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## THE DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE VS. PROTECTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS IN INDIA: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

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### Abstract

The Doctrine of Pleasure, rooted in English constitutional law, was adopted into Indian constitutional jurisprudence through Article 310 of the Constitution, enabling the President or Governor to dismiss civil servants at their discretion. However, India's constitutional vision diverges from the colonial ethos by embedding protections for civil servants under Article 311, thereby creating a unique framework where executive authority is moderated by procedural safeguards. This research critically examines the doctrinal tension between executive prerogative and civil service security, especially in the context of Article 14's guarantee against arbitrariness and the evolving principles of natural justice.

Through a chronological analysis of landmark judgments—from Shyamlal and Dhingra to Tulsiram Patel and T.S.R. Subramanian—the paper maps the judiciary's gradual shift towards interpreting service protections in light of constitutional morality and fairness. It also highlights grey areas such as compulsory retirements, politically motivated transfers, and reversion, which often escape meaningful judicial scrutiny. The paper argues that while the judiciary has played a significant role in bridging doctrinal gaps, structural inconsistencies and lack of codified safeguards continue to undermine administrative independence.

The study concludes with a strong recommendation for legislative intervention through a comprehensive Civil Services Act, reinforcement of tenure stability, and institutional reforms in line with best practices in jurisdictions like the UK and Canada. Ultimately, the research underscores that protecting civil servants from arbitrary executive actions is not merely a matter of service law but a necessary condition for sustaining constitutional governance and public accountability in a democratic polity.

**Keywords.** *Doctrine of Pleasure, Article 310, Article 311, Civil Servants, Constitutional Safeguards, Judicial Review, Administrative Law, Natural Justice, Rule of Law, Public Accountability.*

### I. Introduction

The doctrine of pleasure is a foundational principle in public service jurisprudence, with its roots embedded in the English constitutional system. Under the British legal framework, civil servants held office at the "pleasure of the Crown," a reflection of the monarch's sovereign prerogative. This doctrine, although originating in the context of a hereditary monarchy, was

transposed with minimal modification into colonial India, and later entrenched in the Constitution of independent India. Article 310 of the Constitution of India expressly embodies this principle by stating that civil servants hold office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be. At first glance, this provision appears to confer absolute discretion upon the executive to dismiss or

remove civil servants without assigning reasons or affording procedural safeguards.

However, the Constitution simultaneously introduces a vital counterbalance through Article 311. This article limits the unfettered operation of Article 310 by guaranteeing procedural safeguards to civil servants who are members of the civil services of the Union or of a State, or who hold civil posts under the Union or a State. Specifically, Article 311 mandates that no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed them, and that no such dismissal or removal shall take place without providing the civil servant an opportunity to be heard. Thus, a doctrinal tension is inherently built into the constitutional framework—while Article 310 enshrines executive pleasure, Article 311 institutionalizes the rule of law and principles of natural justice.

This research paper seeks to examine this constitutional dichotomy by undertaking a doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis of the competing frameworks of authority and protection. It explores the historical foundations of the doctrine of pleasure, the constitutional scheme adopted by the framers, and the evolving interpretation of Articles 310 and 311<sup>611</sup> by Indian courts. Through a chronological case law study and critical analysis, the paper aims to assess whether the existing legal framework offers adequate protection to civil servants against arbitrary state action, and how far judicial interpretation has succeeded in reconciling this doctrinal conflict.

## II. Historical and Theoretical Foundations

The doctrine of pleasure originates from English common law and was firmly established by the Privy Council in *Shenton v. Smith*<sup>612</sup>, where it was held that government servants held office at the pleasure of the Crown and could be dismissed at any time without assigning any reason or providing procedural safeguards. The rationale was rooted in the idea of sovereign

supremacy: since the Crown could do no wrong, it needed no justification to terminate employment in the public interest. This model, while viable under a monarchical and largely unitary framework, inherently subordinated the rights of civil servants to the discretion of the executive authority.

This doctrine was transplanted into colonial India through administrative practice rather than legislative codification. Under British rule, civil servants in India were appointed and removed at the discretion of the Governor-General or provincial governors. While Indian civil services were lauded for efficiency and impartiality, the absence of codified protections rendered officers vulnerable to political interference and executive whim. The Indian Civil Service (ICS), although institutionally prestigious, functioned under the shadow of imperial authority, with minimal space for legal contestation against arbitrary dismissal.

The Constituent Assembly of India deliberated extensively on the continuance of the doctrine of pleasure in the draft Constitution. While the framers recognized the importance of maintaining executive control over the administration, there was also an emergent consensus on the need to provide constitutional protection to civil servants. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, while presenting Article 310 (draft Article 282), acknowledged the colonial origins of the doctrine but argued for balancing it with procedural safeguards to uphold fairness and autonomy in service matters. This led to the incorporation of Article 311, which was designed to act as a bulwark against arbitrary termination and to align executive action with principles of natural justice.

Philosophically, the debate around the doctrine of pleasure pivots on the competing imperatives of executive control and civil service independence. While the executive requires flexibility to ensure administrative efficiency, an unregulated doctrine of pleasure risks fostering a culture of fear, politicization, and subservience among civil servants. A

<sup>611</sup> Constitution of India, arts. 310, 311.

<sup>612</sup> *Shenton v. Smith*, (1895) AC 229 (PC).



democratic constitutional order, unlike a monarchy, demands that public servants be protected from arbitrary power to ensure their fidelity to the Constitution and not to transient political regimes. This theoretical tension between authority and autonomy has deeply influenced judicial interpretations of Articles 310 and 311 and remains central to contemporary discourse on public service reform in India.

### III. Constitutional Scheme: Article 310 vs. Article 311

The Indian Constitution, while adopting the doctrine of pleasure, significantly modifies it through a protective framework embodied in Article 311. Article 310 enshrines the principle that members of the civil services hold office during the pleasure of the President (in the case of Union services) or the Governor (in the case of State services). The provision, a direct transplant of English constitutional conventions, grants wide discretion to the executive to appoint and remove civil servants without furnishing cause. However, this power is not absolute in the Indian constitutional context.

Article 311 introduces critical safeguards to temper the broad scope of Article 310. Article 311(1) mandates that no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one who appointed him. This ensures a hierarchical balance and prevents arbitrary action by junior or local officials. More substantially, Article 311(2) secures procedural fairness by guaranteeing a departmental inquiry before any dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank. The clause enshrines the principle of natural justice by requiring the affected employee to be informed of the charges and afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Nonetheless, the constitutional scheme recognizes certain exigencies where procedural formalities may be dispensed with. The proviso to Article 311(2) permits denial of inquiry in three circumstances: first, where holding such an inquiry is deemed inexpedient in the interest of the security of the state; second, where it is

impracticable to hold the inquiry; and third, where the civil servant has been convicted on a criminal charge. These exceptions, while facilitating executive efficiency in extraordinary circumstances, have also led to interpretive challenges and allegations of misuse.

The Supreme Court has consistently balanced these provisions to maintain fidelity to the Constitution's democratic ethos. In *Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India*<sup>613</sup> (1958), the Court clarified that Article 310 must be read in harmony with Article 311 and does not give the executive an unreviewable power to dismiss public servants. Justice S.R. Das emphasized that Article 311 acts as a restraint on the pleasure doctrine by embedding procedural due process into service jurisprudence. This principle was reaffirmed in *Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel*<sup>614</sup> (1985), wherein the Court upheld the validity of the provisos under Article 311(2), but cautioned that exceptions must be narrowly construed and objectively established.

Further complexity arises when distinguishing between statutory and contractual employees. In *Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation v. M. Subba Rao*<sup>615</sup> (2001), the Supreme Court held that contractual employees do not fall within the protective ambit of Article 311, as their terms of service are governed by contract and not by statutory rules. The Court clarified that where the relationship is purely contractual, the remedy lies in private law, not constitutional protections. This distinction underlines the importance of service status in determining access to Article 311 safeguards and poses significant implications for contemporary employment models adopted by state agencies and public sector undertakings.

The constitutional framework thus articulates a nuanced approach to public service regulation: while the doctrine of pleasure grants functional control to the executive, Article 311 operates as a constitutional limitation that enshrines

<sup>613</sup> *Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India*, AIR 1958 SC 36.

<sup>614</sup> *Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel*, (1985) 3 SCC 398.

<sup>615</sup> *Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation v. M. Subba Rao*, (2001) 7 SCC 78.

principles of fairness and accountability. This dual structure reflects the framers' intent to preserve the integrity of civil administration while ensuring it remains subordinate to constitutional morality and judicial oversight.

#### IV. Judicial Interpretation: Chronological Case Law Analysis

Judicial interpretation of Articles 310 and 311 has evolved through a rich tapestry of decisions, reflecting both a reaffirmation and redefinition of the doctrine of pleasure in India's constitutional framework. The courts have balanced executive prerogatives with the imperatives of natural justice and rule of law, progressively carving out procedural and substantive safeguards for civil servants. A chronological study of landmark cases demonstrates how Indian jurisprudence has developed to navigate the tension between absolute executive discretion and constitutional protection.

The foundational case of *State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid*<sup>616</sup> (1954) marked an early judicial departure from the rigidity of the doctrine of pleasure. The Supreme Court recognized a government servant's right to claim arrears of salary even after wrongful dismissal, holding that the doctrine does not override a civil servant's legal entitlements. This judgment implicitly placed limits on the doctrine of pleasure, asserting that service-related rights are not extinguished merely by executive action.

Shortly after, in *Shyamlal v. State of U.P.*<sup>617</sup> (1955), the Court distinguished between dismissal and compulsory retirement. It held that compulsory retirement, if not stigmatic and done in public interest, does not amount to dismissal and hence does not attract the safeguards under Article 311. This case laid the groundwork for a significant body of jurisprudence distinguishing punitive action from administrative measures, shaping the contours of permissible executive discretion.

A major turning point came with *Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India*<sup>618</sup> (1958), where the Supreme Court comprehensively analyzed the scope of Articles 310 and 311. It held that Article 311 applies only to dismissals that are punitive in nature and affect the civil servant's rights. The Court made a crucial distinction between termination simpliciter and termination by way of punishment. Dhingra's case became the doctrinal touchstone for service jurisprudence, asserting that constitutional protections under Article 311 operate only when there is a civil consequence or stigma attached to the termination.

The next shift occurred in *E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu*<sup>619</sup> (1974), which although not directly based on Article 311, expanded the interpretative canvas by linking arbitrary executive action to a violation of Article 14. The judgment famously held that arbitrariness is antithetical to equality. This reasoning had significant implications for civil service dismissals, suggesting that even if Article 311 was technically complied with, arbitrary dismissals could still be challenged under Article 14, thus judicially strengthening civil servant protection through constitutional equality guarantees.

In *Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel*<sup>620</sup> (1985), a Constitution Bench confronted the scope of the exceptions under Article 311(2). The Court upheld the validity of dispensing with inquiry in cases involving national security or practical impossibility, but emphasized that such situations must be objectively justified. The ruling was pivotal in defining the contours of procedural exception and stressed the importance of written reasons and administrative accountability. Tulsiram Patel remains a cornerstone case, balancing state exigency with individual rights.

The principle of natural justice in the context of civil services was further reiterated in *S.S.*

<sup>616</sup> *State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid*, AIR 1954 SC 245.

<sup>617</sup> *Shyamlal v. State of U.P.*, AIR 1954 SC 369.

<sup>618</sup> *Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India*, AIR 1958 SC 36.

<sup>619</sup> *E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu*, (1974) 4 SCC 3.

<sup>620</sup> *Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel*, (1985) 3 SCC 398.

*Dhanoa v. Union of India*<sup>621</sup>(1991), where the Court emphasized that even under the pleasure doctrine, principles of fairness, objectivity, and non-arbitrariness must be observed. The Court made it clear that non-stigmatic compulsory retirement must still be subjected to a judicially reviewable standard of public interest, thereby narrowing the scope for abuse.

A significant administrative reform-oriented judgment emerged in *T.S.R. Subramanian v. Union of India*<sup>622</sup> (2013), which addressed bureaucratic independence from political interference. The Court directed the government to ensure fixed tenure for civil servants and held that they should not act on oral instructions from political executives. Though not directly about Articles 310 or 311, the decision fortified the normative framework for civil service autonomy, underscoring the need for institutional safeguards against arbitrary influence.

Most recently, *Ajay Chadha v. Union of India*<sup>623</sup> (2022) revisited the interplay of constitutional and administrative safeguards before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). The Court underscored the importance of procedural fairness and the need for civil servants to be granted a meaningful hearing before any punitive measure. It emphasized the judicial role of CAT in scrutinizing executive action and reaffirmed that procedural lapses can vitiate disciplinary proceedings even under the broad umbrella of Article 310.

These cases collectively demonstrate that Indian courts have gradually evolved a protective shield around civil servants, despite the formal presence of the pleasure doctrine. The judiciary has insisted on procedural compliance, reasoned decisions, and adherence to the principles of natural justice and non-arbitrariness. While Article 310 affirms executive authority, it is Article 311—judicially interpreted and constitutionally harmonized—

that has emerged as the true guarantor of civil service integrity and protection in India's administrative law framework.

## VI. Need for Constitutional and Institutional Reform

The continuing doctrinal and practical tension between the doctrine of pleasure under Article 310 and the safeguards under Article 311 reveals a compelling need for structural and constitutional reforms aimed at safeguarding the integrity and independence of the civil services in India. The current framework, while progressive in theory, suffers from ambiguity in practice and vulnerability to executive overreach, especially in politically sensitive matters. This necessitates a more robust legal architecture that balances efficiency with accountability and protection.

The most critical reform would be the enactment of a comprehensive Civil Services Act that clearly codifies the rights, duties, and protections of civil servants. Such legislation would clarify the procedural mechanisms for disciplinary actions, including standards of evidence, timelines, and mandatory hearings. While Article 311 provides essential protections such as inquiry and non-dismissal by subordinate authority, the absence of uniform procedures across services and states has led to fragmented interpretations and inconsistent enforcement. A statutory framework can bridge this gap by standardizing service jurisprudence and embedding safeguards against misuse of the pleasure doctrine.

Judicial intervention must also be institutionalized more rigorously. Although the higher judiciary has acted as a bulwark against arbitrary dismissals, a consistent mechanism for judicial oversight, possibly through mandatory judicial review of dismissals and premature retirements, would enhance accountability. This would not only reinforce Article 311 but also deepen constitutional fidelity in executive decision-making.

<sup>621</sup> S. Dhanoa v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 567.

<sup>622</sup> T.S.R. Subramanian v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 732.

<sup>623</sup> Ajay Chadha v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 485.



Further, institutions like the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), established under Article 323A of the Constitution, require substantial strengthening. The CAT was conceived as a specialized forum for service matters, but it often lacks the independence, resources, and credibility necessary to counterbalance executive power effectively. Judicial appointments to CAT must be made with greater transparency and security of tenure to instill trust among civil servants. Additionally, empowering State Public Service Commissions and insulating them from political interference can ensure objective recommendations in service matters, thereby reinforcing institutional credibility.

A pivotal reform worth reiterating is the enforcement of fixed tenures for bureaucrats, as mandated in *Prakash Singh v. Union of India* (2006), where the Supreme Court emphasized that fixed tenure is essential for insulating public officials from arbitrary transfer and political pressure. Unfortunately, despite the Court's directions, fixed tenures are often violated in practice, defeating the very purpose of autonomy and administrative continuity. Codifying these safeguards through parliamentary legislation would strengthen their enforceability.

Comparative insights may also be drawn from countries like the United Kingdom and Canada, where the doctrine of pleasure is statutorily limited by robust civil service frameworks. In the UK, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act<sup>624</sup>, 2010 lays down appointment, dismissal, and conduct rules, thereby limiting ministerial discretion. Canada's Public Service Employment Act similarly offers statutory protections against arbitrary removal. Australia, too, through the Public Service Act, 1999, ensures merit-based hiring and limited executive interference. These jurisdictions demonstrate that democratic accountability need not be compromised to preserve bureaucratic neutrality and efficiency.

In sum, the constitutional vision of a professional, impartial, and secure civil service demands the twin pillars of substantive legal protections and effective institutional mechanisms. Without such reforms, the civil services remain exposed to the vicissitudes of political change, undermining the rule of law and constitutional governance.

## VII. Conclusion

The Doctrine of Pleasure, while rooted in colonial legacy and carried forward through Article 310 of the Indian Constitution, stands today at a critical intersection of constitutional necessity and democratic accountability. Its unregulated or politically motivated application poses a serious threat to the impartial functioning of the civil services and, by extension, to the constitutional framework of governance itself. In a system premised on checks and balances, allowing the executive unfettered discretion over civil servant tenure risks transforming a professional bureaucracy into a politicized apparatus.

The framers of the Constitution foresaw this tension and introduced Article 311 as a corrective mechanism, embedding principles of due process and procedural fairness into the dismissal framework. Over time, the Indian judiciary has played a pivotal role in interpreting and harmonizing this constitutional contradiction, often invoking Article 14 to invalidate arbitrary dismissals and safeguard the rights of public servants. Through landmark rulings—from *Shyam Lal* and *Dhingra* to *Tulsiram Patel* and *T.S.R. Subramanian*—the courts have sought to strike a balance between administrative discipline and individual rights.

Yet judicial interventions alone cannot cure systemic vulnerabilities. The doctrine must evolve from its colonial moorings into a democratically governed rule of law principle. This necessitates doctrinal clarity, constitutional reforms, and the fortification of institutions like the Central Administrative Tribunal and independent public service commissions. Only then can India genuinely uphold the

<sup>624</sup> Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, 2010 (UK).



constitutional promise of a secure, efficient, and accountable civil service, one that serves the nation rather than the regime in power.

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