government and institutional equilibrium principle.⁵

2. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Judicial activism in constitutional law is a revolutionary style of jurisprudence where courts, particularly constitutional courts such as the Supreme Court and High Courts in India, adopt a broad interpretation of their jurisdiction under the Constitution to promote justice, safeguard fundamental rights, and uphold constitutional rule. It entails an active role by the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution in a manner that addresses the changing needs of society. Judicial activism usually occurs where the executive or legislature is slow to act, inactive, or unwilling to handle issues of utmost importance that

influence the lives of citizens. In India, judicial activism has discovered fertile soil with the huge socio-economic disparities, the inefficiency of the political process, and the imperative to provide instant relief in cases dealing with public welfare. The constitutional provisions, especially those relating to fundamental rights (Part III) and directive principles of state policy (Part IV), give the judiciary a robust basis to act when the other two branches of government fail to meet their constitutional responsibilities.⁶ This assertive role of the judiciary has played an important role in shaping constitutional jurisprudence in India. The extension of Article 21, which ensures the right to life and personal freedom, is a classic case of judicial activism. In a series of landmark judgments, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21 to encompass a broad range of rights like the right to a clean environment, right to shelter, right to health, right to privacy, and even the right to education. These developments were not absolutely limited to the literal words of the Constitution but were the outcome of a purposive and dynamic interpretation of constitutional provisions. Judicial activism has facilitated the courts to turn the Constitution into a living document that accommodates changing conditions and embodies present ideas of justice. The development of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) during the 1980s was a turning point when the courts began to reach out to weaker segments of society who otherwise did not have the means to seek legal recourse. The new jurisprudence departed from the conventional adversarial system and substituted it with an inquisitorial and justice-seeking system.⁷

Moreover, judicial activism has played a crucial role in maintaining the checks and balances envisioned in the constitutional framework. When the executive or legislature oversteps its authority or fails to act in accordance with constitutional principles, the judiciary, through activism, steps in to correct the imbalance. For instance, during the Emergency period in the

1970s, the judiciary faced criticism for its passivity, particularly in the infamous ADM Jabalpur case. But this period was succeeded by a reassertion of constitutional values, resulting in a more assertive judiciary in the subsequent decades. In judgments like *Minerva Mills v. Union of India*, *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India*, and *Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India*, the judiciary reasserted its role to review legislative and executive decisions to ensure consistency with the Constitution. The invocation of the doctrine of basic structure is another way in which judicial activism acts as a shield against constitutional amendments which imperil the very values at the heart of the Constitution.⁸ Judicial activism also often inserts the judiciary in complicated controversies pertaining to governance and policy. Though the courts cannot legislate, in a number of cases they have set parameters and frameworks since laws were wanting. This has been done in fields like sexual harassment in the workplace, police reform, green laws, and poll transparency. In the *Vishaka* case, for instance, the judiciary filled a legislative void by enunciating guidelines for preventing sexual harassment, which held good until Parliament passed specific legislation years later. Likewise, in the *Prakash Singh* case, the Supreme Court gave directions for police reforms to check arbitrariness and political interference. These interventions, though filling crucial governance lacunae, also raise questions about whether courts are overstepping into areas constitutionally reserved for other branches of government.⁹

The growth of judicial activism in India also needs to be seen against the backdrop of public confidence in the judiciary. Since institutions of governance frequently fail through corruption, inefficiency, or political stasis, the judiciary increasingly is viewed as a final resort for justice. This popular image, along with the constitutional imperative to preserve justice, forces courts to act decisively in the face of social or institutional collapse. Consequently, the judiciary has sometimes

assumed a supervisory role, watching the implementation of its orders, assigning committees, and requiring periodic reports on compliance, thus exercising what may be argued is judicial governance. Though these measures are based on the quest for justice and proper implementation, they nevertheless diminish the conventional delineation between the judiciary and the executive.¹⁰

3. ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

The separation of powers doctrine owes its intellectual roots to classical political theory but achieved its most familiar and formalized expression in eighteenth-century political philosophy. The principle is manifest in the governmental forms of ancient Rome and Greece, most notably through Aristotle, who separated the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial roles of the government. But the more contemporary expression of the doctrine is more evident in the writings of 17th and 18th-century political philosophers, beginning with John Locke and Montesquieu. John Locke's "Second Treatise of Civil Government" specifically stressed the separation of legislative and executive powers for the purpose of avoiding the monopolization of powers and safeguarding individual freedom. He suggested that legislative and executive authority ought to be lodged in distinct institutions to protect freedom and prevent tyranny. Drawing on this seminal notion, Montesquieu provided the most comprehensive and influential formulation of the doctrine in his masterwork *De l'Esprit des Lois* (The Spirit of the Laws), published in 1748.¹¹ Montesquieu's articulation of the division of powers is widely regarded as the keystone of contemporary democratic theory. Looking at the British system of constitution, he believed that liberty would be safest if the powers of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—were distinct and relegated to separate institutions. He cautioned that if the powers were lodged in one individual or entity, it would be despotic rule. While his comprehension of the British model was

idealized, the theoretical foundation he established found long-term influence in constitutional governance globally. Montesquieu's doctrine sought to check on the misuse of authority by insuring that no government branch would dominate or intervene in the activities of another. This principle has been a major force in shaping many modern constitutions, as well as the United States one, which practiced a robust system of separation supported by a framework of checks and balances.¹²

The American Constitution is one of the most explicit exercises of the doctrine of separation of powers. Based on Montesquieu and Locke, the framers separated power of government among three coequal branches—Congress (legislative), the President (executive), and the Supreme Court (judiciary)—with distinct roles and procedures to balance each other's powers. This structure was designed to preclude authoritarianism and prevent democratic governance from being undermined through institutional independence and interdependence. The American precedent, especially in the Federalist Papers and James Madison's writing, stressed that separation of powers was necessary not just to check governmental excess but to ensure the rule of law and freedom-order balance.¹³ In India, the separation of powers doctrine was not implemented in the strict classical sense, yet its imprint is firmly ingrained in the constitutional framework. The Indian Constitution does not refer to "separation of powers" explicitly, but it makes provisions for a functional separation between the three branches of government. The organization, duties, and authority of the legislature, executive, and judiciary are specified in various sections of the Constitution—Parts V and VI cover the Union and State Executives and Legislatures respectively, whereas Part V (Chapter IV) expounds on the judiciary. While the Indian model attests to the canons of separation of powers, it is crafted in a manner that requires some interdependence between

the branches, facilitating checks and balances. Such flexibility was aimed at allowing for the intricate nature of Indian governance and at avoiding institutional deadlock or incapacity.¹⁴

Judicial interpretations within India have had a central role in establishing and enforcing doctrine in the constitutional framework. The Supreme Court has consistently held the principle of separation of powers to be a component of the fundamental structure of the Constitution, which could not be modified even by amendment to the Constitution. In key cases such as *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala* and *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain*, the Court emphasized that upholding the independence and integrity of every wing was crucial for the continuation of democracy and constitutionalism. Concurrently, the Indian judiciary has not been a passive institution; it has proactively reacted to constitutional crises, legislative failure, and executive misstep through judicial activism. This has created an intricate interaction between the doctrine of separation and the interpretative and sometimes policy-shaping functions of the judiciary, which, though directed toward guarding constitutional values, also test the doctrinal sanitation of the separation of powers.¹⁵ The history and evolution of the doctrine of separation of powers therefore reflect a historical development of political thought and constitutional structure intended to guarantee limited government and responsible government. From its philosophical origins in ancient and Enlightenment theory to its practical application in contemporary constitutions, the doctrine has been a guiding principle for democratic states. Its working in India is specially marked by a pragmatic strategy that combines formal institutional divisions with the requirement of working relations and constitutional accountability. The tension between judicial activism and separation of powers continues to shape the Indian constitutional sphere, highlighting both the robustness and the versatility of the doctrine in tackling current issues.¹⁶

4. ROLE OF JUDICIARY IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION

The judiciary has a central and indispensable function to interpret the Constitution, acting as the final guarantor of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law. In any democratic regime founded on a written constitution, the interpretive power is at the core of judicial duty. In India, this function has been greatly enhanced because of the extensive and dynamic character of the Constitution, which contains elaborate provisions regarding fundamental rights, the organization of government, directive principles of state policy, and the distribution of powers between the Union and the States. The judiciary, and specifically the Supreme Court and the High Courts, is entrusted with interpreting constitutional provisions, resolving ambiguities, and ensuring that all laws and executive actions conform to constitutional standards. This interpretative role renders the judiciary not just a referee of disputes but a crucial architect in determining the understanding and implementation of constitutional values throughout the legal and political landscape.¹⁷ The judicial review power, established under Articles 13, 32, 131, 136, 142, and 226 of the Constitution, grants the power to the judiciary to examine parliamentary legislation and administrative action in relation to the norm of constitutional acceptability. By so doing, this function has empowered the courts to act as the sentinels of the civil liberties as well as a guardian of democracy. Whenever a law is repugnant to or encroaches upon basic rights, it then becomes the responsibility of the judiciary to invalidate it. The judiciary, by doing this, has upheld the purity of the Constitution and served as a check to the other two branches of the government. Throughout the years, the Indian judiciary has construed the Constitution not just in a technical or literal sense, but through purposive and evolving methods. Such interpretations have assisted in broadening the ambit of rights, strengthening accountability, and upholding

justice, frequently completing the gaps left by the legislature or the executive.¹⁸

One of the most important contributions of the judiciary in constitutional interpretation is the creation of the basic structure doctrine. Dating back to the seminal *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala* case in 1973, the doctrine of basic structure states that though Parliament has broad powers to amend the Constitution under Article 368, it cannot modify or demolish its basic structure. The Supreme Court identified the essential ingredients like the predominance of the Constitution, rule of law, separation of powers, judicial review, and the safeguarding of fundamental rights as being integral to the basic structure. This judicial innovation not only saved the Constitutional ideals of foundation but also placed the judiciary on an equal footing and co-constitutional footing with the other organs of the State. It also reaffirmed the interpretive dominance of the judiciary in making decisions about the scope and limitations of constitutional amendments, hence enshrining its pivotal position within constitutional governance.¹⁹ Judicial interpretation in India has also served as a force powerful enough to evolve the nature of fundamental rights from being solely personal entitlements towards becoming instruments for socio-economic reform. Article 21 of the Constitution, which originally secured protection of life and personal liberty against state action that was arbitrary, has been read expansively so as to encompass a broad array of derivative rights like the right to health, education, livelihood, privacy, and a clean environment. This mode of interpretation is a reflection of a living Constitution with a dynamic understanding, a Constitution that evolves as and when conditions and demands of society so change. By a string of milestone judgments like *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*, *Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation*, *Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, and *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*, the judiciary has enriched the substantive content of

constitutional rights and values.²⁰

The interpretive function of the judiciary also covers the area of federalism, secularism, and the separation of powers. In federal conflicts, the Supreme Court has had an essential role to play in defining legislative jurisdictional limits between the Union and State governments. In the domain of religious freedoms and secularism, the Court has developed doctrines like the "essential religious practices" test so as to reconcile religious autonomy with constitutional morality. In separation of powers cases, the judiciary has invariably reaffirmed the independence of the three branches while asserting that no organ ought to excessively meddle in the activities of another. The judiciary has never been averse to intervening, however, when the activities of the legislature or executive have imperiled constitutional norms. This combination of restraint and intervention is the unique hallmark of Indian constitutional interpretation and indicates a sensitive appreciation of democratic government.²¹

5. ROLE OF LEGISLATURE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIARY

In a constitutional democracy such as India, the state structure of government is based on the separation of state powers between three main organs—the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. All three organs obtain their authority from the Constitution and serve a unique but complementary function in the running of the state. The separation of powers doctrine, though not strictly followed in India, is the foundation of this tri-partite division to avoid the centralization of power within one branch and ensure that there is accountability and the proper functioning of democratic institutions. This dogma is particularly relevant when discussing judicial activism, as it raises to the surface the lines, overlaps, and tensions between these organs in traversing the constitutional mandate to uphold the rule of law and justice.²² The Legislature, being the people's representative, is tasked with

enacting laws. It reflects the sovereign will of the voters and is primarily responsible for formulating policy orientations, enacting budgets, and laying down statutory legislation that runs the country. Representing the Parliament at the national level and the State Legislatures at the regional level, the Legislature has legislative dominance under the scheme outlined in the Constitution. Yet, its activity is governed by constitutional restraints, particularly in relation to basic rights and federal division of powers. The Legislature's role is paramount when social welfare legislation, economic reforms, and other initiatives for implementing the Directive Principles of State Policy are to be enacted. Even though its sole law-making role, the Legislature's effectiveness is usually disallowed by political turmoil, delay, and inactivity, which consequently leaves the vacuum for judicial action under the guise of activism.²³

The Executive is the organ entrusted with enforcing laws and managing the day-to-day affairs of the state. At the Union level, it is headed by the President, Prime Minister, and Council of Ministers, and at the State level, by the Governor and the State Council of Ministers. The Executive has great power in areas concerning governance, law enforcement, imposition of policies, and foreign policy. It is authorized to issue ordinances, enact rules and regulations under delegated legislation, and initiate administrative measures for upholding public order and governance. The Constitution places some checks on the Executive, such as judicial review of administrative actions and oversight by the legislature through parliamentary mechanisms. But in case the Executive is unable to fulfill its constitutional or statutory responsibilities efficiently, in domains like human rights, public health, environmental protection, and administrative justice, the Judiciary tends to intervene through judicial activism, because executive inaction or overreach creates a vacuum that needs to be filled.²⁴ The Judiciary, as the guardian and interpreter of the

Constitution, stands in a distinctive position among the three arms. Its central role is to determine disputes, interpret legislation, and protect constitutional values. Through judicial review, the Judiciary enforces that the conduct of both the Legislature and the Executive adheres to constitutional stipulations. With time, the Judiciary has become a vibrant institution where not only are legal contests disposed but also safeguarder of civil liberties and guarantor of constitutional governance. Along the way, it has fashioned doctrines like the basic structure doctrine, the rule of law, and the precedence of fundamental rights. Judicial activism, as an aspect of this function, has enabled the courts to intervene in legislative and executive failures by issuing orders, requiring policy guidelines, and even overseeing their enforcement. Although this activism has, in many cases, led to sweeping social and legal reform, it has also raised controversies about judicial overreach and the infringement on the areas of jurisdiction historically left to the other two branches.²⁵ The relationship between these organs is characterized by cooperation and conflict, moderated by the intrinsic tensions in the democratic system. Though the Constitution envisions a balance of power, political, social, and economic considerations often drive the reality. The Legislature can enact laws that are ambiguous, archaic, or even unconstitutional, which would be subject to judicial review and possible invalidation. The Executive, in an attempt to preserve political leverage or bureaucratic ease, is tempted to bypass the legislative route or indulge in arbitrary action, inviting judicial intervention. On the other hand, when the Judiciary, by virtue of activism, starts prescribing policies or monitoring their enforcement, issues are raised regarding the erosion of democratic accountability and institutional restraint. This fragile equipoise lies at the center of the separation of powers doctrine and is ever under strain in the dynamic relationship of Indian governance.²⁶

6. PRESERVING THE SPIRIT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

Maintaining the essence of the doctrine of separation of powers in a constitutional democracy such as India is not just a matter of keeping strict institutional boundaries, but of ensuring that the power balance between the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary operates in a manner that maintains democratic accountability, guards constitutional values, and facilitates effective governance. Although the Indian Constitution does not follow a rigid separation of powers like that of the American, it does have a functional division between the organs of the State. This functional separation aims to ensure institutional autonomy while making provision for checks and balances to avoid arbitrary or autocratic action. The test is to ensure that every branch uses its powers within constitutional boundaries and in regard for the roles and jurisdiction of the others. Judicial activism thus arises here as both a reaction to and a challenge of the durability of the doctrine. It serves to identify the thin line between active constitutional interpretation and institutional overreach.²⁷ Preservation of this doctrine requires a constant effort by the three branches to maintain constitutional decency, institutional discipline, and respect for one another. The Legislature, as a representative of the people, needs to fulfill its principal role of lawmaking with great diligence, foresight, and sensibility to the needs of society. It should ensure that its laws are clear, fair, and constitutionally valid. Laws that are excessive, ambiguous, or violative of basic rights not only burden the Judiciary with the responsibility of correction but also threaten to erode legislative credibility. An active Legislature that is actively engaged with public policy, is transparent, and offers strong deliberation will minimize the necessity for judicial intervention and reinforce the constitutional scheme of distributed powers. Furthermore, the process of legislation ought not to be by-passed through overreliance upon ordinances or delegated

legislation, which diminishes the deliberative function of legislation and violates the constitutionally intended equilibrium.²⁸

The Executive, with its responsibility for carrying on laws into effect and overseeing the routine operation of the State, has the very important duty of upholding the ethos of separation of powers. It has to operate within the parameters of the laws enacted by the Legislature and be informed by parameters of fairness, accountability, and constitutional morality. Politically driven or arbitrary administrative action is usually courting judicial intervention and activating judicial activism by the courts. When the Executive fails in its responsibility—be it to protect fundamental rights, roll out welfare schemes, or deliver administrative justice—the Judiciary is usually forced to step in. Although such intervention could provide short-term relief, it is long-term troubling in terms of institutional roles and the sustainability of judicial interference in governance. A capable, responsible, and constitutionally aware Executive, hence, is critical in curbing judicial activism and upholding the independence of each arm.²⁹ The Judiciary, on its part, has the onerous task of being the sentinel of the Constitution and the final arbiter of the law. Although judicial review is an absolute necessary for the perpetuation of constitutional rule, the Judiciary should utilize this authority with profound regard for its limitations. It should shun the desire to undertake the roles of the Legislature or the Executive, no matter their failures. The legitimacy of the Judiciary depends not just on the correctness of its reasoning but also on its restraint, neutrality, and commitment to the Constitution. Judicial activism has to be separated from judicial overreach—a development in which courts make policy decisions, dispense public programs, or issue mandates that are in effect legislative or executive in nature. Such tactics may yield short-term benefits or widespread popularity, but they have the potential to erode the strength of democratic institutions and shrink

political accountability space.³⁰ A critical part of upholding the ethos of separation of powers is building constitutional culture within the institutions and society. Constitutional ideals need to become part of the institutional practice, educational narrative, and political practice. Judges need to be educated not merely in law, but also constitutional thought and institutional morality. The legislators need to comprehend their role under the Constitution above party consideration and strive towards enhancing democratic institutions. The bureaucracy needs to become sensitive to rights-based governance as well as openness. Simultaneously, the media and civil society are responsible for checking each branch of government, spreading constitutional awareness, and ensuring the exercise of power in the public interest. An informed and active citizenry can serve as a check on institutional abuse and ensure a political climate that instills respect for constitutional limits.³¹

7. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL INNOVATION IN GOVERNANCE

In the intricate and dynamic environment of contemporary democratic leadership, the call for innovation in the judiciary has come to represent a decisive aspect of constitutional operation, especially within jurisdictions such as India where governance tend to be under immense structural, administrative, and legislative pressures. Judicial innovation is the innovative and purposeful interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions by the courts to adjust to new realities, settle lacunae in the law, and protect fundamental rights. It becomes particularly significant when conventional forms of governance fail or are unable to respond to pressing social concerns, compelling the Judiciary to come up with new legal doctrines, procedural tools, and enforcement techniques beyond normal adjudication. In the larger framework of "Judicial Activism and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers: A Constitutional Perspective," judicial innovation functions as both an antidote to democratic deficits as well as an agent of

legal and institutional change.³² The Indian Judiciary has consistently understood that the inflexibility of formalistic interpretations cannot be enough in a society characterized by profound social disparities, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and legislative stagnation. In this environment, innovation becomes a necessity in the judicial realm and not an exception. The advent of public interest litigation (PIL) in the late 1970s and the 1980s was a landmark development in judicial innovation. PIL removed the conventional hurdles of locus standi and enabled any public-spirited citizen to approach the court for enforcement of the rights of the poor and the marginalized. This transformation allowed the courts to deal with systemic injustices and institutional failures that had not been resolved through regular legal procedures. It turned the Judiciary into a popular platform for social justice and made it an active participant in the governance of the public. With PILs, the judiciary has intervened on a vast spectrum of matters—from bonded labor, custodial violence, and environmental degradation to prison reforms, children's rights, and sexual harassment—illustrating how judicial innovation can plug governance gaps and impose constitutional obligations in new and imaginative ways.³³

The other site of judicial innovation is the evolution of progressive constitutional doctrines that move beyond the letter of the Constitution to capture the spirit and intent behind it. The meaning of Article 21, which provides for the right to life and personal liberty, has been revolutionized through judicial innovativeness. What was previously a narrowly interpreted right has come to encompass the right to a clean environment, health, education, shelter, and dignity, among others. This broad reading is not a product of legislative overhaul, but of judicial attunement to shifting social needs and a creative engagement with constitutional ideals. By importing these rights into the wider scheme of human dignity, the Judiciary has breathed life into idealistic

constitutional principles and brought them into operation in the concrete life of citizens. These innovations are not only interpretative achievements but tools of statecraft that impact policy directions and administrative priorities.³⁴ Judicial innovation also takes the form of making use of continuing mandamus and court-appointed committees to oversee implementation of its orders in intricate socio-economic issues. In pollution control, education reform, food security, and police accountability cases, the courts have transcended the role of issuing declaratory judgments to actively monitor compliance in the form of periodic reports, progress reviews, and structured relief. While such actions extend the boundaries of conventional judicial roles, they frequently arise out of necessity where executive agencies show chronic non-compliance, indifference, or ineffectiveness. These innovations represent the Judiciary's effort to see that justice is not only uttered but also brought about in practical reality. Yet they also pose significant questions regarding institutional roles, democratic legitimacy, and the viability of judicial intervention in governance.³⁵ In the information age and in a world struggling with accelerated technological, environmental, and social transformations, judicial innovation has become even more crucial. Matters like data protection, cyber offenses, artificial intelligence, digital monopolies, global warming, and bioethics pose new legal challenges for which there could be no legislative precedent. In these situations, the Judiciary has to tread new ground, developing temporary legal standards and guidelines on the basis of constitutional principles. The establishment of the right to privacy as a constitutional right in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy

v. Union of India is one such instance of judicial prudence in addressing emerging technology-based threats to personal freedom. By basing new rights and standards on established constitutional provisions, the Judiciary fills the lacuna between static legal

texts and dynamic social realities. This interpretive flexibility, while sometimes faulted, is crucial in keeping the Constitution a living instrument that keeps pace with changing times.³⁶

CONCLUSION

The dynamic, and at times delicate, tension between judicial activism and the separation of powers doctrine is a characteristic of the vibrant and sometimes tenuous balance found in a constitutional democracy. Whereas the separation of powers doctrine is aimed at upholding institutional independence and averting the misuse of power, judicial activism emerges as a necessary antidote to gaps in governance, legislative inaction, and executive failure. In India, this assertiveness of the judiciary has been a catalytic force to uphold fundamental rights, ensure constitutional mandates, and deliver justice to the marginalized. But the exercise of such power has to be tempered by restraint, clarity of intention, and a profound respect for the roles of the Legislature and the Executive. The Judiciary can innovate and intervene, as it should, but always within the limits of constitutional propriety and democratic accountability. Finally, the well-being of a constitutional democracy is the proper functioning of every one of its branches—each separately but harmoniously, every one respecting the others and being faithful to the Constitution. The challenge is balancing this coexistence to enable the Judiciary to act as an indispensable check and upholder of constitutional values.

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