“RECALIBRATING FEDERAL BALANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPRAISAL OF CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS IN INDIA”

AUTHOR – A. ANTONY RAJ & R. PRIYANKA

LLM SCHOLARS AT TAMIL NADU DR.AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY

BEST CITATION – A. ANTONY RAJ & R. PRIYANKA, “RECALIBRATING FEDERAL BALANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPRAISAL OF CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS IN INDIA”, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 5 (8) OF 2025, PG. 231-239, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

Despite being based on the constitutional separation of powers between the Union and the States, India’s federal structure exhibits a clear centralizing bias. The framers’ concerns about separatist tendencies in a newly independent and diverse country, historical circumstances, and national integration initiatives all contributed to this viewpoint. Notwithstanding these beginnings, Indian federalism has developed into a vibrant and contentious area that is influenced by judicial decisions, budgetary agreements, and political events. By examining the constitutional design, specifically the Seventh Schedule, Articles 245 to 263, and emergency measures, as well as political and practical developments, this essay critically explores the structure of Center-State interactions in India.  It assesses how well federal institutions are operating and looks into the roles of important organizations including the Finance Commission, the GST Council, and the Inter-State Council.  Fiscal federalism and the escalating concerns about income distribution inequities, GST Council decision-making, and compensation disputes—particularly in the post-COVID era—are given particular focus.Historic rulings like S.R. Bommai v. Union of India and State of West Bengal v. Union of India, as well as more contemporary rulings like Union of India v. Mohit Minerals, address the judiciary’s function as a custodian of the constitution.  These decisions show how the judiciary is becoming more interventionist and less respectful in its approach to upholding constitutional balance and state autonomy. The Article also explores current conflicts, demonstrating the weakness of cooperative federalism, from the function of governors in states with opposition rule to unilateral legislative measures on topics on the State List and the repeal of essay 370.  In the end, the article makes the case for a revised version of Indian federalism based on sincere intergovernmental communication, openness in fiscal management, and judicial uniformity in upholding federal values.

Keywords: Indian Constitution, Federalism, Centre-State Relations, Judicial Pronouncements, Fiscal Federalism, Cooperative Governance, Political Federalism