DATA MONOPOLIES IN DIGITAL PLATFORM MARKETS – A DOCTRINAL INQUIRY INTO NON-PRICE HARMS AND REGULATORY GAPS
AUTHOR – ABRAHAM JOSEPH, STUDENT AT CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY), BANGALORE
BEST CITATION – ABRAHAM JOSEPH, DATA MONOPOLIES IN DIGITAL PLATFORM MARKETS – A DOCTRINAL INQUIRY INTO NON-PRICE HARMS AND REGULATORY GAPS, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (2) OF 2026, PG. 554-563, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.
Abstract
Digital markets increasingly operate through the accumulation and analysis of large datasets. Firms rely on data to improve algorithms, personalise services, and optimise digital platforms.[1] These developments have transformed competitive dynamics by introducing strong network effects and data-driven feedback loops.[2] Such dynamics enable firms to gain market power without necessarily increasing prices, thereby challenging traditional competition law frameworks that rely heavily on price-based indicators of dominance.
This paper examines whether the framework governing abuse of dominance under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 is capable of addressing market power arising from network effects and big data accumulation. Traditional competition law analysis focuses on price increases, supply restrictions, or exclusionary agreements as indicators of anti-competitive conduct.[3] However, digital platforms often provide services at zero monetary price while monetising user data through targeted advertising and algorithmic optimisation.[4] Consequently, conventional indicators of consumer harm may fail to capture competitive distortions arising in digital markets.
The research adopts a doctrinal methodology, analysing statutory provisions under the Competition Act along with interpretations by the Competition Commission of India. It further integrates economic literature on network effects and data-driven market power to examine structural characteristics of digital platforms. Academic literature demonstrates that data accumulation can generate entry barriers and reinforce market concentration through self-reinforcing network effects.[5]
The paper argues that Section 4 is structurally limited in addressing non-price harms arising from data concentration and network effects. The provision was designed for traditional markets where dominance is reflected through price manipulation or explicit exclusionary conduct. Digital platforms, however, often consolidate market power through data advantages and ecosystem lock-in rather than direct pricing strategies.[6]
The paper concludes that although the Competition Act theoretically applies to digital markets, its enforcement mechanisms require reinterpretation and potentially supplementary regulatory tools capable of recognising data-driven market power and network-based dominance.
Keywords Big Data, Network Effects, Digital Platforms, Com 2002, Market Power
[1] Garima Gupta, Does Big Data Provide a Competitive Advantage to Firms? An Antitrust Analysis, SSRN (2020).
[2] Inge Graef, Market Definition and Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms, 38 World Competition 473 (2015).
[3] Sumit Jain & Vikrant Singh, Competition in Digital Markets: An Indian Perspective (2024).
[4] Garima Gupta, supra note 1.
[5] Inge Graef, supra note 2.
[6] Id.