“THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE AND THE MODERN INDIAN STATE: BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRATIC MANDATE”

“THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE AND THE MODERN INDIAN STATE: BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRATIC MANDATE”

“THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE AND THE MODERN INDIAN STATE: BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRATIC MANDATE”

AUTHOR – A ANTONY RAJ & PRIYANKA.R

LLM SCHOLARS AT TAMIL NADU DR.AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY

BEST CITATION – A ANTONY RAJ & PRIYANKA.R, “THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE AND THE MODERN INDIAN STATE: BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRATIC MANDATE”, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 5 (7) OF 2025, PG. 853-862 APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the Basic Structure Doctrine, a cornerstone of Indian constitutional law first articulated in the landmark Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala case. It explores how this doctrine limits the amending power of the Parliament by protecting certain inviolable features of the Constitution, such as the rule of law, democracy, secularism, federalism, and judicial independence. The paper also examines the doctrine’s judicial evolution through critical cases including Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, Minerva Mills, and Waman Rao, highlighting how courts have expanded and refined the scope of the basic structure to include both constitutional amendments and ordinary legislation when they undermine core constitutional principles.

In addition, the paper delves into contemporary constitutional controversies to illustrate the continued relevance of the doctrine. It includes the debate over madrasa regulation, where the balance between minority rights and state-imposed educational standards is scrutinized through cases like TMA Pai Foundation, Azmat Ullah, and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Madrasas. A significant part of the discussion also focuses on the Tamil Nadu Governor’s delay in assenting to state legislation, bringing to light the constitutional friction between executive discretion and legislative supremacy. Through these cases, the paper underscores the tension between parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review, and critically assesses concerns over judicial overreach.

The paper concludes by situating India’s experience within a broader comparative framework, referencing similar doctrines of constitutional limitation in countries like Germany and the United States. It argues that while the basic structure doctrine has been instrumental in safeguarding democracy and preventing authoritarianism, its continued use must be tempered with institutional restraint to maintain a balanced constitutional order.

Keywords

Basic Structure Doctrine; Judicial Review; Parliamentary Sovereignty; Governor’s Assent; Minority Educational Institutions; Constitutional Morality; Madrasas Regulation; Federalism; Rule of Law; Separation of Powers; Secularism; Kesavananda Bharati; Tamil Nadu Governor Case; Judicial Overreach; Constitutional Supremacy; NJAC Case; Educational Autonomy; Comparative Constitutional Law.